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ABSTRACT
The thesis begins by arguing for an a posteriori approach to
synonymy, according to which synonymy should be treated as an em¬
pirical phenomenon which it is the task of linguistic semantics to
explicate. Arguments are presented against the a priori approach
often underlying treatments of synonymy, which makes it possible to
define synonymy out of existence. A distinction is then drawn
between three possible levels of synonymy (i.e. lexeme-synonymy,
sense-synonymy and occurrence-synonymy), and it is argued that all
three should be treated as legitimate levels - occurrence-synonymy
as the basic level and the other two chiefly as a means of stating
synonymy-relations more economically, where appropriate. This is
followed by the establishment of two criteria of synonymy for ail
three levels. After discussion and (in some cases) re-definition
of various types of acceptability and anomaly, the interchange-
ability criterion is defined as the mutual substitutability of words
without causing either grammatical or collocational anomaly.
The sameness of meaning criterion is based on the distinctions
between pragmatic and analytic equivalence and between performance
and judgement equivalence, and is defined in terms of the first
alternative in each case. While my concern up to this point is
with the explication of synonymy, the remainder of the thesis is
devoted to its description. A distinction is drawn between two
types of case where two senses are synonymous in some contexts but
not in others. Two types of explanation are provided accordingly.
The thesis ends by discussing various types of communicatively
relevant difference between synonyms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION; GENERAL AIMS AND THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
1.1. General aim
The general aim of the present study is to try and clarify, sys¬
tematically and fairly comprehensively, certain questions concern¬
ing the definition (and explication) and description of synonymy as
a phenomenon in everyday communication in the English language (the
exact import of 'in everyday communication' will be explained in
1.2). Thus, when such terms as 'language' and 'native speakers' are
used in what follows, they are generally to be taken as pertaining
to English. However, although this study is specifically devoted to
English and although its results are entirely based on data drawn
from English, there is some reason to believe that some of these
results may apply more generally. But this is only a belief and
hope, and the results of the present study stand or fall with
reference to English alone.
By undertaking such a study, I am implicitly committed to three
claims; (1) that synonymy (in a sense yet to be spelt out) exists as
a phenomenon in everyday communication in English (and hence has
some psychological reality for speakers of the language); (2) that
synonymy (as such a phenomenon) is worth investigating; and (3) that
synonymy (as such a phenomenon) has not yet been thoroughly investi¬
gated.
It will be my concern in the remainder of this chapter to sub¬
stantiate these three claims by way of preparing the ground for the
subsequent investigation. Once this has been done, the more spe¬
cific aims of the present study will emerge at the end of this
chapter.
1.2. Synonymy exists as an empirical phenomenon in English
In the literature on the subject, particularly in the philo¬
sophical literature, one often come3 across conclusions to the
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effect that, or characterizations of synonymy from which it can be
inferred that, synonymy does not exist in natural language. Accord¬
ing to Goodman, to cite only one example, "if difference of meaning
is explained in the way I have proposed, then no two different words
have the same meaning" (1919s 6).
Now as a matter of straightforward reasoning, it is only possible
to deny the existence of synonymy as a phenomenon in natural language
if one adopts what may be called an a priori procedure, whereby one
establishes criteria of synonymity first and then applies these
preconceived criteria to natural language to determine whether
there are in fact expressions which satisfy these criteria (see p.11
on the difference between 'synonymy' and 'synonymity'). I have
found such a procedure to be fairly characteristic of philosophical
treatments of synonymy. Here, for example, is a revealing statement
by Mates:
It is important to observe that this very research could
hardly be carried out unless we possessed in advance a
sufficiently precise characterization of synonymity to
enable us to decide under what conditions we would regard
two expressions as synonymous for a given person (1969: 513).
In fact, it seems that philosophers seldom go beyond these cri¬
teria and apply them to natural language in earnest. On the rare
occasions when they have done so, they have usually been led, as in
the case of Goodman, to the conclusion that there are no synonyms
in natural language - that is, under such criteria as have been set
up beforehand.
It seems to me that to a greater or lesser extent linguists have
tended to follow essentially the same a -priori procedure, moving
from preconceived criteria to natural language data. Such a pro¬
cedure, for example, is reflected in the following observations by
Harris:
It is important to distinguish at the outset between two
related but separate issues: (i) whether or not any lan¬
guage could have expressions differing in form but not
in meaning, and (ii) whether or not any language does
have expressions differing in form but not in meaning.
The former is a matter of relations between definitions,
i.e. the only sense in which no language could have
expressions differing in form but not in meaning would be if
we chose to define 'form' and 'meaning' in such a way
that it followed from our definitions that any statement
to the effect that expressions a and b differed in form
but not in meaning would be self-contradictory. If, on
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the other hand, we do not so define 'form' and 'meaning'
the possibility is open that any language may have ex¬
pressions differing in form but not in meaning. The
question whether any language does have such expressions
is a subordinate question, in that whether it arises at
all depends on the answer propounded to the question of
definitions (1973s 5; cf. also Harris, 1973: 27).
Given this procedure, it is not surprising that some linguists -
such as Bloomfield (cf. Bloomfield, 1935: 145; Harris, 1973: 6-7),
Nida (cf. Harris, 1973: 14-; Lyons, 1963: 52-3), and Ullmann (cf.
Ullmann, 1957: 108-9), though not Harris himself - have ended up
drawing the conclusion that natural language has no room for the
phenomenon of synonymy (or total synonymy).
Although, as we have just seen, the denial of the existence of
synonymy as a phenomenon in natural language entails the adoption of
an a -priori procedure, the converse does not hold. For it is per¬
fectly possible, again as a matter of straightforward reasoning, for
preconceived criteria of synonymity to be satisfied by expressions
subsequently to be found in natural language. Thus, on its own, the
procedure whereby synonymity criteria are set up prior to the inves¬
tigation of natural language does not necessarily rule out the exist¬
ence of synonymy in natural language, but instead leaves open the
question whether there are synonyms in natural language and, in so
doing, makes a negative answer possible. Whether or not a negative
answer is in fact reached depends, therefore, on the actual criteria
worked out in this a priori approach.
Within the a priori approach, there have generally been, as Lyons
has pinpointed (1963: 74), two assumptions, invoked seperately or
together, on the basis of which synonymy has actually been defined
out of existence. One assumption is that to qualify as synonyms
two expressions must be identical not only in cognitive meaning but
also in such other respects as have customarily been subsumed under
the vague, all-embracing rubric of 'connotative• meaning. This
assumption is now generally regarded as unjustified. The same,
however, cannot be said of the other assumption, namely, that two
expressions cannot be treated as synonymous in one context unless
they are synonymous in all contexts. Lyons (1963; 1968) has fur¬
nished a number of cogent arguments against this assumption, to
which I will in the course of the present study add some further
arguments of my own.
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While following Lyons in rejecting these two assumptions, I will
also take the more radical step of rejecting the underlying a priori
approach as such for any linguistic treatment of synonymy. In fact,
I reject the a priori approach regardless of the fact that it can
give rise, and has given rise, to criteria which rule out the exist¬
ence of synonymy in natural language. My ground for such an out¬
right rejection is that synonymy is (best conceived as) an empirical
phenomenon, whose existence is therefore given and not open to ques¬
tion.
To prove that synonymy exists as an empirical phenomenon in every¬
day communication in natural language, it is sufficient to show,
first, that a certain phenomenon exists in natural language and,
second,that it is in accordance with the condition of material ad¬
equacy (cf. Lyons, 1963: 5-7; Naess, 1957) to describe this phenom¬
enon by means of the term 'synonymy'. Methodologically we may
assume a prior criterion of synonymity and try to determine, first,
whether this criterion permits the identification of a certain phe¬
nomenon in natural language and second, whether, if a certain phe¬
nomenon is thus identified, it can be described as 'synonymy' with¬
out breaching the condition of material adequacy.
The criterion I have in mind (to be elaborated later) is roughly
as follows:
In a given sentence used in a given context, two expressions
are synonymous in the sentence if and only if they are
sufficiently similar in meaning and other possibly relevant
respects to be interchangeable in that sentence and to help
convey what would pass for the same meaning in the context
in question by the standard of actual everyday communication.
Note that this criterion differs from certain widely held criteria,
in that it does not insist on the unconditional total absence of dif¬
ference in cognitive meaning, let alone non-cognitive meaning, as
a necessary condition of synonymy.
Under this assumed criterion, synonymy is not only permitted but
is a very widespread phenomenon indeed. As a simple illustration,
give any normal literate native speaker of English a sufficiently
long (say two hundred words) piece of normal English text, and he
will be able, while keeping the structure of the sentences unchanged,
to replace many words or expressions in the text with different
words or expressions without either making the sentences in question
awkward or distorting the meaning of the sentences as they are used
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in the text.
Nor need this be a hypothetical situation. To appreciate this,
one needs only to realize that a great deal of our language activ¬
ity amounts to, or consists in, recounting what we have heard or
read. In the course of our everyday use of language, we convey
messages, retell stories, pass on information and engage in count¬
less other similar activities. In all these activities it is
extremely common for us to use different words to express what in
everyday communication is taken to be the same meaning. In so doing,
we have plenty of room, as it were, for linguistic manoeuvre before
we become open to the charge of misrepresentation. It is true that
the use of different words is often accompanied by the use of dif¬
ferent sentence structures, but (l) this is not invariably the case
and (2) when this is the case it is not invariably necessary. To
the extent of (1) and (2), the use of different words to express
the same meaning constitutes evidence, under our assumed criterion,
of the phenomenon of synonymy as it manifests itself in everyday
communication. Similar evidence is also available in the shape of
other facts, which it is not necessary to go into.
But even if the phenomenon of synonymy was not manifested in
everyday communication, this would constitute no proof that the phe¬
nomenon of synonymy does not exist under our assumed criterion. For
what ultimately matters in the present connection is not the actual¬
ity but the potentiality of synonym substitution; and, as our
earlier, hypothetical, illustration shows, the potentiality of syn¬
onym substitution is clearly present in a natural language such as
English.
Now that we have shown that our assumed criterion is not open to
objection on the ground of not permitting the phenomenon of syn¬
onymy in natural language, we may turn to other grounds on which
our assumed criterion may be open to objection. But first it is as
well to point out that our assumed criterion is in fact one which
has been arrived at in an effort to explicate synonymy as a phenom¬
enon in everyday communication in natural language and is one which,
once it has been further elaborated and slightly modified (as re¬
gards interchangeability), will be adopted in the present study.
There is thus all the more reason to make sure that this criterion
is free from objection.
The grounds on which our criterion may be found objectionable are
essentially two, of which one bears on the question whether the phe¬
nomenon of synonymy exists in natural language, while the other does
not.
Let us deal with the latter possible ground for objection first,
namely, that our criterion is such as to leave out certain cases
which ought to be included within the phenomenon of synonymy. Among
these, in fact, would be many words and expressions which have been
treated as synonyms by linguists, psychologists and, particularly,
lexicographers and synonymists (i.e. compilers of 'dictionaries of
synonyms'). As an answer to this objection, it will suffice to make
it clear that I am far from pretending that what is circumscribed
by my criterion as the object of the present study constitutes the
entire phenomenon of synonymy (in English), Once this point has
been made clear, it only remains to show that it is part of what it
is in accordance with the condition of material adequacy to refer
to as the phenomenon of synonymy. This brings us to the other
ground on which our criterion may be found objectionable.
On this other ground it may be questioned whether, in treating
what this criterion identifies as the phenomenon of synonymy, we
have not stretched the term 'synonymy' to such an extent that we
are in breach of the condition of material adequacy. The answer to
this question clearly bears on our original question as to whether
synonymy exists as an empirical phenomenon in natural language. For
if the answer is in the affirmative, we cannot claim to have demon¬
strated the existence of synonymy in natutal language as opposed to
something which we are merely wrongly referring to as 'synonymy'.
In meeting this potential objection concerning material adequacy,
the first thing to note is that as a matter of established usage
the term 'synonymy' and its cognates have been employed to desig¬
nate phenomena of varying scopes - that is, by people who do not
dispute the existence of synonyms. Without going into subtleties,
it will suffice for our present purpose to mention two well-estab¬
lished ways of employing the term 'synonymy' and its cognates.
The first is more or less characteristic of the practice of syn¬
onymists and lexicographers. The following definition, taken from
Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms (henceforth to be referred to
as Webster), may serve as a good example:
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A synonym, in this dictionary, will always mean one of two
or more words in the English language which have the same
or very nearly the same essential meaning (p. 21a).
The second, equally well-established, is typically to be found in
the practice of certain linguists. A good example is provided by
Crystal, according to whom:
Synonymy can be said to occur if items are close enough in
their meaning to allow a choice to be made between them in
some contexts, without there being any difference for the
meaning of the sentence as a whole (1980: 345).
Given that these two definitions represent well-established ways
of employing the term 'synonymy' and its cognates, for the purpose
of demonstrating the material adequacy of our criterion of synonymy
it will be sufficient to demonstrate its affinity to one or both of
the above two definitions, and this we can do by simply placing it
side by side with the latter.
While their affinity is obvious, it is equally obvious that the
two definitions quoted above differ from each other and that our
criterion differs in turn from both. Broadly speaking, the two defi¬
nitions differ from each other in that the first, unlike the second,
insists neither on interchangeability nor on the total absence of
difference in meaning. To this extent, the first definition imposes
a less strict criterion than the second. The second definition, on
the other hand, further differs from the first in that, instead of
treating synonymy independently of sentence and context as the first
definition does, it treats synonymy as sentence- and context-bound,
whereby for two expressions to be synonymous in one sentence and
context it is not necessary for them to be synonymous in other sen¬
tences and contexts. In this respect, the second definition imposes
a less strict criterion than the first.
Of these two definitions, our criterion is obviously closer to
the second than to the first. However, it differs from the second
definition (if this is construed in a certain way) in an important
yet subtle respect. By way of clarifying what is meant by 'in
everyday communication', we must now look into this difference. Our
definition, it will be recalled, does not insist on the uncondi¬
tional total absence of difference in cognitive meaning as a necess¬
ary condition of synonymy. That this is so is reflected in the
following words in our criterion, namely, "to help convey what would
pass for the same meaning in the context in question by the standard
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of everyday communication". These words imply that for two ex¬
pressions to help convey the same meaning in a sentence and context
by the standard of everyday communication is not the same as for
two expressions to help convey the same meaning in a sentence and
context by the standard of close, leisurely examination. Conse¬
quently, expressions which would count as synonyms in the one case
may well fail to do so in the other. Here our criterion leans
somewhat in the direction of the Webster definition, to the extent
that the latter contains the words "very nearly the same ... mean¬
ing".
It is not absolutely clear how Crystal's definition is intended
to be construed in this regard, though on the face of it Crystal
seems to be insisting on the total absence of difference in cogni¬
tive meaning as a necessary condition of synonymy when he says "...
without there being any difference for the meaning of the sentence
as a whole". But "without there being any difference" by what
standard? If the intended standard is that of close, leisurely
examination, then Crystal's definition clearly imposes a stricter
criterion than ours, and it must be said of it that it does not
explicate synonymy an as empirical phenomenon in everyday communi¬
cation. If, on the other hand, the intended circumstances consist
in the standard of everyday communication, then Crystal's defini¬
tion imposes roughly the same criterion as ours, but in this case
it must be said of it that it is rather misleading.
In fact, I feel that Crystal and those subscribing to essentially
the same definition seem to want to have the best of both worlds.
On the one hand, they seem to deliberately insist on the uncondi¬
tional absence of difference in cognitive meaning. On the other
hand, their actual examples of synonyms (such as 'range' and 'se¬
lection' in 'What a nice of flowers', instanced by Crystal)
lead one to infer that the standard of everyday communication is
in fact what they have in mind, for otherwise what they have singled
out as examples of synonyms and as their chosen explicanda would
not count as synonyms.
It is important that such ambivalence should give way to a
definite choice between the two different interpretations. I think
that if Crystal and others could be persuaded to concede the point
being made here, they would probably say that what they have in
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mind is indeed the standard of everyday communication and so choose
the weaker interpretation. Whether they would do so or not, this
is how our criterion is to be construed.
It may be asked, of course, whether what is permitted by the
weaker interpretation but excluded by the stronger interpretation
should not be referred to with some such term as 'near-synonymy',
given that two degrees of synonymity are already apparent, of which
the one corresponding to the weaker interpretation is the less
strict. The answer is 'No'. I am aware that there are many points
of view, degree of synonymity being one, from which the phenomenon
of synonymy identified by our criterion may be divided into sub-
phenomena. I will take up some of these points of view in the
course of the present study. However, there is an important sense
in which the the phenomenon identified by our criterion is homo¬
geneous: by the standard of everyday communication, which is what
is taken to be important in the present study, all that falls
within its range counts as sameness of meaning. For this reason,
the entire phenomenon will be referred to as 'synonymy' without
qualifications.
Not only is our criterion materially adequate by virtue of its
affinity to well-established ways of employing the term 'synonymy'
and its cognates on the part of synonymists and linguists, its
claim to material adequacy is also based on its correspondence to
the way in which the term and its cognates are employed by lay
native speakers. To prove this, let us revert to the hypothetical
illustration used earlier. All we have to do now is to phrase it
in a slightly different way, as follows: Give any normal literate
adult native speaker of English who knows the term 'synonymous' a
sufficiently long (say two hundred words) piece of English text,
and he will be able, while keeping the structure of the sentences
unchanged, to replace many words or expressions in the text with
what he considers to be 'synonymous' words or expressions. Then
a careful look will reveal that at least some of the 'synonymous'
words or expressions that have been produced in this way help to
convey what would pass for the same meaning only by the standard
of everyday communication, ana not by the standard of close,
leisurely examination.
In fact, similar proof of the material adequacy of our criterion
can also be found in the way in which the term 'synonym' and its
cognates are sometimes employed by linguists, as when they give ex¬
amples of synonyms, such as 'range' and 'selection', which are sub¬
ject to the same analysis that we have just seen applies to examples
of synonyms provided by lay native speakers.
Having, I think, demonstrated the existence of synonymy as a
phenomenon in everyday communication in a natural language like
English, I do not deny that there may be good reasons for philosophi¬
cal treatments not to be concerned, or primarily concerned, with
what I have been referring to as the empirical phenomenon of syn¬
onymy, conceived in whatever scope. But then this is because phil¬
osophers engage in the study of synonymity largely, though not
exclusively, in order to solve philosophical problems. Owing to
the nature of their interest, it may be perfectly justifiable, in
some cases, for philosophers to adopt an a priori approach despite
the existence of synonymy as an empirical phenomenon.
\Whether or not this is so, I can see no reason, particularly
given the existence of synonymy as an empirical phenomenon, for
linguistic studies of synonymy to be conducted in an a priori
spirit. For from the point of view of linguistic semantics, there
seems to be little point in trying at length to define something
that does not or may not exist, that bears or may bear no relation
to the facts of natural language. To this extent, the a priori
procedure is clearly, misguided; even if and when such a procedure
does not actually rule out synonyms in natural language, it is
still to be rejected for putting the cart before the horse. In¬
stead of moving from preconceived criteria of synonymity to natu¬
ral language data, it is more in keeping with the nature of lin¬
guistic semantics to adopt the opposite, a posteriori, approach,
whereby we start by taking the phenomenon of synonymy as given
and then try to explicate it by setting up criteria of synonymy.
Briefly then, the a priori approach consists in saying: Let us
define synonymy as such-and-such a meaning-relation; does it
exist? The a -posteriori approach, on the other hand, consists in
saying: Synonymy exists, e.g. ...; what sort of meaning-relation
is it?
It is true that once we have worked out such criteria of syn¬
onymy it will be necessary to apply them to natural language data.
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But in doing this our aim will be not to determine whether there
are synonyms in natural language but to check the adequacy of syn¬
onymy criteria against empirical data whose existence has already
been established. If no synonyms are allowed under such criteria,
we are not to conclude that natural language contains no synonyms
but only to infer that the criteria themselves are inadequate.
So far I have used both 'synonymy' and 'synonymity' in referring
to sameness of meaning. As I use these terms, they are not in free
variation. By way of underlining the distinction between the
a priori and the a posteriori approaches to synonymy, it may be
helpful now to spell out in what way I see the two terms as dif¬
ferent.
To begin with, both 'synonymy' and 'synonymity' denote the
relation of sameness of meaning, with 'synonyms' denoting the
expressions that enter into this relation. The difference between
'synonymy' and 'synonymity' lies in the way in which the relation
of sameness of meaning is to be construed in each case: 'synonymy'
denotes the relation of sameness of meaning as a phenomenon or
fact, whereas 'synonymity' denotes the relation of sameness of
meaning as a property or concept. As a phenomenon, synonymy em¬
bodies numerous characteristics or features, of which the essen¬
tial or defining ones make up the property of synonymity. It is
clear, then, that synonymy entails synonymity, but not conversely.
For it is possible for there to be a property without there being
a corresponding phenomenon, whereas it is not possible for there
to be a phenomenon without there being a corresponding property,
difficult though it may be to extract the latter from the former.
(I have, incidentally, also used 'synonymy' as a cover-term for
the fact and the property of being synonymous.)
In the light of the difference between the two terms, we may now
characterize the a priori and the a posteriori approaches respect¬
ively in the following way. The a priori approach takes the prop¬
erty of synonymity as its point of departure, thus leaving it open
whether there is the corresponding phenomenon of synonymy. The
a posteriori approach, on the other hand, takes the phenomenon of
synonymy as its point of departure and then explicates it by try¬
ing to arrive at the corresponding property of synonymity. From
this point onward I will for the most part use only 'synonymy', as
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it will be clear in each case from the context whether it is the
phenomenon that is in question or the property, or both.
I hope to have shown that synonymy exists as an empirical phe¬
nomenon in everyday communication in natural language and that,
given this, linguistic treatments of the subject should, accordingly,
be of an empirical rather than fundamentally conceptual character.
This, at least, is the premise on which I intend to proceed in the
present study.
1.3. Why synonymy is worth investigating
There are various points of view from which the question of syn¬
onymy has been found worthy of investigation. But broadly speaking,
studies that have been undertaken on the subject can be seen as
falling into two types.
To the first type belong those treatments in which synonymy is
studied not for its own sake but for some other purpose. In lin¬
guistic philosophy, for example, we find numerous treatments of
synonymy with a view to elucidating the concept of analytic truth
(cf. Cooper, 1973a: 161; Olds, 1956: 473-4)• Another example comes
from the field of psychology, where synonymy has been used to throw
light on the mode of sentence memory (cf. Brewer, 1975)*
The second type consists of treatments where synonymy is studied
for its own sake, as something intrinsically worthy of investigation.
In the linguistic literature, the question of synonymy has some¬
times been raised in the context of other linguistic concerns, for
example phonology (cf. Harris, 1973; 21). Here we have a situation
where synonymy is approached as a problem bearing on linguistic
(as opposed to philosophical or psychological) matters, but not for
its own sake. However, with the exception of such studies, treat¬
ments of synonymy in the linguistic literature belong predominantly
to the second type, where they ought to belong.
The present study belongs also to the second type, in that it is
concerned with the question of synonymy for its own sake.
There is, however, a further complication, in that cutting across
this dichotomy is another dichotomy, already discussed in the last
section, which consists in the distinction between the a priori
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approach and the a posteriori approach.
As we have already stated, the approach followed in the present
study is of the a posteriori type, where the object of investigation
is synonymy as an empirical phenomenon (in English).
Put in this way, the object of our investigation is still not
specific enough. For, again as we have seen in the last section,
the phenomenon of synonymy may be conceived, in yet a further di¬
chotomy, either as something conforming to some absolute standard
or as something conforming to the standard of everyday communica¬
tion.
As we have seen, it is the second way of conceiving the phenom¬
enon of synonymy that we will adopt in the present study.
Now that we have spelt out our position on each of the three
dichotomies, we may formulate the general nature and aim of the
present study thus: to study synonymy (l) for its own sake (2) as
an empirical phenomenon (in English) (3) in actual everyday com¬
munication.
And, having formulated the general nature and aim of the pre¬
sent study in this way, I believe it would be superfluous to argue
that the question of synonymy (as we conceive it) is worth inves¬
tigating.
1.4-. The need for further research
Let us begin by distinguishing two questions, of which the
first is "What are synonyms?" and the second is "How do synonyms
behave?". The first question requires as an answer a definition
(and explication) of synonymy, while an answer to the second ques¬
tion will constitute a description of synonymy. It is clear that
an answer to the second question depends on a prior answer to the
first. For a description of synonymy presupposes some prior defi¬
nition of synonymy, though not necessarily a precise one, which
will serve to identify and delimit the data for description.
There is a tendency for treatments of synonymy, particularly in
the philosophical literature, but also in the linguistic literature,
to be concerned solely with definition. In the case of linguistic
philosophy, this is perfectly understandable, since there the
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subject is studied not for its own sake but in order to shed light
on philosophical problems. This exclusive concern with definition
is also perfectly understandable in the case of the philosophy of
language. For although there synonymy is studied for its own sake,
the aim is confined to explicating or clarifying synonymity as an
existing concept.
In the case of the linguistic study of synonymy for its own
sake, however, it is clearly not enough simply to work out a defi¬
nition. Instead, a complete account should also include a descrip¬
tion.
In this connection, a rough analogy with, say, the study of
verbs may be helpful. When one's aim is to study verbs for their
own sake, one will clearly not be content simply to have a defini¬
tion of verbs - in other words, simply to know what sort of things
verbs are. Imagine how absurd it would be for a book purporting
to be a full account of verbs to provide only a definition, however
elaborate and profound it might be. A full account of verbs, I
think everyone will agree, must contain a description of how verbs
behave. Essentially the same, it seems to me, applies to the study
of synonyms, though with certain qualifications which I will mention
later.
At this point, however, the analogy breaks down, as we notice an
important difference between the two cases. In the case of the
study of verbs, it is clear and agreed what sort of things verbs
are, insofar as verbs can be identified without controversy. There
is thus little need to work out a definition of verbs if our aim is
to describe how verbs behave. The same, however, cannot be said of
synonyms, regarding whose identity controversy abounds. It is thus
a prerequisite to set up a definition of synonymy by way of ident¬
ifying the phenomenon to be described before we are able properly
to proceed with the task of description.
As far as the definition of synonymy is concerned, although
numerous attempts have been made, there exists no definition that
is embraced universally and without reservations. This is not sur¬
prising, given the fundamental difference between the a -priori
approach and the a posteriori approach. But even quite apart from
this, a number of important questions remain unresolved. Before
I mention some of these, it is as well to point out that many
definitions that have been offered are, strictly speaking, not defi¬
nitions but mere glosses, in that they are couched in terms which
are themselves vague and in need of explication. For definitions
of synonymy to count as adequate, such intuitively clear but oper¬
ationally untestable terms as 'meaning' must, as a minimum, be
reduced to some more objectively accessible terms of reference.
A kind of definition which commands wide support and which I
think offers the best chance of success (with regard to both ma¬
terial and operational adequacy) is in terms of 'interchangeability'
plus 'mutual entailment' (or 'bilateral implication'). It is along
the lines of this kind of definition, broadly speaking, that I shall
proceed in the present study. But even with this kind of definition
certain difficulties or uncertainties remain. For example, should
synonymy be seen as a context-free or as a context-bound meaning-
relation? What exactly is meant by 'interchangeability'? And how
exactly is 'mutual entailment' to be construed? Questions like
these, which are important for a proper understanding of synonymy,
have not been sufficiently discussed, or have not been thoroughly
resolved, or have not even been clearly raised. As part of the
present study I will try and make a small contribution to the search
for a better solution to these and other related questions. From
this contribution it is hoped that a clear and comprehensive defi¬
nition of synonymy will emerge, which will serve as the basis for
some subsequent work in the present study on the description of
synonymy.
Of the studies so far carried out on synonymy, more seem to have
been devoted to its definition than to its description. In the
main, I think, there are two reasons for this. In the first place,
as far as studies in the philosophical literature are concerned,
we have already seen that the description of synonymy lies outside
the proper concerns of both linguistic philosophy and the philosophy
of language. In the second place, as far as studies in the lin¬
guistic literature are concerned, these are usually undertaken as
part of (cognitive) semantics. If side by side with this we put
the fact that the description of synonymy (over and above its
definition and explication) is largely of a non-semantic character
(see Chapter 8), it will be self-evident why, though integral to
a full linguistic account of synonymy, the description of synonymy
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has not received as much attention in the linguistic literature as
might have been expected.
In view of this state of affairs, at least as much work requires
to be done on the description of synonymy as on its definition. But
there are a couple of more specific reasons why I consider this to
be the case as far as the present study is concerned. The first
reason derives from the dependence of description on definition.
We have already seen that the nature and scope of a description of
synonymy depends on the phenomenon that has been identified and
delimited by a prior definition. Thus, if and when two persons dif¬
fer in what they regard as synonyms, it is inevitable that at least
part of what falls within the scope of description for one person
will lie outside the scope of description for the other. This, I
think, applies to what I conceive as the scope of description vis-a¬
vis the tacit conception underlying most other work on the descrip¬
tion of synonymy. The kind of facts which in this way come more or
less exclusively under my scope of description will thus receive
treatment in the present study which they either have not received
at all or have not received in sufficient depth or detail.
The second reason is to do with the fact that synonymy has
tended to be studied, not as a heterogeneous phenomenon cutting
across various fields, but in and as part of some larger or related
field, such as semantics, stylistics (cf. Ullmann, 1964) or collo¬
cation. As a result, work carried out on the description of syn¬
onymy tends to be of a somewhat piecemeal character, insufficiently
systematic or comprehensive; and what is lacking is a unifying
perspective which brings together, and in so doing sheds greater
light on, the diverse aspects of synonymy - semantic, syntactic,
collocational and stylistic - which require description. In the
present study an attempt will be made to go some way towards pro¬
viding just such a perspective.
Thus, strictly speaking, the present study is not, as might be
expected, of a purely semantic nature. The unifying point of view
is not semantics, nor any other independent field, but the unified
yet heterogeneous phenomenon of synonymy itself - in a sense similar
to that in which the unifying point of view in a comprehensive
study of verbs is the phenomenon of verbs itself.
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1.5. More specific aims
We stated the general aim of the present study in 1.1. We are
now in a position to give this general aim more substance by break¬
ing it down into two more specific aims.
The first of these aims is to arrive at a systematic and com¬
prehensive definition of synonymy. Let me point out here that I
do not see much intrinsic value in a definition of synonymy as such.
Rather, I regard a definition of synonymy as valuable, first, to
the extent that it is successful in explicating synonymy as an
empirical phenomenon, and synonymity as an intuitive notion. But
a successful explication is bound to go beyond (and is here intended
to go beyond) what is ordinarily understood as definition, thus
shading into description. I regard a definition of synonymy as valu¬
able, secondly, to the extent that it is successful in identifying
and delimiting the phenomenon which will then become the object of
description. In this the role of definition is important, even
indispensable, but also only ancillary.
My second aim in the present study is to provide a systematic
and comprehensive description of synonymy - over ana above what
description is already contained in the definition (as explication).
Description being dependent on definition, the nature and scope of
the description has not been specified in this introductory chapter
and must remain obscure until a definition of synonymy is firmly
established.






DEFINITION AS ELUCIDATION OF A FORMULA
To approach a definition of synonymy, I have found it helpful to
start consciously from an abstract formula: A = B. A comprehensive
and systematic elucidation of this formula would, in my view, con¬
stitute a complete definition and explication of synonymy. In such
an elucidation our aim, to put it at its most general, is to arrive
at a precise notion as to (1) what (kind of units) A and B stand
for, and (2) what the equation sign stands for.
To be more specific, question (l) can, in turn, be divided into
two sub-questions: (la) what kind of syntactic units do A and B
stand for? and (lb) what kind of lexical units do A and B stand for?
Question (la) is a straightforward one. A more explicit way of
putting it, to adopt a common view of the hierarchical structure of
sentences, is simply: Is synonymy conceived as a meaning-relation
between morphemes, words, phrases, clauses, or sentences, or all of
these? In the literature on the subject synonymy is usually con¬
ceived as a meaning-relation between words, or as a meaning-relation
concerning words and phrases subsumed indiscriminately under 'ex¬
pressions', while sentence-synonymy (of various kinds) usually goes
under the name of 'paraphrase1. In the present study synonymy is
conceived primarily as a relation between words. I say 'primarily'
because the scope of the present study occasionally extends to
certain types of phrase which are excluded by the syntactic unit of
word but which, from a purely lexical point of view, are on a par
with words. Thus, a full answer to (la) would be that synonymy is
conceived in the present study as a meaning-relation between lexical
items, within which our emphasis will be on words. In giving this
answer we have obviously departed from the strictly syntactic nature
of the question, but for our purpose this inconsistency is immaterial.
Question (la) is uncontroversial, and the usefulness of an answer
to it lies only in helping to delimit one's object of study, if
such delimitation is intended, as it is in the present study. Thus,
having provided an answer to it, I will not be further concerned
with this question.
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Once we have established the relevant syntactic unit as word
(to be construed as "lexical items, but esp. words"), there immedi¬
ately arises a further, much more complex question, which is in
fact (lb), namely: What lexical units do A and B stand for? Perhaps
'lexical' is not a very appropriate epithet here, but what this
question means will become clear presently.
The question arises as a result of two factors: polysemy on the
one hand, and something of the type-token distinction on the other.
When account is taken of polysemy, A and B may each stand for two
different lexical units. In the first place, A and B may each
stand for a lexeme, polysemous or otherwise. In the second place,
A and B may each stand for all those occurrences of a lexeme which
share one submeaning of that lexeme where two or more submeanings
attach to it. I will refer to such a unit as a sense, which in the
present study is a lexical unit and is therefore not to be confused
with the standard use of 'sense' in linguistics to mean "meaning".
If we now bring in the second factor, there emerges yet a third
possibility. Thus, A and B may each stand for a particular occur¬
rence of a sense or of a lexeme. This gives us, on the same syn¬
tactic level of word, three different possible lexical levels of
synonymy, which we may refer to as lexeme-synonymy, sense-synonymy
and occurrence-synonymy respectively. (I use 'word' for two pur¬
poses: first, for referring to the syntactic unit of word in con¬
tradistinction to phrase, sentence, etc., and secondly, as a con¬
venient non-technical cover-term for lexeme, sense and occurrence.)
Thus, to be more explicit, question (lb) may now be rendered as:
Is synonymy actually to be conceived as a meaning-relation between
lexemes, senses, or occurrences, or all of these? This is a com¬
plex and controversial question, my answer to which I shall not
give here but will provide in Chapters 3 and 1.
So far I have identified three lexical levels and three corre¬
sponding possible lexical levels of synonymy only in a very sche¬
matic way. I will try and clarify the exact nature of these levels
in the next chapter. In the meantime it should be stressed that
the distinction between lexemes and senses on the one hand and
occurrences on the other is only like the distinction between
types and tokens. This will become clear in the next chapter,
where we shall see in particular that occurrences are not tokens.
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We may now turn our attention to question (2), namely: What does
the equation sign stand for? From various treatments of synonymy
in the literature, particularly those by linguists and philosophers,
it appears that the equation sign may stand roughly for one or more
of three distinct but related conditions of synonymy:
(2a) that A and B are interchangeable;
(2b) that A and B have the same cognitive meaning;
(2c) that A and B have the same connotative meaning
(1connotative' being used here as a blanket term for
all aspects of meaning other than cognitive meaning).
These three conditions are not of equal weight. The general
pattern is that when only one condition is regarded as necessary
it is certain to be (2b); when two conditions are regarded as
necessary there tends to be a conjunction of (2a) and (2b); only
when all three conditions are regarded as necessary, is (2c) finally
included. The number of conditions judged to be necessary is a
measure of the 'strength' of the synonymy criterion imposed on A
and B.
It seems that most definitions of synonymy (esp. those by lin¬
guists and philosophers) can be characterized by seeing which and
how many of the conditions under (2) are considered necessary for
'A = B' to hold, and by seeing which lexical units under (1) - i.e.
(la) lexeme, (lb) sense, and (lc) occurrence - A and B are taken to
be. To illustrate, here are three different definitions of synonymy:
Synonyms, in the narrowest sense, are separate words whose
meaning, both denotation and connotation, is identical, so
that one can always be substituted for the other without
change in the effect of the sentence in which it is done
(Modern English Usage: 611).
Two expressions are synonymous in a language L if and only
if they may be interchanged in each sentence in L without
altering the truth value of that sentence (Mates, 1969: 54-9).
If there is one or more environment in which two lexemes
are substitutable for each other without any change in
COGNITIVE meaning, then they are synonymous in that en¬
vironment or those environments (Bennett, 1968: 158).
I have cited these definitions in descending order of strength: the
first may be characterized in terms of (2a), (2b), (2c), and (la)
or (lb); the second in terms of (2a), (2b), and (la) or (lb); and
the third in terms of (2a), (2b) and (lc).
The identification of conditions of synonymy is helpful as far as
it goes. However, the very conditions themselves are not as trans-
- 21 -
parent as they might appear, and they are not matched with precise,
universally-agreed interpretations. Both as a result and as evi¬
dence of this, definitions of synonymy differ (or potentially dif¬
fer in the case of non-explicated definitions) not only in the
number of conditions they consist of, but also as regards the way
in which the relevant conditions are intended to be construed. It
is therefore not enough simply to name the conditions that make up
one's definition: it is also necessary to provide clear interpre¬
tations, without which the conditions will remain vague and not
very helpful.
As far as the number of conditions regarded as necessary in the
present study is concerned, I follow a widespread practice in the
linguistic and philosophical literature (which I do not consider it
necessary to justify) in not regarding (2c), i.e. identical con-
notative meaning, as a necessary condition. There is thus no need
for me to provide an interpretation for this condition. At the
same time, I depart somewhat from a widespread practice in the lin¬
guistic and philosophical literature (for reasons which will become
clear in Chapter 7) in not insisting on an absolutely clear-cut
distinction between cognitive and connotative meaning. Subject to
this qualification, I conceive synonymy as a matter of cognitive
meaning.
At this point our remaining, and much more substantial, tasks
concerning the definition and explication of synonymy are three:
first, to decide which lexical units (i.e. lexeme, sense, or occur¬
rence, or all of these) A and B should be conceived as standing for
(question (lb)); secondly, to furnish a precise interpretation of
'being interchangeable' (condition (2a)); and, finally, to furnish
a precise interpretation of 'having the same cognitive meaning'
(condition (2b)). These three tasks will receive our attention in
Chapters 3 and A, 6, and 7 respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
LEXICAL UNITS AND DEFINITION
3.1. Three levels of synonymy
In the last chapter we drew a threefold distinction between
what we referred to as lexeme-synonymy, sense-synonymy and occur¬
rence-synonymy, This distinction is more complex and problematic
than it might appear at first sight, and we must examine the three
individual levels more closely.
The threefold distinction between lexeme-synonymy, sense-syn
onymy and occurrence-synonymy is best viewed in the first instance
as arising out of the conventional dictionary, where many identical
forms are set up as separate entries, and where under most entries
are listed a number of submeanings, sometimes further divided and
even subdivided. In the course of elaborating the threefold dis¬
tinction viewed in this way I hope to provide a useful background
against which subsequently to examine and assess various approaches
to synonymy as regards the nature of the lexical units involved.
In particular, I hope to uncover certain problems which any approach
to synonymy must avoid or overcome if it is to count as adequate.
In the context of the conventional dictionary, A and B can be
given a wider or narrower scope. In the first place, A ana B may
each stand for a lexeme in the sense of an entire dictionary entry,
polysemous or otherwise. This, we must note, presupposes the dis¬
tinction between homonyray and polysemy. In the case of the con¬
ventional dictionary such a distinction is drawn in a somewhat
informal and inconsistent manner. To qualify as adequate, any
approach to synonymy which makes this presupposition must be
equipped with a principled way of determining lexeme-identity.
In the second place, A and B may each stand for a single sense
of a lexeme where more than one submeaning, each corresponding to
a sense (as we employ the term 'sense'), is listed under its entry.
Independently of the practice of lexicographers, we may define a
sense as those occurrences of a polysemous lexeme sharing a sub-
meaning of that lexeme which it is considered appropriate to enter
into the lexicon. It is important to note that to conceive synonymy
- 23 -
as a meaning-relation between senses presupposes the notion of pol¬
ysemy whereby the meaning of a lexeme is treated as divisible into
a finite number of distinct submeanings. Here again the conven¬
tional dictionary is backed up neither by a theoretical justifica¬
tion of finite polysemy nor by any wholly systematic procedure for
dividing the meaning of a lexeme into its various submeanings. To
qualify as adequate, any approach to synonymy which relies on the
concept of finite polysemy must be free from these objections.
Finally, if in addition to lexemes and senses we also bring in
the distinction between these units on the one hand and their indi¬
vidual occurrences on the other, A and B may be given a yet narrow¬
er scope. That is, A and B may each stand for an individual occur¬
rence of a lexeme or of a sense of a lexeme. We must now explain
what kind of lexical unit an occurrence exactly is.
As we conceive it, every occurrence is embedded in a sentence
(i.e. a text-sentence as defined in Lyons, 1977: 29-30), which is
in turn actually or potentially embedded in a text (the limiting
case being none) and a context-of-situation ('context' for short),
actual or imagined. A context-of-situation is made up of all the
features relevant to the understanding of the sentence. Of such
features, two are an addresser on the one hand and one or more
addressees on the other, with all that these roles involve, such
as the encoding intention of the addresser and the decoding capac¬
ity or habits of the addressee(s). For convenience, however, I
will treat addresser and addressee, not as components of a context-
of-situation, but as separate factors. Thus every occurrence (l)
is embedded in a sentence, (2) is embedded, via the sentence in
which it is embedded, in a text, (3) is embedded, via the sentence
and text in which it is embedded, in a context-of-situation, (4)
implies an actual or imagined addresser, and (5) implies one or
more actual or imagined addressees. Having distinguished these
five components in the characterization of occurrence, I will for
the most part in what follows idealize away (4-) and (5) by postu¬
lating the commonly-invoked ideal or average speaker-listener. We
are thus left with occurrence, sentence, text, and (the narrowed-
down version of) context-of-situation; to these we must now give
closer attention.
Contrary to what might appear to be the case, an occurrence is
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not conceived here as a unique event; it is thus not to be equated
with a token. Instead, each occurrence consists in, and stands for,
the merging of unique (actual and potential) events (the limiting
case being one unique event, i.e. a token) which are considered to
be identical from a certain point of view, whatever it may be. In
our case, needless to say, the point of view in question is synonymy.
If, say (1) there is an A such that it stands for a set of unique
12 n
events, A , A ... A , (2) there is a B such that it stands for a
12 n
set of unique events, B , B ... B , and (3) A and B are synonymous,
12 n
then for our purpose A , A ... A may be regarded as identical and
thus as instantiating a single occurrence, and the same applies to
} -D • • • D m
What has been said about the nature of occurrence applies equally
to the nature of sentence, text, and context-of-situation. Thus a
sentence S in which an occurrence under focus is embedded is con¬
ceived not as a unique event, but as consisting of a subset of all
the (actual and potential) disambiguated sentences identical in form
to S - that subset whose members are considered to be identical (in
addition to formal identity) from a certain point of view. The
point of view in our case is that of occurrence-synonymy. Likewise,
a text is conceived not as a unique event, but as consisting in the
merging of unique events which are considered to be identical from
the relevant point of view, it being in our case that of occurrence-
synonymy. And exactly the same is true of a context-of-situation.
When we say that every occurrence is embedded in a sentence and,
via that sentence, in a text and context-of-situation, in each case
the occurrence, the sentence, the text and the context-of-situation
are co-extensive. From now on I will, where convenient, subsume
the text and the context-of-situation under 'context1.
What I have just characterized may be called, for the time being,
'simplex occurrences'. To make the concept of occurrence more use¬
ful for our purpose, I will now extend it by introducing what may
be called, for the time being, 'complex occurrences'. A complex
occurrence consists in the merging of two or more simplex occur
rences where the result of the merging does not qualify as a sense
(see for the conditions that a complex occurrence must meet to
qualify as a sense). From now on I will talk about occurrences
without distinguishing between simplex and complex ones.
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This extension does not alter our original conception of occur¬
rence as sentence-bound and context-bound. What we have to do,
however, is to interpret 'sentence-bound' as being bound to one or
more sentences and 'context-bound' as being bound to one or more
contexts. When occurrence is conceived in this way, it has the
advantage of almost infinite flexibility: we can identify an occur¬
rence on any level of abstraction (down to and including the level
of tokens) which suits our purpose, just as long as that level of
abstraction is not lexeme or sense.
In view of our conception of occurrence, questions of whether
two occurrences are synonymous should always be settled with ref¬
erence to the corresponding sentence(s) and context(s). This,
however, is a matter of principle, not a matter of method. As far
as method is concerned, we need to take into account only what
actually influences our answer as to whether two occurrences are
synonymous. Thus, if two occurrences are synonymous or not syn¬
onymous in a sentence regardless of context, it will be methodol¬
ogically desirable to leave context out of account. Similarly, if
two occurrences are synonymous or not synonymous in an expression
regardless of what sentence that expression is used in, it will be
methodologically desirable to leave sentence out of account. If,
on the other hand, two occurrences are synonymous only in a cer¬
tain sentence or sentences, then sentence will have to be taken
into account. Similarly, context will have to be taken into
account if two occurrences are synonymous only in a certain con¬
text or contexts. This is how we shall proceed methodologically.
'Lexeme', 'sense' and 'occurrence', as we use these terms,
denote (three different levels of) lexical units. Corresponding
to these we may now postulate three different levels of lexical
meaning: lexeme-meaning, sense-meaning and occurrence-meaning, which
are paired with lexeme, sense and occurrence respectively. (While
using lexeme and lexeme-meaning, occurrence and occurrence-meaning
as they have been defined above, for convenience I will quite often
use 'sense' both to refer to the lexical unit and to refer to the
semantic unit. This will not cause uncertainty, since in each case
it will be clear from the context whether what is in question is
the lexical unit or the semantic unit, or both.) A lexeme consists
in all the forms that instantiate it. Its meaning is what semantic
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information all these forms have in common. A form is identifiable
as instantiating a particular lexeme by virtue of its formal, syn¬
tactic and semantic properties. What has just been said about
lexemes applies also to senses and occurrences, except that the
identification of a form as instantiating an occurrence or, especial¬
ly, a sense relies more heavily on the semantic properties of the
form.
Having started with the simple formula of 'A = B', we have now
arrived at three different interpretations of A and B, which we may
represent as (l) A"*" = B , (2) A3 = BS and (3) A° = B° respectively.
The relation which holds between occurrences and senses/lexemes
and which holds between senses and lexemes may be seen as one of
assignment. An occurrence is directly assignable either to a sense
o s
or to a lexeme, whereby we can say that A is an occurrence of A or
A1; a sense is directly assignable to a lexeme, whereby we can say
that AS is a sense of A .
Given the assignment relation, it is possible to define occur¬
rence-synonymy independently and then to define sense-synonymy and
lexeme-synonymy derivatively through the assignment relation. Thus,
for 'A° = B0' to hold, it is both necessary and sufficient that A
and B fulfil the requisite conditions (i.e. '=') in one sentence
and context. For 'A3 = B3' to hold, it is both necessary and
3
sufficient that for each and every occurrence assignable to A
there is assignable to Bs an occurrence which is synonymous with it,
and vice versa. It follows that a single instance of 'A0 ^ B0'
3
between an occurrence assignable to A and an occurrence assignable
to B3 constitutes sufficient proof that 'A3 ^ B3'. Lastly, for
'A"*" = B^"' to hold, it is both necessary and sufficient either (l)
that for each and every occurrence assignable to A^" there is assign¬
able to B an occurrence which is synonymous with it, and vice
versa, or (2) that for each and every sense assignable to A"^" there
is assignable to B a sense which is synonymous with it, and vice
versa. It follows that a single instance where either (1) 'A° = B0'
is not the case between an occurrence assignable to A"'* and an
1 3 g
occurrence assignable to B or (2) 'A = B ' is not the case between
a sense assignable to A^" and a sense assignable to B"*" constitutes
sufficient proof that 'A"1" ^ B^"'.
We have already uncovered two presuppositions underlying lexeme-
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synonymy and sense-synonymy respectively. In the light of the last
two paragraphs we can now formulate these presuppositions in a dif¬
ferent and more direct way. In the case of lexeme-synonymy, the
presupposition is that for each and every occurrence or sense we are
able to determine whether it is an occurrence or a sense of a par¬
ticular lexeme. For unless we are able to do this, we will not be
in a position to say whether an instance of lack of occurrence-
synonymy or lack of sense-synonymy constitutes evidence that two
lexemes are not synonymous, in which case the conception of lexeme-
synonymy cannot be judged adequate.
What sense-synonymy presupposes is that for each and every occur¬
rence we are able to identify the sense to which it is assignable
and, furthermore, to determine whether it should be assigned to an
existing sense or be considered a novel use necessitating the set¬
ting up of a new sense. For unless we are able to do so, we will,
as with lexeme-synonymy, not be in a position to say whether an
instance of lack of occurrence-synonymy constitutes evidence that
two senses are not synonymous, in which case the conception of
sense-synonymy cannot be judged adequate.
The assignment of an occurrence or a sense to a lexeme is rela¬
tively straightforward, because the distinction between homonymy
and polysemy is relatively easy to draw and, given the way this
distinction is normally drawn, homonymy is a much rarer phenomenon
than polysemy. The assignment of an occurrence to a sense, on the
other hand, is fraught with complications. Therefore, before we
accept any conception of sense-synonymy as adequate, we must first
be satisfied that it is backed up by a satisfactory method for
unequivocally assigning occurrences to senses.
We have been elucidating lexeme-synonymy, sense-synonymy and
occurrence-synonymy with particular reference to the conventional
dictionary. Now in the academic literature on the subject there
are to be found close counterparts of all three of these concep¬
tions of synonymy. I say 'close' (rather than 'identical')
because in most cases the exact nature of lexeme-identity and sense-
identity is not clearly spelt out either in the conventional dic¬
tionary or in the treatments of synonymy in the academic literature.
There are, however, also to be found in the literature treat¬
ments of synonymy (or latent treatments of synonymy, in the sense
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of being deducible from general views of meaning) where the concep¬
tion appears to be ambiguous as between lexeme-synonymy and sense-
synonymy. Such treatments are characterized by the matching of one
lexical unit with one and only one homogeneous meaning, so that
there is no room for the distinction between lexeme-meaning and
sense-meaning and hence no room for the distinction between lexeme-
synonymy and sense-synonymy. This is, or may be, a reasonable way
to proceed in dealing with idealized languages. In the case of a
natural language like English, however, the matching of one lexical
unit with one meaning does not solve, but only serves to conceal,
the problems involved. To appreciate this, one only needs to dis¬
ambiguate the treatments of synonymy in question. Once such treat¬
ments have been disambiguated, we shall find that their conception
of synonymy is either close to lexeme-synonymy or close to sense-
synonymy. If the former, then they rest on the same presupposition
as we have found to underlie any explicit conception of lexeme-syn¬
onymy. If the latter, then they rest on the same presupposition as
we have found to underlie any explicit conception of sense-synonymy.
In either case, they are confronted with the need to justify one of
these presuppositions. In the final analysis, then, every seemingly
homogeneous conception of synonymy in a natural language like Eng¬
lish is in fact a conception of lexeme-synonymy, sense-synonymy, or
occurrence-synonymy.
Underlying these different conceptions of synonymy can be clearly
detected two opposing views of meaning: on the one hand, the so-
called 'autonomist' view, which attributes an independent status to
lexical meaning; and, on the other hand, the so-called 'contextual-
ist' view, which regards lexical meaning as deriving entirely from
context. Expositions of these two opposing views do not always
touch upon the question of synonymy, but, if conceptions of syn¬
onymy are to be derived from them, they clearly point in different
directions. Lexeme-synonymy and sense-synonymy go naturally with
the autonomist view of lexical meaning, while occurrence-synonymy
springs equally naturally from the contextualist view of lexical
meaning. I will deal with these two views of meaning in more
detail later in this chapter and particularly in 10.4.
In view of their common theoretical basis it is not surprising
that, where the distinction is recognized, lexeme-synonymy and
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sense-synonymy are usually regarded as compatible (cf. Abraham &
Kiefer, 1966: 33; Katz, 1972: 4-8; Baldinger, 1980: 217-8). Nor is
it surprising, in view of their different theoretical underpinnings,
that the conceptions of sense-synonymy and occurrence-synonymy have
tended to be held by people who regard their own conception as
incompatible with the other (cf. Lyons, 1963: 74; Ullmann, 1957:
108-9). This is particularly true of those who subscribe to sense-
synonymy. Where no distinction is drawn between lexeme-synonymy
and sense-synonymy, we may find treatments (or latent treatments)
in which lexeme-synonymy or sense-synonymy is tacitly regarded as
the only legitimate level of synonymy.
For the purpose of the following discussion, treatments of syn¬
onymy may be seen as falling into three categories as regards lexi¬
cal units: (l) those in which lexeme-synonymy is treated as the only
legitimate level of synonymy; (2) those in which sense-synonymy is
treated as a legitimate level of synonymy, with or without also
treating lexeme-synonymy as a legitimate level of synonymy; and (3)
those in which occurrence-synonymy is treated as a legitimate level
of synonymy, with or without also treating lexeme-synonymy and/or
sense-synonymy as legimate levels of synonymy. In the following
three sections I will examine each of the three categories in turn,
concentrating on lexeme-synonymy, sense-synonymy and occurrence-
synonymy respectively.
3.2. Lexeme-synonymy
I have not come across any treatment of synonymy in which lexeme-
synonymy is regarded as the only legitimate level of synonymy.
There exists a view of lexical meaning, however, which, if a con¬
ception of synonymy is to be deduced from it, will lead to just
such a treatment. This is the autonomist view of lexical meaning
as it is held, for example, by Antal (1961) and Droste (1968).
Both Antal and Droste draw a distinction between meaning and
denotation such that to any lexeme there corresponds only one,
invariant, meaning which underlies all its occurrences. Within
this view of meaning there is no room for polysemy, for a lexeme
cannot have different submeanings but only different denotata.
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Thus what for the conventional dictionary is a matter of multiple
meaning is for Antal and Droste a matter of multiple denotata purely
extralinguistic in character.
Antal cites Walpole's treatment of 'case' as an example where in
his view meaning is confused with denotation. The following are
among the sentences used by Walpole in this connection:
(i) I thought he was in Mexico; but such was not the case.
(ii) In this case the detective was completely baffled.
(iii) If this was the case, why didn't you inform the police?
(iv) "You have a very good case", said the lawyer.
(v) What is the case of this pronoun?
Of these five occurrences of 'case', Antal confines himself to the
first three, commenting that
The instances of case we have quoted are, in my opinion,
completely identical in meaning, and this is precisely why
we are justified in considering them the same morpheme as
appearing in three different contexts.
We have just said that the three case-s are alike in
form as well as in meaning. This is undeniably so. But
this is not the same as saying that they are identical in
every respect. However, it is not their meanings that
differ, the difference exists between them in so far as
each denotes something different in the concrete reality.
The flaw in Walpole1s whole argument is that he confounds
meaning with what we have here called denotation ....
Meaning - as stated above - is necessarily independent of
context; that which is added from the context is not
meaning but denotatum (1961: 218-9).
It so happens that the three occurrences of 'case' that Antal
chooses to comment upon in support of the autonomist view of mean¬
ing are in fact assignable to the same sense in the average con¬
ventional dictionary, where the two occurrences in (iv) and (v)
are assignable to two other senses respectively (cf. Collins Eng¬
lish Dictionary (henceforth CED); Oxford Advanced Learner's Dic¬
tionary of Current English (henceforth OALDCE)). It seems that
Antal is equivocating somewhat here. For what we are not told is
whether the occurrences of 'case' in (iv) and (v) are also instan¬
tiations of the same meaning.
If the answer is negative, then what is really eliminated is
not the level of sense but the level of lexeme as these are dis¬
tinguished in the conventional dictionary. On this interpretation,
an approach to synonymy deriving from Antal's view of meaning would
be faced with the same problems that, as we shall see later, beset
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any approach to synonymy on the level of sense.
However, I think; that, if pressed, Antal would probably give an
answer in the affirmative. But even if this were so, it is not
enough to state that
A particular morpheme has exactly the same meaning in all
the various contexts, because when it has a different
meaning we have to do not with the same but with a dif¬
ferent morpheme (1961: 218).
For, as it stands, the statement is merely circular and therefore
vacuous, unless we are furnished, which we are not, with a prin¬
cipled way of settling questions of sameness and difference of
meaning regarding identical forms.
With a combination of theoretical pronouncements and exemplifi¬
cation, Droste leaves us in no doubt that in his theory there is no
place for the conventional dictionary's level of sense. This is
how he states his position:
In so far as forms are fixed and have no variants, the
meanings of these forms have no variants either; variants
in meaning are valid if and only if they are formally
expressed. What is usually regarded as a variant of mean¬
ing is in fact a variant in the concept (the 'denotatum')
to which meaning is related. These extra-linguistic vari¬
ants are not recognizable within the direct and invariable
relation form-meaning (1968: 128).
For illustration the word used is 'head' as it occurs in the
following sentences:
(vi) He has a terrible pain in his head.
(vii) He is the head of the family.
(viii) He is taller by a head.
(ix) My head is in a whirl.
(x) He has a good head for mathematics.
All the five occurrences of 'head', in Droste' view,
have exactly the same form and therefore, according to
our assumptions, the meaning should be identical too.
There really does not seem to be one indication which
might lead to a differentiation within this meaning;
on the contrary, the meaning of head in all the cases
is 'head' (1968: 128).
In conventional dictionaries, however, the five occurrences of
'head' are assignable to four or five separate senses (cf. CED:
senses 1, A, 9, and 11 under the entry of 'head'; OALDCE: senses
1, 2, 4-, 7, and 12 under the entry of 'head'). An even more strik¬
ing example is that Droste treats 'light' (colour) and 'light'
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(weight) as sharing one meaning, so that the difference between them
is relegated to the extralinguistic level of denotation (1968: 130).
Although the level of sense is absent from Antal's and Droste's
theory of lexical meaning, its absence does not result in a net loss
in the descriptive power of the theory. For in its place is estab¬
lished the level of denotation. However, the difference between
this level of denotation and the conventional dictionary1s level of
sense is not a mere matter of terminology. In the first place,
there is a clear difference in their status. Those who speak of the
level of sense obviously take it to be a legitimate level of meaning
lower than but nevertheless not different in essence from lexeme-
meaning: both constitute lexical meaning. In sharp contrast, those
who hold an autonomist position like Antal's and Droste's regard
the level of denotation as extralinguistic and hence fundamentally
different from lexeme-meaning. Thus what the former would treat as
sense-synonymy amounts in the eyes of the latter to merely denota-
tional identity, which is presumably not worthy of the descriptive
label 'synonymy*. What is more, given Antal's and Droste's posi¬
tion, it would not only be considered objectionable to talk about
sense-synonymy, it would be impossible to do so. For on their
autonomist view of meaning there is no distinction between the level
of sense and the level of occurrence: both are conflated in the
level of denotation. While the number of senses attaching to a
lexeme is finite, there is no limit to the number of denotata that
a lexeme can be used to designate.
It seems clear that from Antal's and Droste's autonomist view of
meaning the following consequences will follow as regards synonymy.
It is neither legitimate nor feasible to treat synonymy as a rela¬
tion between senses. It is feasible but not legitimate to treat
synonymy as a relation between occurrences. It is both legitimate
and feasible only to treat synonymy as a relation between lexemes.
We have already seen that two lexemes, A^" and b\ are synonymous if
and only if for each and every sense assignable to A1 there is
assignable to B"*" a sense which is synonymous with it, and vice versa.
In practice, then, a conception of synonymy derived from Antal's
and Droste's view of lexical meaning would have the following con¬
sequence in a hypothetical situation. Imagine the following facts.
There is a lexeme one of whose senses has been established as
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synonymous with 'light'(weight). However, there is no sense assign¬
able to this lexeme which is synonymous with 'light'(colour). It
follows then, simply from this second fact, that we are prevented
from describing the first fact in terms of synonymy.
A conception of synonymy which regards lexeme as the only level
on which synonymy is to be located if at all is open to challenge on
at least three counts. In the first place, we may point to the fact
that a clear definition of lexeme-identity is often lacking, as in
the case of Antal and Droste (argument from lexeme-identity). How¬
ever, this is a relatively minor objection, which we may henceforth
ignore. More important are the following considerations. The first
of these is that the autonomist view of meaning on which the ex¬
clusive lexeme conception of synonymy is based is itself open to
challenge (argument from views of meaning). If the autonomist view
of lexical meaning can be shown to be inadequate, the exclusive
lexeme conception of synonymy must fall with it, particularly in
view of the third ground on which this conception may be found
objectionable. This is that the exclusive lexeme conception of
synonymy is too strong and thus runs counter to what synonymy is
normally understood to be (argument from material adequacy). If
this is so, it must be rejected for failing to satisfy the condition
of material adequacy.
I think that the last two objections are both valid and that
they constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting the exclusive
lexeme conception of synonymy. To substantiate the third objec¬
tion, it is sufficient to show that the conception of synonymy as
holding between senses or between occurrences is not too weak. I
will try and show this later in this chapter; and I will substan¬
tiate the second objection in 10.4-.
3.3. Sense-synonymy
It is on the level of sense that most definitions of synonymy
are to be found. In such definitions, when A and B are said to be
synonymous, synonymy is to be understood as the sharing of one
rather than of all their senses if more than one sense is seen as
attaching to A or B or both. The following are all examples of
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sense-synonymy definitions, though they vary in explicitness.
Ullmann locates synonymy on the level of what corresponds to the
conventional dictionary's sense. For him, polysemy is a matter of
"one name with several senses" (1957: 114), while synonymy is de¬
fined in terms of "one sense (my underlining) with several names"
(1957: 108). Therefore, when two (polysemous) lexemes are said to
be synonymous (as in 1957: 108, penultimate line), what exactly is
meant, if Ullmann is consistent, is that there is one sense from
among the several senses of one lexeme which is synonymous with one
sense from among the several senses of the other lexeme. However,
little is done to justify the presuppositions underlying sense-
synonymy.
Nida is even more explicit in treating synonymy as holding be¬
tween senses rather than whole lexemes when the latter are considered
to be polysemous, when he says:
Terms whose meanings overlap are generally called synonyms.
Such terms are usually substitutable one for the other in
at least certain contexts; but rarely, if ever, are two
terms substitutable for each other in any and all contexts.
In most discussions of meaning, synonyms are treated as
though the terms overlap, while in reality what is involved
is the overlapping of particular meanings of such terms.
When one says that -peace and tranquillity are synonyms,
what is really meant is that one of the meanings of peace,
involving physical and/or psychological state of calm,
overlaps the meaning of tranquillity, also involving physi¬
cal and/or psychological calm. One is not at this point
discussing the meaning of peace as the absence of war or
the cessation of hostilities. This distinction becomes
clear when one compares the common expression peace con¬
ference with the nonoccurring expression -ftranguillity
conference (1975: 98).
Various linguists have explicitly distinguished between what are
essentially lexeme-synonymy and sense-synonymy, although the termi¬
nology they employ may be different or idiosyncratic. Generative-
transformational linguists, for example, have formulated the dis¬
tinction in terms of 'full synonymy' and 'i-ways synonymy', the
limiting and perhaps typical case of the latter being one-way
synonymy, where two polysemous lexical entries have only one sense
or 'path' in common. Thus, for Katz:
Synonymy is the limiting case of semantic similarity: it
is the case where two constituents are as similar as
possible, where there is no difference in meaning between
a sense of one and a sense of the other. Hence, the defi¬
nition of 'synonymy' is as in (2.35) and of 'full synonymy'
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as in (2.36):
(2.35) A constituent C. is synonymous with another con-
tituent C. just in case they have a reading in common.
(2.36) A ''constituent Ch is fully synonymous with G. just
in case the set of readings assigned to is ^
identical to the set of readings assigned to C . (1972: 4-8).
J
Abraham and Kiefer define synonymy in a very similar manner:
(i) We say that between two words, W^ and W£ , a full syn¬
onymy holds if, and only if, their trees have exactly
the same branching structure (i.e. the same paths) and
exactly the same labels on the corresponding nodes.
(ii) We say that between two words, W^ and W2, an i-ways
synonymy holds if, and only if, they have in their tree
graphs i paths in common (1966: 33)•
Employing a different terminological framework, Baldinger ex¬
plicitly locates synonymy on two distinct levels: the 'level of the
signifie' (i.e. lexeme) and the 'level of the sememe' (i.e. sense):
Heger's trapezium distinguishes, on the plane of the sub¬
stance of content
signifie (brings together all the sememes linked to a
moneme).
sememe (= 'meaning' in traditional terminology).
seme (= concept; system of semes = conceptual system).
If the signifie has but one sememe, signifie and sememe
are identical; if, on the other hand, the signifie contains
several sememes, it constitutes a semasiological field. As
far as synonymy is concerned, this basic formulation allows
us to distinguish between two kinds of synonymy on the plane
of the substance of content:
A svnonvmv of two signifies (if the two signifies linked
to two different monemes, contain but one sememe each ...).
A synonymy of two sememes which are linked by means of
two complex signifies (which contain more than one sememe),
to two different monemes ....
In this second case, the synonymy is produced, not on
the level of the signifie. but on the level of the sememe
(...) (1980: 217-8K
Further examples of sense-synonymy definitions can be found, but
those already cited will suffice for our purpose of making a criti¬
cal examination of sense-synonymy definitions in general. Before
we comment on these sense-synonymy definitions, however, it is
necessary to examine the level of sense as such in some detail.
It is generally agreed by those who regard sense as a legitimate
level of meaning that the finite number of senses attaching to a
polysemous lexeme are arrived at through abstraction from the
lexeme's infinite variety of occurrences. To see this process
at work, we may now look at a study of 'polysemy and the structure
of the subjective lexicon' conducted by two psychologists,
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Caramazza and Grober (1976).
In this study three levels of meaning of diminishing abstraction
are distinguished, which are referred to as core meaning (i.e. lexeme-
meaning), prototypical sense (i.e. sense-meaning) and sense-instance
(i.e. occurrence-meaning). The authors' main aim is to show that
there is a core meaning underlying the endless variety of sense-
instances that a lexeme can acquire in context. Of more particular
interest to our present concern, however, is the finding that be¬
tween these two levels of meaning it is possible to establish in an
empirical manner (i.e. through clustering and multidimensional
scaling methods) a number of what are called prototypical senses.
Thus, for the lexeme 'line' (conceived as cutting across parts of
speech) twenty-six sense-instances are recognized, which are exemp¬
lified in an equal number of sentences (the numbering in what fol¬
lows is Caramazza and Grober's):
(1) Ford is coming out with a new line of hard tops.
(2) I am no longer in that line of business.
(3) He had come from a line of wealthy noblemen.
(4) They came to two different conclusions using the same line
of reasoning.
(5) Sam owned the local bus line.
(6) When the curtain rose for the second act, Bob could not
recall his opening line.
(7) She said it was a line from Keats.
(8) He began to type the first line of his paper.
(9) When you arrive in New York, please remember to drop me
a line.
(10) The tailor would line the coat with fur.
(11) The rich man was able to line his pocket with money.
(12) We wanted to line the street with people.
(13) We were told to line up.
(14) Line your paper for writing.
(1$) Sergeant Jones would bring him into line.
(16) We built a fence along the property line.
(17) There was no turning back; they had crossed the enemy line.
(18) The children were playing in the direct line of fire.
(19) The judge had to draw a line between right and wrong.
(20) I pulled on the line with all my strength.
(21) The workman broke through to the gas line.
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(22) The shortest distance between two points is a straight
line.
(23) We were told to draw a line under the title of the book.
(24.) When he frowned, a line formed across his forehead.
(25) The road was flanked by a line of trees on either side.
(26) As I examined the wall of the cave, I could clearly see
a line of iron ore (Caramazza & Grober, 1976: 187).
Garamazza and Grober find, on the basis of evidence obtained from
three experimental studies, that underlying all these diverse sense-
instances there is a core meaning, which they specify as "unidimen-
sional extension". From clustering and scaling experiments, it
also emerges that the twenty-six sense-instances fall into five
major clusters, corresponding to which five prototypical senses have
been distinguished thus:
Cluster 1, comprised of sentences (l), (2), (3), and (4)
(and marginally, (5)), suggests a sense of line that might
be labelled a SEQUENCE or ORDERING OF CONSTRUCTS. Thus,
in sentences (1) and (2), line is used to indicate KIND OR
TYPE. In sentence (3) it denotes a CONSECUTIVE SEQUENCE OF
ANCESTORS, and in sentence (4-) it refers to a SEQUENCE OF
THOUGHTS. Cluster 2 represents a grouping of sentences (6),
(7), (8), and (9), and the sense of line found here can be
described as a CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE OF WORDS. In sentences
(6) and (7), and to a lesser extent (8), the words have a
formal status, while in sentence (9) they do not. The sense
of line in the third cluster, formed by sentences (10), (11),
(127; (l3), and (14.), does not have the same conceptual
unity as the other four. In sentences (10) and (11), line
denotes the FILLING or COVERING of a surface by ARRANGING
objects in a CONTIGUOUS FASHION. In sentences (12) and (13)
people are ARRANGED IN A SERIES OF ROWS, while in sentence
(14.) it is MARKS that are ARRANGED IN ROWS. Cluster 4
(sentences (16), (17), (18), and (19)) indicates a BOUNDARY
or DEMARCATION that may or may not have a physical existence.
The BOUNDARY in sentences (16) and (17) does, while in
sentence (18) it does not. Sentence (19) involves a DEMAR¬
CATION between moral constructs or categories. The fifth
cluster (sentences (22), (23), (24.), (25), and (26)) rep¬
resents a sense of line that denotes a CONCRETE and CON¬
TINUOUS MARK. This sense is most clear in sentences (22)
and (23), where a distance is traced out by a MARK. In (25)
it is a continuous row of trees and in sentence (26) it is
a seam of iron ore. Sentences (20) and (21) were clustered
at the final stages of the program and together with sen¬
tence (15) were unstable with respect to their positions in
the two solutions. Our results, then, suggest the existence
of five conceptually distinct clusters (major senses) which
can be clearly labelled (Caramazza & Grober, 1976: 191).
Now from perceiving that senses result from the merging of occurrences,
it is only a short step to observing two consequences both of which
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present difficulties for a sense-synonymy definition.
The first consequence that follows from the nature of sense as
the merging of occurrences is that there lie between the level of
lexeme and the level of occurrence potentially infinite levels of
sense of successive degrees of abstraction. This is clearly borne
out by the spatial-hierarchical representation given by Caramazza
and Grober of the twenty-six sense-instances of 'line' (1976: 190):
What is clear from Figure 1 is that there are clusters within clus¬
ters and that the five major clusters are not equi-aistant from
one another. This being the case, we could distinguish, within the
so-called prototypical senses, sub-senses and sub-sub-senses and so
on until we reach the sense-instances. In fact, as a cursory glance
at, say, OED will confirm, this is exactly what is sometimes done
in unabridged dictionaries.
If to the twenty-six sentences used by Caramazza and Grober we
now add the following:
(3.1) His line is banking.
(3.2) He is in the drapery line.
(3.3) That's not much in my line.
it is fairly obvious that they would first form a cluster with (2)




before merging into a further, larger, cluster with (l), (3), (4-)
and (5) to yield the prototypical sense SEQUENCE. If so, the merg¬
ing of the sense-instances of (2), (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) would
justify the setting up of what might be dubbed a sub-prototypical
sense, i.e. "a department of activity; a branch of business" (The
Short Oxford English Dictionary (henceforth SOED)). In fact, this
is a sense commonly isolated in dictionaries.
So, if the question is asked as to, say, whether 'field' is
sense-synonymous with 'line', the answer will depend on the depth
or level of abstraction at which we are prepared to locate the
senses. On the level of prototypical sense identified by Caramazza
and Grober, we must deny that 'field' and 'line' are synonymous, for
'field' obviously cannot replace 'line' in (l), (3) and (4) while
preserving acceptability and identical cognitive meaning. If, on
the other hand, we move to the lower level designated by "a depart¬
ment of activity; a branch of business", then the answer might well
be in the affirmative: at least in (2), (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3)
'field' seems to be occurrence-synonymous with 'line'. The import¬
ant point is that whichever level we choose, our choice would be
largely arbitrary (see, however, Chapter 4).
While the twenty-six occurrences of 'line' instanced by Caramaz¬
za and Grober are assignable in an unabridged conventional diction¬
ary to a much larger number of senses than the five identified by
Caramazza and Grober, they would be assigned to fewer than five
senses, perhaps even only one, under certain approaches to polysemy.
One such approach is founded on the distinction between genuine
ambiguity and mere indeterminacy (which Weinreich in the quotation
below refers to as 'indefiniteness') of reference, whereby only
the former justifies the setting up of distinct senses. This ap¬
proach has been suggested by, among others, Weinreich (1966) and
Hill (1970: 254-6), although Weinreich recognizes the difficulty
inherent in this approach when he points out:
But this will presuppose, as a primitive concept of the
theory, an absolute distinction between true ambiguity and
mere indefiniteness of reference. The difficulty of vali¬
dating such a distinction empirically makes its theoretical
usefulness rather dubious (1966: 411-2).
Without going into the question of how many senses the twenty-six
occurrences of 'line' would be assigned to under this approach, it
would seem safe to suggest that the number would be lower than five.
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For Bennett (1973) even genuine ambiguity, if and when it can be
established, is too weak a condition for polysemy. With Weinreich's
proposal (1966) in mind, Bennett says:
Wherever an ambiguous sentence can be 'disambiguated' by
substituting for one of its lexemes, this does not necess¬
arily prove that the original lexeme was polysemous (1973:
305).
Bennett's approach stems instead from the distinction, as he sees
it, between intension and extension. He argues in favour of an
intensional approach with reference to "eight senses of over that
one might find in a dictionary" (the following numbering is Bennett'
(1) Directly above
The airplane flew over the town.
(2) Above and covering
She spread a cloth over the table.
(3) Before and covering
They hung a curtain over the picture.
(i) Above in status or position
He has two people over him in the office.
(5) Above and onto the other side of
We climbed over the gate.
(6) Across, from one side to the other
The bridge over the river is closed.
(7) Downwards from the edge of
John fell over a cliff.
(8) As a result of collision with
John fell over a stone (1973: 298).
According to Bennet, "the dictionary approach to describing the mean
ing of a preposition such as 'over' is an extensional approach"
(1973: 299). Under the intensional approach, however, "the same
sense of the preposition occurs in each of the eight examples" (1973
300). Bennett is prepared to recognize polysemy only under the
following condition:
The question now arises whether an intensional view of mean¬
ing forces us to regard all lexemes as having only one sense.
The answer to this question is no. Wherever there is no
overlap whatsoever between two senses of a lexeme given by
a dictionary, it is necessary to recognize separate senses.
There seems to me to be nothing in common to the meaning
of the preposition by in (9) and (10):
(9) He is standing by the door.
(10) It was painted by a professional.
In such cases the facts would be represented in a stratifi-
cational description by means of an UPWARD OR, showing the
lexeme in question as being connected to two separate
sememes (1973: 300).
It seems quite clear that on Bennett's view of polysemy the twenty-
six occurrences of 'line' would be assigned to one and one sense
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only. In fact, Bennett's approach to polysemy might be more accu¬
rately described as a synchronic approach to homonymy. If we oper¬
ate on the level of sense as conceived by Bennett, we will to all
intents and purposes be operating on the level of lexeme. (Inci¬
dentally, as shall see later, Sennet's view of polysemy does not
seem totally consistent with his view of synonymy.)
In addition to the two approaches we have just discussed, a dis¬
tinction has been drawn by Weinreich between what he calls contras-
tive and complementary senses (1964.: 4-06). Contrastive senses are
ones identified on the basis of genuine ambiguity. Complementary
senses, on the other hand, correspond to what Bennett refers to as
extensional senses. While emphasizing that the distinction is a
prerequisite for descriptive semantics, Weinreich points out that
"complementary senses, too, must be distinguished in a full seman¬
tic description" (1964.: 4-06).
In the light of our discussion of sense so far, it is clear that
at least three broad levels of sense should be distinguished: the
intensional level, the contrastive level, and the complementary level. It
is therefore not sufficient simply to say that synonymy is a meaning-
relation on the level of sense: it is also necessary to specify
which level of sense is in question. Furthermore, no matter which
level of sense we operate on, we shall be faced with problems. If
we operate on the intensional level, we will, as we have already
seen, be operating to all intents and purposes on the level of
lexeme, in which case our conception of synonymy will be open to
the same objections as is an exclusive lexeme conception of syn¬
onymy. If we operate instead on the contrastive level, we will be
up against the difficulty of drawing an absolute distinction be¬
tween genuine ambiguity and mere indeterminacy of reference. And
even greater difficulties will confront us if we move down to the
complementary level. In the first place, the complementary level,
unlike the two higher levels, is not homogeneous and can itself be
divided into yet further levels. Not only will it be largely
arbitrary, as we saw earlier, to choose one of such levels rather
than another, it will also be difficult to be consistent in the
exercise of such a choice. In the second place, as is only to be
expected, the boundaries between complementary senses are much less
distinct than those between intensional or contrastive senses.
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This latter difficulty is in fact the second consequence follow¬
ing from the nature of sense as the merging of occurrences. To be
more explicit, this consequence may be formulated as follows: The
lower the level on which the merging of occurrences takes place,
the more difficult it is to draw a hard and fast line between the
resulting senses. And if there is no hard and fast line between the
various senses of a lexeme, it will be difficult or even impossible
unequivocally to assign occurrences of the lexeme to its senses.
Thus, unless we adopt a strictly intensional or contrastive ap¬
proach (to the extent that the contrastive approach is workable) to
polysemy, we shall be faced with the additional difficulty that
there often do not exist clear boundaries between the various senses
of a lexeme. As an example of such polysemy, Waldron (1979) in¬
stances the various senses of 'betray' in contrast to those of
'article':
BETRAY 1. 'To give someone over to an enemy by treachery'
2. 'To be disloyal to' 3. 'To lead astray; to deceive'
4. 'To reveal a secret' 5. 'To reveal inadvertently; to
show signs of' 6. 'To seduce' (1979: 67).
ARTICLE 1. 'Clause of a statute, agreement, etc.' 2.
'Literary composition in a periodical or encyclopaedia'
3. 'Commodity, piece of goods, thing' 4. (Grammar) a,
an, the (1979: 67).
Waldron comments thus:
The example of betray, though, shows a rather more subtle
kind of polysemy than the other examples we have considered,
most of which have been words whose several meanings have
so diverged that they can be brought together as meanings
of the same word only with some mental effort, and in some
cases only by those with special etymological knowledge.
It would be misleading to suggest that all polysemy is as
clear-cut as that of article. Where this more subtle kind
of polysemy is concerned it makes more sense to talk of a
central meaning - or at least of a common factor for part
or all of the meaning-range of the word. ...
A large number of very common words are polysemous in
this finely-graduated way, as we can see from the amount
of space and the number of subdivisions they are allotted
in OED. Where these are concerned we may well ask what
constitutes a 'different meaning' (1979: 69).
Now in view of the fact that the level of sense is capable of
varying degrees of abstraction, together with the further fact that
the boundaries between (complementary) senses are often indistinct,
a sense-synonymy definition is beset with difficulties from which
both lexeme-synonymy and occurrence-synonymy definitions are free.
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Before it can lay claim to adequacy, therefore, it has to be shown
to be backed up by a method for dividing a polysemous lexeme into
its various senses such that
(1) the senses established for a lexeme are distinct;
(2) the senses established for a lexeme do not do violence to
native speakers' intuitions;
(3) the number of senses established for a lexeme is finite;
(4) every occurrence is unequivocally assignable to a sense; and
(5) the assignment of an occurrence to a sense does not do viol¬
ence to native speakers' intuitions.
Strictly speaking, (1) and (2) are entailed by (A) and (5) respect¬
ively and vice versa. Either (l) and (2) or (4-) and (5) are,
therefore, redundant. Both pairs are included, however, because of
their difference of emphasis. Given the nature of sense and poly¬
semy, I believe it is the obligation of anyone working, explicitly
or otherwise, with an exclusive sense-synonymy definition (i.e. to
the exclusion of occurrence-synonymy, though not necessarily of
lexeme-synonymy) to provide just such a method: it will not do to
take polysemy for granted or simply to rely on intuitions or con¬
ventional dictionaries.
This is an obligation which those authors whose sense-synonymy
definitions we cited earlier fail either to discharge or to do so
satisfactorily. Little or no effort is made by Ullmann, Nida, Katz,
or Abraham and Kiefer to provide an account of polysemy in support
of their definitions of sense-synonymy. For this reason, their
definitions of sense-synonymy must be considered open to the same
objections as would vitiate a definition of sense-synonymy based
on the conventional dictionary alone.
Baldinger (1980) goes to greater lengths but his solution to
polysemy cannot be regarded as satisfactory. What we are informed
of is no more than the interdependence between sense-synonymy and
polysemy in terms of what Baldinger calls the onomasiological and
seraasiological structures:
Linguistic realization (the object of onomasiology) is
carried out by means of "words", words subject to polysemy,
and whose semasiological structure has to be taken into
account. In other words, the onomasiological elements
needed to study the realisation of the concept in question
are each embedded in a semasiological structure. The study
of these semasiological structures, then, should precede
the study of the onomasiological field. On the other hand,
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it is precisely the distribution of lexical elements within
an onomasiological field which determines, to a great ex¬
tent, the semasiological value of each element. First,
then, we have to study the different onomasiological fields
in which, by virtue of its polysemy, each word participates,
in order to be able to determine subsequently its different
semasiological values within a semasiological field. In
other words, we have to start at both ends - which is im¬
possible (1980: 211).
Baldinger clearly equivocates here, for the solution he offers is
patently circular. To break out of the circle, we will have to
choose a direction. If we choose the semasiological direction, we
will obviously be no better off than the conventional dictionary.
If, on the other hand, we proceed in the onomasiological direction
(i.e. treat substitution by synonyms as the sole factor in resolv¬
ing issues of polysemy), then we will be following Kurylowicz's
approach to polysemy.
Weinreich outlines Kurylowicz's approach as follows:
A more elaborate solution, suggested by Kurylowicz, could
be stated as follows: a dictionary entry W will be shown to
have subpaths (submeanings), and W^, if and only if there
is in the language a subpath of some entry Z which is syn¬
onymous with Wx and is not synonymous with W^. According to
Kurylowicz, the notions of polysemy (path branching) and syn¬
onymy are complementary, and neither is theoretically tenable
without the other. Thus, the path for file would be shown
to branch insofar as file^ is synonymous with put away, where¬
as file? ;3-s no^* However, the condition would have to be
strengthened to require the synonyms to be simplex, since it
is always possible to have multi-word circumlocutions which
are equivalent to indefinitely differentiated submeanings of
single words (1966: 4.12).
Now if by synonymy is meant sense-synonymy, we are back in a circle,
for we will be guilty of assuming a prior solution to polysemy
instead of providing one. So let us pursue the other interpreta¬
tion whereby synonymy is construed as occurrence-synonymy. Given
this interpretation, it follows that every time we encounter occur¬
rence-synonymy between two words we are automatically justified in
recognizing a distinct sense for each word, that the two resultant
senses are synonymous, and that a word has as many senses as it has
different mutually-non-synonymous occurrence-synonyms. In the light
of these consequences, it is clear that occurrence-synonymy and
sense-synonymy have in effect become merged into one. Alston's
(1971) solution to polysemy is essentially the same and therefore
incurs the same consequences.
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Thus, on the evidence at our disposal we have to conclude that
none of the above conceptions of sense-synonymy succeeds in vindi¬
cating the presuppositions on which it rests: these conceptions
either will lapse into occurrence-synonymy, in which case they will
be better regarded as such, or evidently fail to offer any adequate,
non-circular solution to the crucial question of polysemy. The view
of synonymy as holding exclusively between senses is based, as we
saw earlier, on the presupposition that it is possible in a prin¬
cipled way to segment any polysemous lexeme into a finite number
of distinct senses, which can then be used as the basis for the
study of sense-synonymy. Such a presupposition, we have seen, has
so far not been satisfactorily justified.
This is hardly surprising in view of the fact that "the practice
and whole methodology of the relevant parts of linguistics are at
present in too provisional and uncertain a state of development
(Wiggins, 1971: 14). But is a satisfactory solution to polysemy
possible in principle? Lyons's answer is that "it may well be that
the whole notion of discrete lexical senses is ill-founded; and if
it is, there is no hope of defining lexemes on this basis" (1977:
554). As far as the present discussion is concerned, we need not
go so far as to agree entirely with this opinion, for a large por¬
tion of the vocabulary is reasonably unproblematic as regards
polysemy. At the same time, there seems little doubt that to a
significant part of the vocabulary (e.g. lexemes such as 'true'/
'real' and 'fast'/'quick') the notion of discrete senses is not
wholly applicable. If so, it will be safe to conclude that no
conception of sense-synonymy is possible which will deal satisfac¬
torily with the vocabulary as a whole. But even where polysemy is
unproblematic, an exclusive sense-synonymy conception may yet turn
out to be too strong. To prove this, it is sufficient to show, as
we shall try to do later in this chapter, that the conception of
synonymy as holding between occurrences is not too weak.
In the meantime we may note a further, third, consequence which
arises from the nature of sense as the merging of occurrences. If
senses are derived from occurrences, then apart from the fallibility
of those responsible for deriving them, why should we accord senses
such a sacrosant status as to treat them as indivisible units?
There is no reason whatsoever why we should do so. But that senses
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should be treated in this way is exactly the theoretical assumption
underlying an exclusive sense-synonymy conception (cf. Lyons, 1968:
428). Essentially the same applies to any exclusive lexeme-synonymy
conception.
Thus the view of synonymy as holding exclusively between lexemes
is based on the assumption that meaning is invariant at the level of
lexeme. Similarly, the view of synonymy as holding exclusively
between senses is based on the assumption that meaning is invariant
on the level of sense. In either case the underlying theory of
meaning is an autonomist one, which treats meaning as independent of
context. The consequence of the former assumption is that two occur¬
rences cannot be synonymous unless their corresponding lexemes are
synonymous. The same consequence arises from the latter assumption,
except that it is less strong: two occurrences cannot be synonymous
unless their corresponding senses are synonymous. Given the nature
of sense-meaning and lexeme-meaning, neither assumption is justified
and neither consequence acceptable. We will examine the autonomist
view of lexical meaning more closely in 10.4.
To sum up our discussion of sense-synonymy, let me first bring
together the four arguments against any conception of synonymy in
which synonymy is treated as a meaning-relation holding between
senses, possibly also between lexemes, but not between occurrences.
These are (1) the argument from the plurality of levels of sense,
with more specific arguments regarding each of the three broad levels,
(2) the argument from the frequent vagueness of the boundaries be¬
tween (esp. complementary) senses, (3) the argument from the lack
of material adequacy of any exclusive sense-synonymy definition
(i.e. too strong), and (4) the argument from the inadequacy of the
underlying autonomist view of lexical meaning for being one-sided.
What stands out from our discussion of sense-synonymy is the
dependence of sense-synonymy upon polysemy. From this dependence
it clearly follows that our understanding of the former depends in
large measure on our understanding of the latter. I have tried to
achieve as clear an understanding of sense-synonymy as I can in the
light of the present knowledge of polysemy at my disposal. It is to
be hoped that improvements in our understanding of polysemy will
result in improvements in our understanding of sense-synonymy. I
believe, however, that such improvements will not invalidate my
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main lines of argument about sense-synonymy, for they are based on
what I perceive as problems inherent in the phenomenon of polysemy
and not contingent therefore upon the present state of research.
3.4-. Occurrence-synonymy
The theoretical assumptions underlying exclusive lexeme-synonymy
and exclusive sense-synonymy definitions are far from undisputed.
Those who reject these assumptions necessarily also reject their
consequences. Such a rejection is implicit in the following defi¬
nition of synonymy by Bennett:
If there is one or more environment in which two lexemes
are substitutable for each other without any change in
COGNITIVE meaning, then they are synonymous in that en¬
vironment or those environments (1968: 158).
Another statement in favour of occurrence-synonymy can be extracted
from the following observations by Blose:
Another pair of putatively mutually entailing, but non-
synonymous sentences is 'This has shape' and 'This has size'.
But once more the reply can be that to call the two sen¬
tences nonsynonymous may be a mistake. And in this case the
mistake can be seen quite easily even without any further
appeal to what must be admitted about synonymy and mutual
entailment. For once we see precisely what it is to say
that 'This has shape' and 'This has size' are synonymous,
we lose some of our reluctance to say it. The common
apprehension is that if the two sentences are synonymous
then the words 'shape' and 'size' must be synonymous too.
And indeed they must, but only in a very limited sense.
To call the words synonymous-in-at-least-one-context is not
to authorize synonymy substitutions of 'shape' for 'size'
in the sentence 'The room is 30 by 15 feet in size'; nor of
'size' for 'shape' in 'The candy box is the shape of a
heart'. For the resulting sentences would not entail the
originals, nor vice-versa. It is only to authorize the
replacement of 'shape' by 'size' in 'This has shape', and
of 'size' by 'shape' in 'This has size' - a replacement
that is wholly unimpeachable since admitted as proper by
an adversary who insists that the two sentences entail
each other. In short, the words 'size' and 'shape' enjoy
only the most restrictive sort of synonymy - a synonymy
that is realized only in cases where both words are equat-
able with 'extension'.
Of course, to repeat, even if the innocuousness of the
synonymity could not be demonstrated in this way, the con¬
tention could still be defended that the sentences are
synonymous. For whenever there is mutual entailment we
must admit there to be synonymy (1965: 311-2).
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In Crystal (1980) we find a further example where synonymy is
defined as a meaning-relation on the level of occurrence:
Synonymy can be said to occur if items are close enough
in their meaning to allow a choice to be made between
them in some contexts, without there being any difference
for the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Linguistic
studies of synonymy have emphasised the importance of
context in deciding whether a set of lexical items is
synonymous (1980: 34-5 )•
Occurrence-synonymy is also treated as a legitimate type of syn¬
onymy in Naess's theory of empirical semantics, where it is ident¬
ified with the concept of 'interpretation' (cf. Naess, 1953; Berg,
1968).
A systematic argument against lexeme/sense-synonymy and in favour
of occurrence-synonymy has been furnished by Lyons (1963, 1968),
who holds that
In common with all meaning-relations, synonymy must be
bound to context; we may indeed accept, as the limiting
case, that two forms might be synonymous in one and only
one context (1963 : 74.) •
Thus for Lyons the relevant units for investigating synonymy are
forms as they are used in (the same) context. If two forms can be
shown by empirical means to have the same meaning in a particular
context, then they are to be regarded as synonymous in that con¬
text. No assumptions are made as to whether their synonymy extends
into other contexts. For two forms to have the same meaning in one
context is thus a sufficient condition of synonymy. I will discuss
Lyons's approach to synonymy in some detail in Chapter 7.
I hold the view that the conception of synonymy as a meaning-
relation between occurrences is both operationally and materially
adequate.
As far as operational adequacy is concerned, it seems to me clear
that a conception of occurrence-synonymy is free from objections as
regards the identity of the lexical units involved, for no unwarranted
presupposition concerning the identity of such lexical units is
entailed by this conception of synonymy. Of the three conceptions
of synonymy, occurrence-synonymy is the most operationally adequate
in this respect while sense-synonymy is the least so. There is, of
course, the separate question of whether a conception of occurrence-
synonymy can be operationally adequate as regards what the equation
sign stands for. I will argue for a positive answer in Chapter 7.
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With regard to material adequacy, we have already, though some¬
what tacitly, made out a case for occurrence-synonymy in 1.2. The
argument set forth there may be encapsulated in the following two
statements:
(1) Occurrence-synonymy is materially adequate because it
reflects what happens in everyday communication - in
the sense that native speakers readily employ words in
such a way that we are justified in treating them as
synonymous in a particular sentence/context or particu¬
lar sentences/contexts despite the failure of the same
words to behave synonymously in other sentences/contexts.
(2) Occurrence-synonymy is materially adequate because it
reflects (at least some) native speakers' intuitions -
in the sense that they readily judge words to have the
same meaning in a particular sentence/context or par¬
ticular sentences/contexts despite the fact that they
have judged, or will judge, the same words not to have
the same meaning in other sentences/contexts.
A number of objections have been raised by Harris (1973) against
the conception of synonymy as a meaning-relation between occurrences.
Although these objections are directed at Lyons's (1963) formulation
of the conception in particular, they are clearly intended to apply
to conceptions of occurrence-synonymy in general.
The first objection is that there is no operationally adequate
means of determining whether two occurrences are synonymous, since
there is no operationally adequate way of ascertaining 'pragmatic
commitment', in terms of which occurrence-synonymy is defined in
the first place (by Lyons). Here the charge of lack of operational
adequacy is directed not at the identity of lexical units (i.e. A
and B), occurrences being unproblematic in this respect, but at the
characterization of what the equation sign stands for. We shall
see in Chapter 7 that this objection is ill-founded.
The second objection is that the conception of synonymy as a
meaning-relation between occurrences suffers from lack of material
adequacy, since once synonymy is conceived in this way meaning
becomes confused with reference and consequenetly mere identity of
reference is mistaken for identity of meaning. To clinch our claim
that occurrence-synonymy is materially adequate, I will try and
show in Chapter 7 that this need not be the case.
The third objection is that conceiving synonymy as a meaning-
relation holding exclusively between occurrences precludes generic
statements of synonymy relations. Whereas the other two objections
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both concern the definition of synonymy, this last objection clearly
is to do with the description of synonymy, that is, with the ques¬
tion of what is the best way to state the facts of synonymy. Thus
this objection will be valid only if we confine the description of
synonymy to the level of occurrence. Since, as will become clear
in the next chapter, we will not do this, this objection no longer
applies.
In addition to the three objections raised by Harris, there is a
further objection implicit in the autonomist view of meaning. This
is self-evident in view of the fact that occurrence-synonymy is
based on the contextualist view of lexical meaning, to which the
autonomist view is normally treated as diametrically opposed. I
will try and overcome this implicit objection in 10.4-. I will not
do this, however, by pursuing the line of argument that the con¬
textualist view of lexical meaning is more satisfactory than the
autonomist view. I will do this, instead, by making out a case for
the stand that the two views of lexical meaning are complementary,
with neither view wholly tenable on its own. Incidentally, such a
stand underlies, though it is not necessary to, what I have to say
in the next chapter.
Once occurrence-synonymy is shown to be materially adequate, it
follows that a conception of synonymy as a meaning-relation holding
exclusively between senses and/or lexemes is too strong and must
consequently be rejected for imposing unjustifiably stringent re¬
quirements as regards material adequacy.
Treating occurrence-synonymy as materially adequate does not
preclude us, however, on purely logical grounds, from conceiving
synonymy as a meaning-relation holding also between senses and/or
lexemes. We may see ourselves as precluded from doing so only by
two other considerations.
The first consideration concerns sense-synonymy alone. It
adduces the four arguments advanced earlier against an exclusive
sense-synonymy conception, i.e. (1) the argument from the plurality
of levels of sense, (2) the argument from the frequent vagueness of
the boundaries between (esp. complementary) senses, (3) the argument
from the lack of material adequacy of any exclusive sense-synonymy
conception for being too strong, and (4-) the argument from the
inadequacy of the underlying autonomist view of lexical meaning for
being one-sided. Of these four arguments, the first will cease to
apply if we can find a principled way of deciding which level of
sense to operate on in each and every case, we want to work with
sense-synonymy. I will try to offer such a way in the next chapter.
It should be stressed, however, that the discovery of such a way
will not serve to vindicate the conception of synonymy as a meaning-
relation holding exclusively between senses; for not only is such a
way absent from the conceptions of sense-synonymy we discussed ear¬
lier, it cannot, as we shall see in the next chapter, be provided
by an exclusive sense-synonymy conception in principle. We can
overcome the second argument by noting that this argument does not
say that the boundaries between (esp. complementary) senses are
always vague but only that they are sometimes so. Thus the second
argument contains no reason why we should not work with sense-synonymy
where the boundaries between senses are clear-cut; it only imposes
limits on the extent to which we can work with sense-synonymy with¬
out breaching the condition of operational adequacy. The third
argument does not apply to any treatment of synonymy in which syn¬
onymy is conceived as a meaning-relation holding between both senses
and occurrences as opposed to one holding between senses and/or
lexemes alone. There is thus no need to try and overcome this
argument. The same is true of the fourth argument, for the auton¬
omist view of lexical meaning is objectionable, not for sanctioning
sense-synonymy, but for being one-sided in ruling out occurrence-
synonymy.
The second consideration concerns both sense-synonymy and lexeme-
synonymy. It derives from the contextualist view of lexical mean¬
ing, according to which it is wrong to posit any meaning units
larger than occurrence-meanings. In my view, just as the auton¬
omist view of lexical meaning is one-sided in failing to give due
recognition to sentence and context and, as far as we are concerned,
in ruling out occurrence-synonymy, so the contextualist view of
lexical meaning is equally one-sided in failing to acknowledge the
relative autonomy of lexical meaning and, as far as we are concerned,
in ruling out sense-synonymy. If so, then this second consideration
does not stand, either. I will expand on this argument in 10.U*
Not only are the above-mentioned two considerations invalid,
there are positive reasons, with regard to the description to synonymy,
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for making use of the levels of sense and lexeme, particularly the
former. These reasons will emerge in the next chapter and in
Chapters 9 and 10 as well as throughout the text.
We can now sum up our position as regards the definition of syn¬
onymy as follows. The definition of synonymy should be such as to
accommodate occurrence-synonymy. At the same time, it need not, on
either logical or a number of other grounds, rule out lexeme-synonymy
and sense-synonymy, and should not do so if the two higher levels
of synonymy can be turned to advantage (in ways which we shall see
later)•
3.5. Exemplification
It is time for exemplification. But before looking at specific
examples, let me make two preliminary points concerning the exemp¬
lification used in the present study as a whole.
(1) In order to reduce the possibility of error or bias arising
in my example sentences as a result of my being a non-native
speaker of English, I have for the most part modelled these closely
on illustrations of usage found in dictionaries (esp. OALDCE),
occasionally to the extent of adopting them verbatim. With the
acceptability of such example sentences thus reasonably assured, I
then placed alongside the word under focus in each sentence a syn¬
onymy candidate, with the aim of discovering whether it could
replace the former (a) without making the sentence unacceptable and
(b) without changing the meaning of the sentence. In what I saw as
clear-cut cases I relied on the evidence of my own introspection.
Where I considered it unsafe to trust my own intuitions, as in the
majority of cases, I based my analysis on judgements which I had
elicited from native speakers (usually three to five in each case)
either verbally or through somewhat crude informal questionnaires.
While I would have liked to aim at firmer empirical validity, I
hope that at least some members of the sets of examples with which
I have had to be content will adequately serve their illustrative
purpose. Where they do not, I nevertheless like to think that the
points being illustrated will still stand and that there exist
better examples which I have not been able to find.
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(2) Where two words separated by a stroke in an example sentence
are without marking, they are taken to be interchangeable in that
sentence without changing its cognitive meaning. Where the second
word of the pair is marked with an asterisk, it means that the first
word of the pair is acceptable in the sentence whereas the second
word is either not acceptable in the sentence or does not preserve
the meaning of the sentence if it replaces the first word. A ques¬
tion mark serves the same purpose as an asterisk except that it
indicates some measure of indeterminacy.
For the purpose of this section, let us assume that our treatment
of examples conforms to generally-agreed criteria of synonymy, since
it is the question of between what lexical units synonymy is a mean¬
ing-relation that is now under focus.
Our first example consists of 'thrive' and 'flourish' as they
occur in
(3.A) He worked hard and his business thrived/flourished.
(3.5) Children thrive/flourish on good food.
(3.6) Very few plants will thrive/flourish without water.
(3.7) Socrates flourished/*thrived about 4-00 BC.
Under the exclusive lexeme-synonymy definition, 'thrive' and
'flourish' cannot be regarded as synonymous in (3.4-) to (3.6),
simply because they are not synonymous in (3.7).
The procedure implicit in the exclusive sense-synonymy defini¬
tion would be something along the following lines. Before we look
at the behaviour of 'thrive' and 'flourish' in (3.4-) to (3.7), we
already have at our disposal a number of independently-established
senses attaching to the two words respectively. We then examine
the two words as they occur in the sentences in question and try to
assign each occurrence to a sense. If at the end of this process
we find that, say, only the occurrences of 'thrive' in (3.4-) to
(3.6) are assignable to the same sense attaching to 'thrive' and
the same is true of 'flourish', we will conclude that, relative to
the data in question, there is a sense attaching to 'thrive' which
is synonymous with a sense attaching to 'flourish'. If, on the
other hand, we find that, say, all the occurrences of 'flourish' in
(3.4-) to (3.7) are assignable to the same sense, then we will have
to conclude instead that 'thrive' and 'flourish' are not synonymous
in (3.4.) to (3.6), either. Since, however, the occurrence of
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•flourish' in (3.7) can be fairly reasonably assigned to a different
sense from the other occurrences of 'flourish', those who subscribe
to the exclusive sense-synonymy definition will not be prevented
from attributing synonymy to 'thrive' and 'flourish' as they occur
in (3.4-) to (3.6) and regarding these three instances of occurrence-
synonymy as instances of sense-synonymy between one or more pairs of
senses. Whether (3.4-) to (3.6) are treated as instantiating syn¬
onymy between one pair of senses or more will depend on the number
of sense(s) to which the occurrences of 'thrive' and 'flourish' are
assigned respectively. As far as conventional dictionaries are
concerned, practice varies quite considerably.
If we adopt the occurrence-synonymy definition, our procedure
regarding (3.4-) "to (3.7) will be simple and straightforward. We
will consider one sentence at a time without being affected by the
other sentences or any potential sentences, and will pronounce
'thrive' and 'flourish' individually synonymous in (3.4-)» (3.5) and
(3.6).
As our second example, we turn to 'real' and 'true' as they are
used in
(3.8) He has a real/true interest in art.
^3.9) Is this real/true silk or rayon?
(3.10) True/real friendship should last forever.
(3.11) The British sovereign has little real/true power.
(3.12) The doctors could not effect a real/*true cure.
(3.13) Things that happen in real/*true life are sometimes
stranger than things that happen in fiction.
(3.14-) This picture is true/=fcreal to nature.
No complications arise with regard to either the exclusive lexeme-
synonymy definition or the occurrence-synonymy definition. As far
as the exclusive lexeme-synonymy definition is concerned, 'real'
and 'true' are not synonymous in (3.8) to (3.11), by virtue of the
fact that they are not synonymous in (3.12) to (3.14-). Under the
occurrence-synonymy definition, on the other hand, 'real' and
'true' are synonymous in the first four sentences despite the fact
that they are not synonymous in the rest.
With the exclusive sense-synonymy definition, however, we run
into serious difficulties. Here, unlike in (3.4-) to (3.7), the
difficulty of dividing a lexeme into discrete senses is thrown into
sharp relief. Not only is it difficult adequately to establish
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separate senses for 'real' and 'true', it is no less difficult
satisfactorily to assign occurrences to senses where the latter
are available (though not sufficiently adequate) in conventional
dictionaries. Those who treat synonymy as a meaning-relation hold¬
ing exclusively between senses have not shown us how to overcome
either difficulty. In the absence of an adequate solution to these
difficulties, we cannot even begin to make judgements about sense-
synonymy with regard to the above sentences.
Words like 'real' and 'time' are by no means rare. Here it will
suffice to give one more example, i.e. 'lively' and 'animated' as
they occur in
(3.15) They spent an hour in lively/animated talk about
their respective travels in England and France.
(3.16) We had a (an) lively/animated discussion.
(3.17) There was a (an) lively/animated atmosphere
during the debate.
(3.18) He has a (an) lively/^animated imagination.
(3.19) The patient seems a little more lively/*animated
this morning.
We find yet a third type of situation in the case of 'fire' and
'conflagration', and 'drink' and 'eat'. Under the occurrence-syn¬
onymy definition, these two pairs of words will be treated as syn¬
onymous as they occur in (3.20) and (3.22) respectively among the
following sentences:
(3.20) A disastrous conflagration/fire made thousands of
people homeless.
(3.21) There was a small fire/*conflagration in the street.
(3.22) They drink/eat soup at the beginning of a meal.
(3.23) He seldom drinks/*eats whisky.
(3.24.) Eating/+drinking habits vary from country to country.
That the two pairs of words will not be treated as synonymous in
(3.20) and (3.22) respectively under the exclusive lexeme-synonymy
definition is only too obvious. It is almost equally unlikely that
they will qualify as synonymous under the exclusive sense-synonymy
definition. For to accord them the status of sense-synonyms we
would have to identify, for example, a distinct sense for 'eat'
with the sense-meaning of "drink", although even this would be of
no avail in the light of (3.23). But this is a path leading to
excessive or even infinite polysemy which surely no one subscribing
to the sense-synonymy definition would be prepared to follow.
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CHAPTER 4
LEXICAL UNITS AND DESCRIPTION
4.1. The need for descriptive economy
The definition of synonymy, it was argued in the last chapter,
should allow for synonymy as a meaning-relation between occurrences.
It was also argued, however, that allowing for occurrence-synonymy
need not prevent us from also allowing for lexeme-synonymy and
sense-synonymy. The aim of this chapter is to show why allowing
for occurrence-synonymy should not, in the description of synonymy,
prevent us from doing so, and to provide a principled way of making
use of the levels of lexeme and sense when the need for descriptive
economy arises.
The need for descriptive economy is self-evident in numerous such
cases as are exemplified by 'match' and 'equal' as the two words
occur in the following sentences:
(4.1) It has been said that no language can match/equal
French in expressing ideas with clarity and exactness.
(4.2) This hotel can't be matched/equalled for good service.
(4.3) No matter how hard he tries, he can't match/equal his
brother's achievements.
(4.4) The carpets do not match/*equal the curtains.
Here strict adherence to an exclusive occurrence-synonymy concep¬
tion would mean that, instead of trying to see whether (4.1) to
(4.3) can be subsumed under a single statement of sense-synonymy,
we are only allowed to state the instances of synonymy in these
sentences individually. The same applies to 'thrive' and 'flourish'
in (3.4) to (3.6), as to numerous other pairs of words. In both
cases it seems to me perfectly unobjectionable to invoke sense-syn¬
onymy; in refusing to do so we would commit the error of forgoing
economy of statement when economy of statement is both feasible and
justifiable.
Suppose, further, that (4.4) were not the case and that 'match'
and 'equal' were interchangeable in any and all sentences without
changing their cognitive meaning. Under this supposition, it would
seem, moreover, quite appropriate to achieve economy of statement
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by invoking lexeme-synonymy. In the case of 'match1 and 'equal'
this is obviously a hypothetical situation. But there do seem to
be pairs of lexemes (particularly non-polysemous ones) which would
be susceptible to such a treatment, such as 'chap' and 'bloke'.
Even actual instances of lexeme-synonymy aside, it would seem sen¬
sible that any description of synonymy which aims for the greatest
possible economy of statement should allow for this possibility.
In the light of what has been said above, I wish to advance the
thesis that to be maximally adequate the description of facts of
synonymy should not be confined to the level of occurrence but
should be undertaken on the level of sense or lexeme whenever it is
profitable to do so. This thesis, as will become clear in the
course of the present chapter, is neutral as regards the opposition
between the autonomist and the contextualist view of lexical mean¬
ing, and it need not involve us in attributing undue theoretical
status to the level of sense.
Since the level of sense is complicated by problems over and
above those shared by the level of lexeme, we shall concentrate in
the main on the level of sense.
4..2. The nature and status of sense
The central question, then, is: What is the nature and status of
the level of sense?
To this question, an answer was in fact already provided in the
last chapter when we looked at the study of 'polysemy and the struc¬
ture of the subjective lexicon' conducted by Caramazza and Grober.
It will be recalled that two findings have emerged from that study
which bear on our interest. The first of these is that it is plaus¬
ible to identify three levels of meaning for each (polysemous)
lexeme: a core meaning, prototypical senses, and sense-instances.
The second finding is that prototypical senses, which make up the
intermediate level, result from the merging of sense-instances. We
may now add that these findings are arrived at within the frame¬
work of an autonomist view of lexical meaning, as Caramazza and
Grober make explicit with the statement "we favour the autonomy of
lexical meanings" (1976: 186).
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It is interesting, therefore, to find essentially the same two
views expressed by a scholar who stands on the other side of the
autonomist/contextualist divide. I am referring to Walpole (1961).
As an advocate of the contextualist view of lexical meaning,
Walpole maintains that "a symbol has meaning only in its context"
(1961: 105). At the same time, he subscribes to the notion of
finite polysemy when he says that "most of our words each have many
meanings" (1961: 20). By meanings are clearly meant senses rather
than occurrence-meanings, the latter being referred to as "the dif¬
ferent uses" of a lexeme, since all lexemes each have many (in fact
countless) occurrence-meanings. In addition, a level higher than
sense is postulated in the shape of "the totality of senses".
Although all three levels of meaning - lexeme-meaning, sense-
meaning, and occurrence-meaning - are recognized by Walpole, it is
important to note that occurrence-meaning is still considered prior
to sense-meaning. The level of occurrence-meaning and the level of
sense-meaning are seen as mediated by what Walpole calls 'multiple
definition', which "consists of the linking up of two different
parts of a context - or, to put it in another way, of merging two
contexts into a larger one" (1961: 33). What results from the
merging of contexts is the level of sense-meaning.
With reference to the lexeme 'case', Walpole lists
... three steps in the process of multiple definition.
First, one collects examples of different uses of the word,
in their contexts. Secondly, one sorts out what seem to be
"separate senses" and defines each sense. Lastly, one scans
this list of different senses, which forms a map of the
word, and considers how each sense is related to the total¬
ity of senses (1961: 23).
For Walpole, the segmentation of a lexeme into its various senses
is designed as something which serves a practical purpose; "mul¬
tiple definition", he says, "is a technique for controlling the
shifts and ambiguities of words" (1961: 22).
Moreover, Walpole is prepared to admit that "there is not always
one 'right' answer" to the merging of occurrence-meanings to yield
sense-meanings (1961: 37), as I think one of the exercises set by
Walpole amply testifies:
True
A. 1. If I believe it strongly enough, then it is true.
2. The last witness had given a true description of the
incident.
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3. The scientist said that though his colleague's theory-
did not, as far as he knew, contradict the facts he
could not accept it as true.
B. 1. Say what's true, and shame the Devil ...
2. All things which are beautiful are true ...
3. The true story of that expedition was never revealed ...
4. Everything you see is not necessarily true ... (1961: 36-7).
In this exercise we are asked to "put beside each sentence in B the
number of the A sentence which comes nearest to using the word in
the same sense" (I96I: 34)• In fact, what Walpole does with 'case'
is clearly open to criticism:
Let "case" provide a simple example. It has different
senses in "a case of diphtheria", "the case for birth con¬
trol", "in case of fire". One could begin a multiple defi¬
nition of "case" on the basis of these phrases alone.
1. A case is an example of a disease.
2. A case is a group of arguments in support of a belief.
3. A case is an event (1961: 22-3).
One may well question whether 'a case of diphtheria' and 'in case of
fire' justify the setting up of two senses rather than one.
It will have been seen that, like Caramazza and Grober, Walpole
identifies three levels of meaning, notwithstanding their diametri¬
cally opposed positions on the question of the relation between
meaning and context. Moreover, also like Caramazza and Grober,
Walpole clearly sees senses as resulting from the merging of occur¬
rence-meanings. Thus, despite the fact that lexeme-meaning and
occurrence-meaning assume central importance in the autonomist and
contextualist view of lexical meaning respectively, the two oppos¬
ing views of meaning - as conceived by Caramazza and Grober and by
Walpole respectively - have in common both the identification of
levels of meaning and the conception of senses as the product of
the merging of occurrence-meanings. This is what I had in mind
when I said earlier that the decision to carry out the description
of synonymy relations on the levels of lexeme and sense where
profitable is neutral as between the autonomist and the contextual¬
ist view of lexical meaning. More particularly, and in order fur¬
ther to show that allowing for occurrence-synonymy need not prevent
us from also allowing for lexeme-synonymy and sense-synonymy, it
should perhaps be stressed that the setting up of the level of sense
is entirely compatible with the contextualist view, as expressed by
Walpole, that occurrence-meaning is prior to sense-meaning. By
implication, the recognition of sense-synonymy should be seen as
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entirely compatible with the contextualist position, inferrable from
Walpole's account of meaning, that occurrence-synonymy is prior to
sense-synonymy.
In addition to what we have just seen to be held in common by
Caramazza and Grober on the one hand and Walpole on the other, I
should like to underline a further point, which I only touched upon
in my brief exposition of Walpole's conception of polysemy. It is
this: the level of sense is set up, not (primarily) as a theoretical
construct, but as a means of serving practical purposes. This
point is important for two reasons. First, it offers a general jus¬
tification for making use of the level of sense-synonymy without in
the least undermining the position of occurrence-synonymy as the
more primitive and hence more important level of synonymy. Second¬
ly, it helps us to overcome two specific arguments, mentioned in
the last chapter, against making use of the level of sense-synonymy,
i.e. (1) the argument from the plurality of the levels of sense and
(2) the argument from the frequent vagueness of the boundaries be¬
tween (esp. complementary) senses. This second reason will be
expanded presently.
In the meantime, it will be helpful to sum up this section with
the following two statements. The nature of sense is as the merg¬
ing of occurrence-meanings. The status of sense, in descriptive
semantics, is as a 'tool' serving practical purposes.
4.3. The nature and status of sense-synonymy statements
It is on exactly the same lines that statements of sense-synonymy
are to be conceived in the present study.
Thus, as far as their nature is concerned, statements of sense-
synonymy are to be conceived as the merging of statements of occur¬
rence-synonymy. Statements of lexeme-synonymy, by extension, may
be conceived as the merging of statments of sense-synonymy or simply
as the merging, on a larger scale than in the case of sense-synonymy,
of statements of occurrence-synonymy. Given the high incidence of
polysemy in English, it is not surprising that statements of lexeme-
synonymy 3eem to be seldom warranted. Nevertheless, we would do
well to make our descriptive framework flexible enough to allow for
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this possibility, however rarely it may materialize in practice.
Statements of sense-synonymy, on the other hand, have a much more
useful role to play in contributing towards economy of description.
As far as their status is concerned, statements of sense-synonymy
are to be conceived as a 'tool' serving the practical purpose of
descriptive economy. This brings us back to the two arguments which
I said, towards the end of the last section, might be overcome by
adopting the conception of the level of sense as a means of serving
practical purposes.
The argument from the plurality of levels of sense constitutes a
r~
valid argument against making use of the level of sense-synonymy
only as long as the selection of one level of sense rather than
another in any given case is arbitrary and the selections of levels
in different cases are inconsistent in a haphazard way. Now once
we cease to conceive sense-synonymy statements as based on senses
established independently of and prior to the investigation of syn¬
onymy and begin to conceive of them instead as a means of achieving
descriptive economy, this argument ceases to be valid. The selec¬
tion of one level of sense rather than another in a given case will
no longer be arbitrary because that level of sense will be selected
which will best serve the purpose of descriptive economy. What is
exactly meant by 'which best serves the purpose of descriptive
economy' will become clear when later in this chapter we introduce two
principles designed to ensure the adequacy of sense-synonymy statements.
The selections of levels of sense in different cases will no longer
be inconsistent in a haphazard way because where inconsistency arises
this will have been the result of well-motivated selections in
individual cases.
When statements of sense-synonymy are conceived as a 'tool' serv¬
ing the practical purpose of descriptive economy, the argument from
the frequent vagueness of the boundaries between (esp. complementaiy)
senses will also cease to be valid. We have already noted in 3.4-
that this argument does not say that it is always the case that
(esp. complementary) senses are divided by vague boundaries, but
only that this is sometimes the case. Now what we require of a tool
is that it is useful on some occasions or for some purposes, and we
do not abandon it simply because it is not always useful. On the
other hand, of course, it is not wise to attempt to use it when it
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is not fit for its intended purpose. The same applies to the way
in which we should treat sense-synonymy statements.
Broadly speaking, it is in the light of the last few paragraphs
that sense-synonymy statements are to be conceived.
The usefulness and limitations of sense-synonymy statements;
different types of cases
To be somewhat more specific about the usefulness and limitations
of sense-synonymy statements, we may divide instances of synonymy
roughly into three types. Under the first type come lexemes whose
occurrences merge fairly neatly into a number of discrete senses.
It is when synonymy is seen to hold between the occurrences of such
words that the level of sense can often be put to good use in cap¬
turing the relevant facts in a statement of sense-synonymy. Among
the words we have looked at so far, 'thrive' and 'flourish', and
'match' and 'equal' may be cited as examples of this category.
The second category consists of lexemes whose occurrences it is
difficult, in varying degrees, to combine neatly into discrete
senses. Such synonymy as is found between occurrences assignable
to words of this category is less amenable to description on the
level of sense. Among the words examined earlier, 'real' and
'true', and 'lively' and 'animated' would seem to exemplify this
category.
In the case of both of the last two categories, occurrence-syn¬
onymy is more or less expected rather than merely accidental - more
will be said about this later. It is the somewhat unexpected coinci¬
dence of meaning that characterizes the third category. It is
exemplified by the occurrence-synonymy we noted earlier between
'drink' and 'eat'. Not only is it counter-intuitive to describe
such instances of occurrence-synonymy in sense-synonymy statements,
it is also inappropriate to do so on the ground that excessive
polysemy would result if such a practice was consistently adopted.
Instead, instances like this may be regarded as occurrence-synonyms
•par excellence.
We will later have occasion to clarify and expand on some of the
points touched upon in this section, but for the moment it suffices
to have indicated, in a somewhat crude way, where sense-synonymy
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statements are useful, where they are of limited usefulness, and
where they are of no use at all.
4.5. Descriptive adequacy and descriptive economy: two complementary
principles
Although our conception of sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy is
inductive in character, it is neither possible nor necessary to
proceed in an inductive manner when trying to arrive at the most
economical synonymy statements. Therefore, instead of moving from
occurrence-synonymy hypotheses to sense-synonymy hypotheses and
then to lexeme-synonymy hypotheses, we will follow the opposite,
deductive, direction. In theory, this means starting with lexeme-
synonymy hypotheses. In practice, however, since lexeme-synonymy
hypotheses are seldom worth seriously entertaining, we would do well
in most cases to start with sense-synonymy hypotheses. There need
be no requirements as to how we form such hypotheses: we may be
guided by intuitions, or dictionaries, or whatever. What matters
is that, once they are formed, such hypotheses should be subjected
to attempts at falsifying them. They will be judged to have with¬
held attempts at falsification and therefore to qualify as sense-
synonymy statements if and only if they conform to the following
constraints.
The first constraint is designed to ensure what might be called
the legitimacy of statements of sense-synonymy. Under this con-
s s
straint, it is legitimate to conclude that A and B are synonymous
3
if and only if for every occurrence assignable to A there is
3
assignable to B an occurrence which is synonymous with it, and
vice versa. This constraint, it will be remembered, it a natural
consequence of the assignment relation between occurrences and
senses.
The second constraint is designed to ensure what might be called
the genuineness of statements of sense-synonymy. Given that sense-
synonymy statements are conceived as the merging of occurrence-
synonymy statements, every statement of occurrence-synonymy is
capable of being turned into a statement of sense-synonymy, unless
we take steps to prevent this from happening. This is for the
simple reason that however accidental an instance of occurrence-
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synonymy may be, it is always possible to create or imagine circum¬
stances where it will be duplicated. For example, we could easily
make up sentences similar to (3.22) where the occurrence-synonymy
between 'eat' and 'drink' is repeated. In that event, we could then
merge these statements of occurrence-synonymy regarding 'eat' and
'drink' into a single statement of sense-synonymy. But somehow such
statements of sense-synonymy seem to be merely 'passing for' what
they purport to be. In other words, they do not seem to be genuine
statements of sense-synonymy. The explanation for this is not hard
to find. When we remind ourselves that there are potentially infi¬
nite levels of sense, it is easy to see that the statement of sense-
synonymy between 'eat' and 'drink' is made on too low a level. By
this token we may say that a genuine statement of sense-synonymy is
one that is made on a sufficiently high level of sense.
Two provisions will be introduced whereby a sufficiently high
level of sense might be ensured. The first provision stipulates
that a hypothesis of sense-synonymy must be tested in randomly
obtained sentences where at least one of the two synonymy candidates
is acceptable. This provision is based on the rationale that
'accidental' synonyms are ones which are synonymous as a result of
special sentential circumstances such that the same words will not
be synonymous in randomly obtained sentences. Under this provision,
for instance, sentences like (3.23) and (3.24.) will prevent a
statement of sense-synonymy from being made for 'eat' and 'drink'.
For this provision to have the intended effect, however, the range
of randomly obtained sentences must be narrowed down by some prior
intuitive notion of what the two relevant senses are, so that lack
of synonymy between such occurrences of the same two lexemes as
are not assignable to the two relevant senses will not count as
evidence against the sense-synonymy hypothesis. Otherwise, this
provision would have the same effect on 'thrive' and 'flourish' as
it has on 'eat' and 'drink'. In fact, it would automatically
falsify all sense-synonymy hypotheses in the case of lexemes which
fall short of lexeme-synonymy. Once we add this caveat, however,
we must also admit that the very need for some prior notion of the
identity of the senses somewhat weakens the present provision.
A second provision, therefore, will not be out of place. Under
this provision, we postulate a lexicon and a 'grammar', both
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specially designed for handling synonyms. The lexicon is such that
every time a statement of sense-synonymy is made the senses in ques¬
tion must be entered under the lexemes to which they are respectively
assignable. The 'grammar', on the other hand, consists of rules
which are designed to account for, among other things, instances of
accidental occurrence-synonymy. In this way, the principle of dim¬
inishing returns may be relied on to prevent 'eat' and 'drink' (and
other synonyms of the third category), but not 'thrive' and 'flour¬
ish' (and other synonyms of the first category), from being covered
by sense-synonymy statements.
The third and final constraint is designed to ensure what might
be called the naturalness of statements of sense-synonymy. A
natural statement of sense-synonymy is one that conforms approxi¬
mately to native speakers' intuitions as regards the merging of
occurrence-meanings into sense-meanings. By insisting on the
naturalness of sense-synonymy statements, the present constraint
will also serve to render sense-synonymy hypotheses amenable to
falsification by preventing A° or B° (or both) in a counter instance
A0 ^ B° from being assigned in an ad hoc manner to an allegedly dif¬
ferent sense from the ones regarding which a sense-synonymy hypoth¬
esis is being tested. Let us envisage, for example, the following
situation. After partial substitution tests have been carried out
on a sufficiently large sample of randomly obtained sentences, it
is found that two words are occurrence-synonymous in the majority
of the sentences but are not occurrence-synonymous in the rest.
All of the occurrences of each word in these sentences, however,
are intuitively felt to be assignable to a single sense. Further¬
more, there is no intuitively satisfactory way of subdividing either
of the senses in question in such a way that the non-synonymous
occurrences can be re-assigned. Under these circumstances, we are
not permitted under the third constraint to re-assign the non-
synonymous occurrences in order that we may then sum up the syn¬
onymous occurrences in the form of a statement of sense-synonymy.
Together, then, these three constraints are designed to ensure
the descriptive adequacy of sense-synonymy statements resulting
from sense-synonymy hypotheses. Of these three constraints, the
last two clearly leave something to be desired. Until more work
is done, therefore, I can only hope that the three constraints
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will go some way towards achieving the end to which they are designed.
As for lexeme-synonymy statements, if we assume that lexeme-
identity is unproblematic, the condition of descriptive adequacy
will be satisfied provided only that these statements are legit¬
imate. Therefore, only one constraint, parallel to the first con¬
straint on sense-synonymy statements, is required. Under this con¬
straint, it is legitimate to conclude that A^" and B^" are lexeme-
synonymous if and only if for every occurrence (or sense) assignable to A1
there is assignable to an occurrence (or sense) which is synony¬
mous with it, and vice versa.
These four constraints, three on sense-synonymy statements and
one on lexeme-synonymy statements, may be subsumed under the 'prin¬
ciple of descriptive adequacy'.
To this may now be added the 'principle of maximum descriptive
economy', which is self-explanatory.
Now according to the former principle alone. lexeme-synonymy
statements, sense-synonymy statements and occurrence-synonymy state¬
ments are equally desirable as long as they fulfil the requirement
of descriptive adequacy. According to the latter principle alone,
on the other hand, lexeme-synonymy statements are always to be
preferred. In order to achieve the best description, therefore, we
have to operate with a combination of the two principles. Thus, we
aim first of all for descriptively adequate lexeme-synonymy state¬
ments; if descriptive adequacy cannot be achieved for them, we then
aim for descriptively adequate sense-synonymy statements; only if
descriptive adequacy cannot be achieved for sense-synonymy state¬
ments do we finally resort to occurrence-synonymy statements, whose
descriptive adequacy, with regard to the identity of lexical units,
can be safely taken for granted.
The forming of sense-synonymy hypotheses is, of course, compli¬
cated by the plurality of levels of sense. With the introduction
of the two above-mentioned principles, however, the plurality of
levels of sense will no longer pose any problems. For, in each
given case where sense-synonymy statements are warranted, that
level of sense will be selected which makes for the highest possible
degree of descriptive economy compatible with descriptive adequacy.
We said earlier in this chapter that "the selection of one level of
sense rather than another in a given case will no longer be arbit-
- 67 -
rary because that level of sense will be selected which best
serves the purpose of descriptive economy". Now this is precisely
what is meant by 'which best serves the purpose of descriptive
economy'•
4..6. Occurrence-synonymy statements and 'qualified' sense-synonymy
statements
If the two principles are adhered to, the description of synonymy
relations will consist of three categories of synonymy statements:
lexeme-synonymy statements, sense-synonymy statements and occurrence-
synonymy statements. The last category, however, is not homogeneous.
For the purpose of describing synonymy relations, roughly two
types of occurrence-synonyms (i.e. synonyms covered by occurrence-
synonymy statements alone) may be distinguished. On the one hand,
there are occurrence-synonyms which end up in occurrence-synonymy
statements because sense-synonymy hypotheses concerning the corre¬
sponding senses have been somewhat narrowly refuted by one or more
types of counter-instances. On the other hand, there are occur¬
rence-synonyms which end up in occurrence-synonymy statements be¬
cause sense-synonymy hypotheses concerning the corresponding senses
have been refuted in all but a small number of types of instances.
In view of this important difference, I would like to suggest,
in the interests of descriptive economy, that a small number of
types of counter-instances need not prevent us from using sense-
synonymy statements, provided certain qualifications are introduced.
Thus, what might be called a 'qualified' sense-synonymy statement
s s
will take the following form: "A and B are synonymous except when
...". Occurrence-synonyms of the second type, on the other hand,
may be covered by occurrence-synonymy statements of the following
si si
form: "A (or A ) and B (or B ) are occurrence-synonymous only
when ...".
While lexeme-synonymy and sense-synonymy statements (qualified
or not) will be entered in the lexicon, occurrence-synonymy state¬
ments will be predicted by a rule or rules to be found in the
'grammar'. The conjunction of such rules will be of the form:
"AS (or A~) and B3 ( or B"^") are occurrence-synonymous when X-^, when
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X£, when ... or when Xn (where X^, etc. stand for relevant de¬
termining factors or causes)". These rules are directed at the
circumstances under which occurrence-synonymy may arise. A general
rule will be suggested in Chapter 10.
We may also find it profitable to introduce analogous rules in
the 'grammar' for qualified sense-synonymy statements, to be di¬
rected at the circumstances under which occurrence-synonymy will
not hold between two otherwise synonymous senses. The conjunction
s s
of these rules will take the following form: "A and B are not
occurrence-synonymous when X-^, when X^, when X^ ... or when X^".
Such rules may then be drawn upon in filling the space after "when
..." in qualified sense-synonymy statements in the lexicon. Some
specific rules will be suggested in Chapter 9.
It should now be stressed that the distinction between the two
types of occurrence-synonyms is motivated entirely by consider¬
ations of descriptive economy. In Chapter 8, however, we will draw
a very similar distinction between two types of occurrence-synonyms,
which is entirely motivated by considerations of the naturalness of
explanatory statements (i.e. statements aimed at explaining the
irregular behaviour of senses as regards synonymy). The two dis¬
tinctions largely overlap. But where there is a difference, dif¬
ferent considerations will prevail according to whether we are
engaged in trying to make the most (descriptively adequate) econ¬
omical descriptive statements of synonymy relations or in trying to
offer the most natural explanatory statements of why the same two
senses are sometimes synonymous and sometimes not synonymous. It
should be pointed out, therefore, that the specific rules referred
to at the end of each of the last two paragraphs are designed in
the first place for the latter purpose and that consequently they
may sometimes have to be adapted before they can be put to good




5.1. Criteria of synonymy and lexical units
In the last two chapters our concern was with the lexical units
between which synonymy is to be conceived as a meaning-relation,
first with regard to the definition of synonymy and then with re¬
gard to its description. Our concern, in other words, was with the
A and B in our synonymy formula, A = B. The way is now clear for an
explication or elucidation of the equation sign in the synonymy
formula. Such an explication is aimed at answering the question of
what it is for two lexical units to be synonymous. In this chapter
we will prepare the ground for such an explication, ending with the
identification of two distinct criteria of synonymy. Then, in the
next two chapters, we will consider the two criteria in turn.
The nature of our present undertaking derives in large measure
from conclusions that we reached in the last two chapters. Of these
conclusions, three are particularly relevant in this regard, namely:
(1) a conception of synonymy should treat occurrence-synonymy as a
legitimate level of synonymy; (2) a conception of synonymy should
also allow for sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy as a means, or
potential means, of achieving descriptive economy; and (3) occur¬
rence-synonymy is the primitive, or most basic, level of synonymy,
from whose characterization can be derived characterizations of
sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy provided questions of sense-
identity and lexeme-identity can be settled in advance.
In view of the first two conclusions, our task as regards the
equation sign is to provide an explication of synonymy as a mean¬
ing-relation between occurrences, between senses, and between lexemes.
It follows from the third conclusion, however, that to carry out
this task it will be sufficient to explicate synonymy as a meaning-
relation between occurrences (see, however, 7.9). On the question
of lexeme-identity we may continue to assume that lexeme-identity
is generally unproblematic. On the question of sense-identity we
supplied an answer in the last chapter by conceiving sense-synonymy
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statements as a means of achieving descriptive economy and, more
specifically, by introducing the genuineness constraint and the
naturalness constraint on sense-synonymy statements. We may safely
confine ourselves in this and the next two chapters (except for 7.9),
then, to seeking an explication of synonymy as a meaning-relation
between occurrences, or, in other words, to completing the bicon¬
ditional in the following statement: "A and B are synonymous in a
sentence and context if and only if ...".
5.2. Preconditions of adequacy
As is to be expected, two types of approach must be ruled out
from the outset. The first is exemplified by the following state¬
ment:
We can say that the sentences, "I saw a policeman," and "I
saw a cop," are paraphrases of each other because the only
difference between the two sentences is the substitution
of the word cop for policeman and these two words are syn¬
onymous (Nilsen & Nilsen, 1975: 142)•
From this we can infer the following generalization: Two words are
synonymous in a sentence because they are synonymous in isolation.
What is implicit in this generalization is that sentence-synonymy,
where the difference between two sentences consists in the choice of
a different word, is discoverable via word-synonymy. But this is
question-begging unless word-synonymy can be shown to be discoverable
independently of their use in sentences. The fact, however, is that
word-synonymy cannot be properly established except in terms of the
contribution that words make to the meaning of sentences. In other
words, it is not sentence-synonymy that is deducible from word-syn¬
onymy but word-synonymy that is deducible from sentence-synonymy.
The conception of word-synonymy implied by Nilsen and Nilsen must be
rejected, therefore, for reasons of circularity.
In rejecting this conception, we are insisting that word-synonymy
must be determined via the more basic relation of sentence-synonymy.
Equally to be rejected is any approach according to which the
question of synonymy between A and B in a sentence/context is not
determinable with reference to that sentence/context alone. Such
an approach is founded on the assumption that two words cannot be
synonymous in one sentence/context unless they are synonymous in all
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sentences/contexts. We have already seen that this assumption is
untenable.
For our present purpose this approach may be seen as falling into
two types. The first type consists of explications of sense-synonymy
or lexeme-synonymy such that they are directly derived from prior
explications of some sort of occurrence-equivalence, though, need¬
less to say, the occurrence-equivalence in question is not treated
as synonymy. The 'universal interchangeability' theory clearly
belongs to this type. The following are two representative pro¬
nouncements, the first by a philosopher, the second by a linguist:
Two expressions are synonymous in a language L if and only
if they may be interchanged in each sentence in L without
altering the truth value of that sentence (Mates, 1969: 54-9).
Only those words can be described as synonymous which can
replace each other in any given context, without the slight¬
est alteration either in cognitive or in emotive import
(Ullmann, 1957: 108-9).
Explications like these are easily reducible to explications of
occurrence-equivalence; and there is no reason why we should not
adopt the latter as explications of occurrence-synonymy if they come
up to our requirements of adequacy, nor is there any reason why we
should not make use of them in our search for an explication of
occurrence-synonymy if they do not come up to such requirements.
The second type of the approach in question comprises explica¬
tions of sense-synonymy or lexeme-synonymy such that they are not
directly derived from any prior explications of occurrence-equival¬
ence. What we have here, in other words, are treatments of syn¬
onymy in which explications of the equation sign are interwoven
with a particular level of lexical unit on which synonymy is
conceived as a meaning-relation.
To this type belongs, for example, Harris's explication of syn¬
onymy, in which each expression is paired with one meaning and
which is thus ambiguous as between lexeme-synonymy and sense-syn¬
onymy. According to Harris, for two expressions to be synonymous
is for them to have identical semantic characterizations. A
procedure is adopted whereby the semantic characterization of each
expression is first arrived at individually for that expression
and only then are the semantic characterizations of different ex¬
pressions compared to determine whether the expressions are syn¬
onymous. There is thus no (direct) way in which we can reduce this
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explication to some corresponding explication of occurrence-equiv¬
alence.
Another example of this second type would be an explication of
synonymy (also ambiguous as between sense-synonymy and lexeme-syn¬
onymy) derivable from Firth's theory of meaning. Firth, according
Sampson (1980: 226), "equate(s) the meaning of a word with the
range of verbal contexts in which it occurs". As Sampson further
notes, this view of meaning is
perverse. Apart from anything else, it forces us to claim,
say, that in a context such as Stop that this instant or I'll
tan your , the word podex is as likely to occur as
backside - or alternatively to deny that these words are
synonymous, which by all normal criteria they are (1980: 227).
Explications of this second type, it will have become clear, re¬
present a more radical departure from our view of synonymy than do
those of the first type. As a consequence, they are of little use
for our purpose.
Whichever type it may happen to fall under, however, the approach
under discussion must be rejected as incompatible with occurrence-
synonymy.
In rejecting this approach, we are insisting that the question
as to whether A and B are synonymous in a sentence and context can
and should be decided with reference to that sentence and context
alone.
In the light of the foregoing it is clear that an adequate
explication of occurrence-synonymy must at least fulfil two require¬
ments: that it explicates word-synonymy via sentence-synonymy, and
that it does not take us outside the sentence/context in question.
5.3. Interchangeability and sameness of meaning as two separate
criteria of synonymy
The two minimal requirements specified above are fulfilled by
the following definitions of synonymy:
If there is one or more environment in which two lexemes
are substitutable for each other without (my underlining)
any change in COGNITIVE meaning, then they are synonymous
in that environment or those environments (Bennett, 1968: 158).
Synonymy can be said to occur if items are close enough in
their meaning to allow a choice to be made between them in
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some contexts, without (my underlining) there being any dif¬
ference for the meaning of the sentence as a whole (Crystal,
1980: 345).
These definitions, it is important to note, contain two separate
criteria of synonymy, the second criterion beginning with 'without'
in each case. The first criterion, which we may refer to as the
'interchangeability criterion', is that A and B must be interchange¬
able in a sentence/context. In common parlance, 'interchangeable'
is sometimes used of two words in the sense of "substitutable for
each other without any change in the meaning of a particular sen¬
tence". This is clearly not the sense in which 'interchangeable'
is to be construed in the two definitions in question, for otherwise
there would have been no need for 'without ...' in these definitions .
The second criterion may be referred to as the 'sameness of meaning
criterion', which requires that the substitution of A for B and
vice versa preserve the meaning of the sentence in which the sub¬
stitution takes place.
It is obvious that the sameness of meaning criterion is the more
important, in that it directly answers the question of what it is
for two occurrences to be synonymous. Equally obvious, however, is
that for two occurrences to be synonymous in a sentence/context,
it must first be established that the two occurrences are in fact
interchangeable in that sentence/context (i.e. that they can both
occur in that sentence/context), however one may wish to define
interchangeability. The two criteria, therefore, are both necess¬
ary to the explication of occurrence-synonymy: the interchangeability
criterion as an indispensable preliminary, the sameness of meaning
criterion as the substantive part of the explication.
There is no novelty in the identification of these two criteria.
What is lacking is a generally agreed way of characterizing them.
Treatments of synonymy have in the main concentrated on the
sameness of meaning criterion while the interchangeability criterion
has tended to be taken for granted. This would not matter if
interchangeability was a clear notion. In point of fact, however,
the notion of interchangeability is far from unproblematic. As
Naess reminds us:
The terms 'interchangeability' and 'exchangeability' are
vague, ambiguous and mostly used without basis in any
criteria applicable in research. There is no procedure
established for finding out, for instance, whether
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'brother' and 'male sibling' are interchangeable in English
(1956: 9).
What Naess said in 1956 is perhaps still largely true today. If so,
this is unfortunate, for, as we have seen, the relationship between
the two criteria of synonymy is such that we cannot ask whether A
and B have the same meaning in a sentence/context unless we have
first established that they are interchangeable in that sentence/
context. Thus the sameness of meaning criterion will be vitiated
to whatever extent an unobjectionable interchangeability criterion
is lacking.
As for the sameness of meaning criterion itself, it seems to me
beyond doubt that the only approach that can lead to an adequate
characterization is one which invokes the prior notion of bilateral
implication between sentences. Here complications and controversies
arise, largely as a result of the fact that, when applied to natural
language.the notion of bilateral implication in turn poses diffi¬
cult problems, not least because it is open to more than one inter¬
pretation. To arrive at an adequate characterization of the same¬
ness of meaning criterion, then, what we will have to do is to
provide an adequate characterization of bilateral implication as
an explication of sentence-synonymy.




CRITERIA OF SYNONYMY; 1. INTERCHANGEABILITY
6.1. Interchangeability and acceptability: varieties of accepta¬
bility
To say that A and B are interchangeable in a sentence is to say
that the substitution of A for B or vice versa does not render that
sentence unacceptable. (Alternatively, of course, to say that A
and B are interchangeable in a sentence is to say that A and B are
both acceptable, or can both occur, in a certain position in that
sentence. Strictly speaking, however, this is a derivative state¬
ment, since for A or B to be acceptable in a sentence is for that
sentence, of which A or B is a constituent, to be acceptable in the
first place. Thus, although we may also talk about the acceptabil¬
ity of words in sentences as opposed to the acceptability of sen¬
tences, we can do so only derivatively.) Thus the correlative
notion of interchangeability on the level of sentence is that of
acceptability, and it is through the notion of sentential accepta¬
bility that an explication of lexical interchangeability must be
sought.
As is well known, acceptability is a complex and far from homo¬
geneous notion. For our present purpose four types or levels of
acceptability and, by the same token, unacceptability (or anomaly)
may be roughly distinguished: the grammatical, the semantic, the
collocational and the situational.
We will consider grammatical acceptability first. For a sen¬
tence to remain grammatically acceptable under the substitution of
A for B, it is necessary and sufficient that A and B belong to the
same syntactic category or sub-category. Downright grammatical
anomaly will occur, for example, if we replace 'reason' with
'because' (unless 'because' is being quoted) in
(6.1) The reason/*because is hard to explain.
Needless to say, the anomaly will be due to the fact that 'reason'
and 'because' do not belong to the same syntactic category. More
specifically, this may be seen as constituting a violation of
categorial-component rules. Grammatical anomaly will also occur if
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we replace 'bear' with 'abide' in (6.3), although in (6.2) the two
words are both perfectly acceptable:
(6.2) She can't bear/abide those noisy children.
(6.3) She can't bear/*abide to see animals cruelly treated.
This time the grammatical anomaly will be due to the fact that
'abide' does not come under the sub-category of verbs which can be
followed by an infinitive construction. More specifically, this may
be seen as constituting a violation of rules of strict subcategor-
ization (cf. Weinreich, 1966: 414-6).
Where to draw the line between grammatical anomaly on the one
hand and semantic or collocational anomaly on the other depends on
how fine one's syntactic sub-categories are. In the present treat¬
ment the line is drawn with reference to what are commonly known as
co-occurrence or selection restrictions (of which more later) such
that we will treat as either semantic or collocational such anomaly
as is due to the breach of co-occurrence restrictions.
The distinction between semantic and collocational acceptability,
as it is drawn here, is based on the prior distinction between the
meaning (i.e. sense-meaning) of a sense and its co-occurrence
restrictions. We will justify this latter distinction in Chapter 9.
The important point for our present purpose is that the relationship
between the meaning of a sense and its co-occurrence restrictions
is such that the latter are often the direct result of the former.
Take, for example, the substitution of 'increase' for 'improve' in
(6.4) The factory has improved/increased its output.
(6.5) The factory has improved/*increased its working condi¬
tions .
We may explain the unacceptability of 'increase' in (6.5) by say¬
ing that 'increase' requires an object capable of being construed
in terms of quantity (or amount), etc., a requirement which is not
fulfilled by 'working conditions' in the sentence and the implied
context in question. Now this co-occurrence restriction is not
gratuitous, but is entailed by the meaning of 'increase', which we
may roughly characterize as "make greater in quantity, etc.".
It is equally important to note, however, that the co-occurrence
restrictions of a sense need not be the direct result of its mean¬
ing. A case in point is the unacceptability of 'handsome' (with
the sense-meaning of "generous") in (6.7) as opposed to its
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acceptability in (6.6):
(6.6) He gave me a generous/handsome gift.
(6.7) He is generous/*handsome with his money.
As an explanation of the unacceptability of 'handsome' in (6.7), it
seems safe to suggest that 'handsome' (when carrying the sense-mean¬
ing of "generous") is subject to the co-occurrence restriction that
it is not directly applicable to human beings. We will have more to
say about this co-occurrence restriction in Chapter 9. In the mean¬
time, one thing is clear: it is implausible to see this co-occur¬
rence restriction as directly resulting from the relevant sense-
meaning of 'handsome'.
Having identified two types of co-occurrence restrictions, we
\
are now in a position to offer the following characterizations of
semantic acceptability and collocational acceptability.
For a sentence to remain semantically acceptable under the
substitution of A for B, it is necessary and sufficient that there
is no breach of such co-occurrence restrictions as are the direct
result of the meaning of A.
For a sentence to remain collocationally acceptable, on the
other hand, under the substitution of A for B, it is necessary and
sufficient that there is no breach of A's co-occurrence restrictions,
whether they are the direct result of A's meaning or not.
It should be clear from the above that collocational acceptabil¬
ity entails semantic acceptability, but not vice versa. Conversely,
semantic anomaly entails collocational anomaly, but not vice versa.
It will be convenient (particularly in Chapter 9), however, also
to talk about what may be called purely collocational anomaly (or
unacceptability), by which is meant collocational anomaly caused by
the breach of such co-occurrence restrictions of a sense as are not
the direct result of its meaning. Semantic anomaly does not entail
purely collocational anomaly, nor the other way round; in fact,
they are complementary.
Once we have introduced the notion of purely collocational anom¬
aly, it may be mentioned that the distinction between semantic and
purely collocational anomaly is not always easy to draw in prac¬
tice. This fact becomes important when it comes to accounting for
the failure of two senses to be interchangeable in certain sentences
when they are interchangeable in other sentences. In Chapter 9,
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where ue will be concerned with this, we will adopt the general
principle according to which an explanation in terms of semantic
anomaly is preferable, for being more powerful, to one in terms of
purely collocational anomaly and therefore the latter should be
invoked only as a last resort.
We are now left with situational acceptability yet to explain.
For a sentence to remain situationally acceptable under the substi¬
tution of A for B, it is necessary and sufficient that the sentence
does not become inappropriate because of A's stylistic properties
(e.g. formal, informal, literary, poetic, archaic, technical, dia¬
lectal). An account of stylistic properties will be given in
Chapter 11. In the meantime it should be stressed that the sharing
of identical stylistic properties by A and B is not a necessary
condition for a sentence to remain situationally acceptable under
the substitution of A for B. It is only when their stylistic
properties diverge beyond a certain extent, the exact extent de¬
pending on actual situations, that A's substitution for B will
render the sentence situationally anomalous.
We have just distinguished and briefly characterized four types
of acceptability and anomaly. These will be discussed further and
in greater detail in Chapter 9. What will occupy us for the
remainder of this chapter is the more general question, now seen in
a clearer light as a result of the distinction of four types of
acceptability and anomaly, of how to define interchangeability as
a criterion of synonymy.
6.2. Loose interchangeability and strict interchangeability
In view of the heterogeneous nature of acceptability, the notion
of interchangeability cannot be taken for granted. It is essential,
if we are to be 'responsible' in seeking an explication of synonymy
for a natural language with the aid of the notion of interchange-
ability, that we spell out how many and which of the various types
of acceptability of a sentence are meant to be entailed by the
interchangeability of A and B in that sentence.
It should first be noted, however, that we are not free to
characterize interchangeability, as a criterion of synonymy, in
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just any way we like. For, in the context of explicating synonymy,
to say that A and B are interchangeable in a sentence is in fact
just a somewhat more technical way of saying, in more everyday lan¬
guage, that A and B can both occur, or can both be used, in that
sentence. From this way of looking at interchangeability we may
derive the following constraint on its characterization: an adequate
characterization of interchangeability must be such that given any
statement to the effect that A and B are interchangeable in a sen¬
tence it will not be inappropriate, or counter-intuitive, also to
say that A and B can both occur in that sentence.
In treatments of synonymy the notion of interchangeability tends
to be used in such a way that it seems to entail only grammatical
acceptability. I say 'seems' because usually no clear indications
are given. Even where grammatical acceptability or some such notion
is explicitly mentioned, it is not clear, for lack of further spec¬
ification, whether it is conceived as having the scope we have given
it or as having broad enough a scope to subsume either what we have
treated as collocational acceptability or, more narrowly, what we
have treated as semantic acceptability. Whatever the case may be,
there is no doubt that it would be highly counter-intuitive to
regard grammatical acceptability as we conceive it as a sufficient
condition of interchangeability, in view of such cases as (6.5) on
the one hand and (6.7) on the other. Clearly, we do not want to
say that 'increase' can occur in (6.5), nor that 'handsome' can
occur in (6.7). As (6.5) and (6.7), which exhibit semantic and
purely collocational anomaly respectively, combine to suggest,
collocational acceptability must, if we are to avoid a highly
counter-intuitive characterization of interchangeability, be treated
as a necessary condition in addition to grammatical acceptability.
Given the not uncommon lack of explicit statement on this matter,
it is necessary to make the above point clear, but once clearly
stated, this much may be taken as fairly uncontroversial.
What is (potentially) controversial is whether situational
acceptability is also to be treated as a necessary condition of
interchangeability. Here we find ourselves in something of a
dilemma, which in fact faces anyone who invokes the notion of inter¬
changeability and at the same time treats synonymy as purely a
matter of cognitive meaning. On the one hand, it is obviously
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somewhat artificial to treat A and B as both capable of occurring
in a sentence when the substitution of the one for the other will
render that sentence situationally unacceptable. On the other hand,
if we for this reason judge A and B to be non-synonymous in the sen¬
tence, our judgement will have been interfered with by a factor
which has nothing to do with cognitive meaning. Moreover, if we for
the same reason judge A and B to be non-synonymous in the sentence,
we will be treating as non-synonymous many lexical items which are
normally treated as synonymous (e.g. 'mingy'/'avaricious' and 'pop
off'/'pass away' in Ullmann's quotation immediately to follow).
This dilemma is thrown into sharp relief in the following observa¬
tion by Ullmann:
If ... the difference between synonyms is mainly emotive or
stylistic, there may be no overlap at all: however close in
objective meaning, they belong to totally different regis¬
ters or levels of style and cannot normally be interchanged.
It is difficult to imagine any context - except a deliber¬
ately comical or ironical one - where mingy could replace
avaricious or where pop off could be substituted for pass
away (1961: 14-3).
Our dilemma, to put it more directly, is that a drawback will
arise if we do not treat situational acceptability as a necessary
condition of interchangeability, while a couple of other drawbacks
will arise if we do. To free ourselves from this dilemma, I pro¬
pose a solution consisting of three steps. The first step is to
distinguish two degrees of interchangeability, which we may refer
to as 'loose' and 'strict' interchangeability respectively. Loose
interchangeability entails grammatical acceptability and colloca¬
tional acceptability, while strict interchangeability entails also
situational acceptability. The second step, designed to avoid the two
drawbacks of treating situational acceptability as a necessary
condition of interchangeability and hence of synonymy, is to stipu¬
late that for A and B to be synonymous it is necessary for them to
be loosely interchangeable, but not necessary for them to be strictly
interchangeable. This does not, of course, alter the fact that it
is somewhat artificial to treat A and B as both capable of occurring
in a sentence when they are only loosely interchangeable in that
sentence. We must acknowledge this drawback of not treating situ¬
ational acceptability as a necessary condition of interchangeabii-
ity, which the final step is designed to remedy. This final step
consists in the further stipulation that a statement of synonymy
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will specify whether the synonyms in question are loosely or strictly
interchangeable.
To conclude our characterization of interchangeability, here is
our twofold interchangeability criterion again: A and B are loosely
interchangeable in a sentence if and only if that sentence remains
grammatically and collocationally acceptable under the substitu¬
tion of A for B and vice versa; A and B are strictly interchange¬
able in a sentence if and only if that sentence remains grammati¬
cally, collocationally and situationally acceptable under the sub¬
stitution of A for B and vice versa.
6.3. Judgement-interchangeability and performance-interchangeability
Having worked out an interchangeability criterion, we must now
tackle a further problem, namely: judgements of acceptability (and,
by the same token, interchangeability) cannot always be made with
certainty. Instead of being a simple 'yes or no' matter, accepta¬
bility is in the nature of a scale on which, following Greenbaum
and Quirk (1970), we should identify at least three points. In
Greenbaum and Quirk's words, these are 'perfectly natural and
normal', 'wholly unnatural and abnormal' and 'somewhere between'
(1970: 5, 9 and 16). I have carried out some informal testing,
which (for what it is worth) confirms the need to recognize a bor¬
derline cateogory. For example, I have noticed considerable
hesitancy on the part of some informants when asked to judge (via
the notion of acceptability) the interchangeability of 'fast'/
'rapid', 'ordinary'/'common', 'disaster'/'calamity' and 'lively'/
'animated' in the following sentences (the question mark in these
sentences indicates hesitancy over the acceptability of the word
in question), where it seems to me reasonable to ask whether the
two words in each pair are synonymous:
(6.8) It is a very fast/?rapid horse.
(6.9) He has a rapid/?fast pulse.
(6.10) Just wear your ordinary/?common clothes.
(6.11) This word is no longer in common/?ordinary use.
(6.12) Natural disasters/?calamities are unknown to this region.
(6.13) She is a (an) lively/?animatea conversationalist.
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We must distinguish, of course, between what we may call genuine
hesitancy, which is a reflection of inherent uncertainties in the
language, and what we may call trivial hesitancy, which is due merely
to informants' lack of familiarity with the synonym candidates in
question. Where genuine hesitancy is involved, as in the case of
'fast'/'rapid' and 'ordinary'/'common', it seems usually to lie
somewhere on the borderline between semantic acceptability/anomaly
and purely collocational acceptability/anomaly. If this is so, then
it is hardly surprising that judgements of acceptability should
often be accompanied by hesitancy. For here we are on ground where
the issues involved are subtle while the intuitions available are
hazy. As far as trivial hesitancy is concerned, I have not infre¬
quently found informants to be hesitant as to the interchangeability
of A and B in a sentence for the simple reason that they are not
sufficiently familiar with A or B or both, or a particular use of A
or B or both. The hesitancy as regards 'disaster'/'calamity' and,
to a lesser extent, 'lively'/'animated' seems to be largely of this
character. This is attested by the frank admission by some inform¬
ants that some of the words in question are not within the vocabu¬
lary that they know well. When lack of familiarity is indeed the
only or chief cause of hesitancy, it is clear that the resultant
judgement should be disregarded. There is a sense in which we are
better masters of grammar than of vocabulary. This fact imposes a
limitation on our inquiry into interchangeability and synonymy,
which no amount of ingenuity can overcome.
Leaving trivial hesitancy out of account, we have yet to decide,
in the case of genuine hesitancy, whether or not A and B should be
treated as interchangeable in a sentence. To do this, I will begin
by drawing a distinction between acceptability as a matter of judge¬
ment and acceptability as a matter of performance (i.e. the actual
use of language). We have already seen that, as a matter of judge¬
ment, acceptability is in the nature of a scale, on which we have
identified three points. Having drawn the above distinction, I
will treat A and B as strictly judgment-interchangeable in a sen¬
tence if and only if that sentence is judged to be 'perfectly
natural and normal' under the substitution of A for B and vice
versa; and I will treat A and B as loosely judgement-interchange¬
able in a sentence if and only if that sentence is not judged to be
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'perfectly natural and normal' under the substitution and what pre¬
vents it from being judged as 'perfectly natural and normal' is
lack of complete situational acceptability. Now the distinction
between strict and loose interchangeability is impossible to draw
in the case of performance, since when A and B are established as
interchangeable in a sentence through observation of performance
it must be inferred that the sentence remains acceptable under the
substitution on all counts (i.e. A and B are strictly interchange¬
able in it). I will treat A and B as performance-interchangeable
in a sentence if and only if A and B have both been observed to
occur in that sentence such that the use of neither A nor B is a
performance error (such as slips of tongue or pen).
It is well known that judgements of acceptability (whether
elicited or volunteered) are often at variance with elicited and, to
an even greater extent, spontaneous performance. Generally speak-
ing, judgement-acceptability entails (potential) performance-
acceptability, but not conversely. Thus what normally happens is
that informants may judge sentences to be of dubious acceptability
when these sentences have in fact been observed in their own speech.
Where judgement-acceptability and performance-acceptability
diverge, we are not obliged to treat either type of acceptability
as uniquely valid to the exclusion of the other. Both are valid in
their own way, though, beyond saying that the former suggests more
care and self-consciousness in the choice of words than the other,
their respective spheres of validity are difficult to pin down.
In view of the distinction between judgement-acceptability and
performance-acceptability, our interchangeability criterion needs
to be slightly modified. It now stands as follows: For A and B to
be synonymous in a sentence, it is necessary either that they are
loosely judgement-interchangeable in that sentence or that they are
performance-interchangeable in that sentence; it is not necessary
that they are strictly judgement-interchangeable.
Coming back now to the question as to whether, in the case of
genuine hesitancy, A and B should be treated as interchangeable in
a sentence, we have already mentioned that there are (a large num¬
ber of) cases where A and B fall short of judgement-interchange-
ability but nevertheless satisfy the requirement of performance-
interchangeability. Now, as it will have become clear from our
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modified interchangeability criterion, it is only in such cases that
the answer is in the affirmative.
6.4-. The importance of the interchangeability criterion
We have already emphasized the importance of the interchange-
ability criterion in the last chapter. To this emphasis we may now
add that the interchangeability criterion is especially crucial
under two circumstances.
In the first place, there are words such that, except in highly
elliptical sentences, they will almost automatically be synonymous
if and when they are interchangeable. Examples are 'entire'/'com¬
plete', 'disaster'/'calamity', •obstacle'/'impediment' and 'fast'/
'quick'. Of the last pair, for instance, it has been said that
Fast and quick largely overlap in meaning but differ in
the contexts in which they can be used. Fast engine sounds
more natural than quick engine and quick temper sounds
better than fast temper (Kadesh et_al, 1976: 214).
Now if 'fast' is acceptable in the environment of ' temper'
and if 'quick' is acceptable in the environment of ' engine',
then the synonymy of the two words in these environments will be
virtually assured.
In the second place, it often happens that a sentence is seman-
tically constrained in such a way that a particular place in it can
be filled by almost any word or expression without changing the
meaning of the sentence provided the word or expression in question
does not render the sentence unacceptable.
Under both of the above circumstances, the interchangeability
criterion and the sameness of meaning criterion effectively merge
into one, with almost the entire weight being concentrated on our




CRITERIA OF SYNONYMY: 2. SAMENESS OF MEANING
7.1. Sameness of meaning in terms of bilateral implication
Once A and B have been established as interchangeable in a sen¬
tence, a sameness of meaning criterion is needed to determine
whether or not they also have the same meaning in that sentence.
To be adequate, as we pointed out in Chapter 5, the sameness of
meaning criterion must be conceived in terms of bilateral implica¬
tion (or entailment). The sameness of meaning criterion so con¬
ceived is based on "the systematic connection between semantic
relations between statements and semantic relations between words"
(Leech, 1970: 34-5), whereby the latter can be explicated in terms
of the former. Here are two definitions of synonymy in this vein:
Synonymy may be defined in terms of bilateral implication,
or equivalence. If one sentence,S^, implies another sen¬
tence, Sg, and if the converse also holds, and are
equivalent .... If now the two equivalent sentences have
the same syntactic structure and differ from one another
only in that where one has a lexical item, x» the other
has y, then'x and are synonymous (Lyons, 1968: 4-50).
Two expressions are synonymous if and only if (a) they
are both complete sentences and they entail one another;
or (b) they are both sentence components, and when they
are placed in identical sentential contexts, the result¬
ing sentences entail one another (Blose, 1965: 310).
Although bilateral implication is often associated with what is
essentially sense-synonymy, it is clearly compatible also with
occurrence-synonymy. In fact, as we saw in 3.4, occurrence-syn¬
onymy is treated as a legitimate level of synonymy by both Lyons
and Blose.
Our concern, let us recall, is with bilateral implication as a
means of explicating occurrence-synonymy in the first place, since,
as we saw in 5.1, once occurrence-synonymy has been explicated a
corresponding explication of sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy can
be arrived at in ways already set out in Chapters 3 and 4 (see also
7.9).
Straightforward though it may seem at first sight, bilateral
implication is far from unproblematic. The main problem, which we
- 86 -
mentioned in passing in Chapter 5, lies in the fact that bilateral
implication is capable of, and has in fact received, different
interpretations. To provide an adequate explication of synonymy in
terms of bilateral implication, therefore, we must specify exactly
how we intend bilateral implication to be construed. Towards this
end I will start with an examination of two accounts of bilateral
implication, whose apparent similarity conceals important differ¬
ences.
7.2. Leech's account of bilateral implication
The first account of bilateral implication which we will examine
is by Leech. To be more precise, what we are going to examine is,
in the main, part of a theory of semantic testing in which the
concept of implication plays an important part. It should be noted
that in the two sources that we shall examine Leech attaches rela¬
tively little importance to synonymy and bilateral implication.
This fact, however, matters little for our present purpose, since
Leech's treatment of hyponymy and implication lends itself easily
to a fuller corresponding account of synonymy and bilateral impli¬
cation. Such an account is what I will try and present, slightly
amplifying Leech's own account and providing additional exemplifi¬
cation where necessary.
Leech's point of departure is what he calls 'basic statements',
'x is synonymous with y;' being one of them:
Linguists appeal to the synonymy of sentences, to the fact
that one sentence entails or presupposes another, to
various types of semantic abnormality. These may be incor¬
porated in a list of types of statement about meaning,
called here BASIC STATEMENTS, which I shall treat for prac¬
tical purposes as 'given' (1974.: 84-).
Basic statements are derived directly from linguistic intuitions as
a result of codifying the latter, and they impose constraints on
the material adequacy of a semantic theory. Once a range of basic
statements has been isolated,
The task of semantics is then to explain such statements,
by constructing theories and descriptive rules and cat¬
egories from which they can be deduced (Leech, 1974.: 84.).
Such "theories and descriptive rules and categories" constitute in
fact the formal definitions or formulations of the corresponding
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basic statements. Thus, taking Leech's definition of hyponymy as a
model, we may define the synonymy between two words thus: If x is
a synonym of y, and X and Y are two assertions identical except that
X contains x where Y contains y, then X logically implies Y and
conversely. Once definitions like this have been constructed, the
way is open to a rigorous testing of the corresponding basic state¬
ments. The latter, as we saw earlier, are the point of departure,
but after reliable test procedures have been established, intuitive
judgements (i.e. instances of basic statements) must give way to
test results whenever there is a conflict between the two.
Before tests can be worked out, another measure needs to be taken,
for
If the results are to be truly representative of a linguistic
community, such tests have to be presented in a way that can
be understood by people with no technical knowledge of lan¬
guage. For example, it would be little use facing a repre¬
sentative collection of English speakers with the question
'Does sentence X entail sentence Y?', but it might well be
worth while to ask them 'If sentence X is true, does sen¬
tence Y have to be true?' Hence the value of reducing
questions of conceptual meaning to questions of truth and
falsehood: notions which are familiar to everyone (Leech,
1974: 90-1).
What is required, as Leech would put it in more formal terms, is
that definitions relating to competence (in the Chomskyan sense),
like the one for synonymy given earlier, be converted into defini¬
tions relating to performance (in the Chomskyan sense). Implica¬
tion is treated by Leech as a competence concept, the corresponding
performance concept being that of truth. Thus, a performance
definition of word-synonymy would be: Given that x is a synonym of
y and X and Y are two assertions identical except that X contains
x where Y contains y, then (1) if X is true, Y will also be true
and conversely and (2) if X is false, Y will also be false and
conversely.
The concept of truth thus assumes a central place in Leech's
thinking. For Leech, semantic description, to be objective, must
be backed up by semantic testing. Semantic testing, in turn,
depends upon the concept of truth, for only through this performance
concept can the crucial competence concept of implication, whether
unilateral or bilateral, be rendered amenable to test. In this way
the performance concept of truth becomes, via the competence concept
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of implication, a cornerstone of Leech's theory of semantic test¬
ing. As such, it also constitutes an indispensable part of the
basis of his cognitively-oriented approach to meaning.
With the addition of performance definitions, we now have at our
disposal a complete rationale of semantic testing, as follows:
On the theoretical level, we have (A) general or universal
categories and statements which we regard as applicable to
all languages (on this level, semantic relationships such
as hyponymy and synonymy are postulated); and (B) descrip¬
tive categories and statements, or interpretations of the
universal categories and statements with reference to par¬
ticular items in a particular language such as English.
From these are derived (C) a basic statement or hypothesis
relating to competence, from which is deduced a similar
statement relating to performance (D). This last is in-
terpreted as a test prediction (F) by means of a testing
hypothesis (E). Finally the predicted result is matched
against the actual result (G) (Leech, 1970: 351).
Now from this general rationale it will be fairly straightfor¬
ward to derive a specific rationale for testing the synonymy between
two words, say 'cop' and 'policeman', in a particular sentential
frame, say 'He chucked a stone at the ' (Leech's example):
(A) Universal statement: If x is synonymous with y in S and
S(x) and S(y) result from the insertion in S of x and y
respectively, then S(x) implies S(y) and vice versa.
(B) Descriptive statement: 'Cop' is synonymous with 'police¬
man' in 'He chucked a stone at the '.
(C) 'He chucked a stone at the cops' implies 'He chucked a
stone at the policemen', and vice versa.
(D) If 'He chucked a stone at the cops' is true (or false),
then 'He chucked a stone at the policemen' must be true
(or false), and vice versa.
(E) If less than 80% of the informants in an I & I test (to
be explained presently) respond 'yes', the proposition
that S(x) implies S(y) and vice versa is false.
(F) At least 80% of the informants will assent to the
proposition that (D).
(G) 90% of the informants assent to the proposition that (D).
Conclusion: the prediction (F) is confirmed; therefore
(B) is correct (the 90% assent is hypothetical) (cf. Leech,
1970: 352-3).
Of these steps in the rationale, only (D) actually appears as
part of the 'Implication-and-Inconsistency Test' referred to in (E)
above. Since synonymy is characterized by bilateral rather than
unilateral implication, the same test has to be carried out twice
in reverse order. Thus:
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Instructions
(1) Assuming S(x) is true, judge whether S(v) is true or not.
If you think S(y) must be true, write 'yes'.
If you think S(y) cannot be true, write 'no'.
If you think S(y) may or may not be true, write 'yes/no'.
If you don't know which answer to give, write
(2) Assuming S(y) is true, judge whether S(x) is true or not.
If you think S(x) must be true, write 'yes'.
If you think S(x) cannot be true, write 'no'.
If you think S(x) may or may not be true, write 'yes/no'.
If you don't know which answer to give, write •?'.
Processing
A 'yes' response in both directions is taken to be diagnostic
of synonymy (cf. Leech, 1970: 345; 1974: 90-1).
On the question of the validity of tests of this kind, Leech says:
From initial experiments I have conducted, elicitation tests
such as these promise to be reasonably reliable in producing
clear-cut results. A 100 per cent confirmation is scarcely
to be looked for, because all tests take place at the level
of performance rather than competence, and so ad hoc meta¬
phorical interpretations and other 'nuisance factors' are
bound to interfere. (Such interference is inevitable seeing
that the tests themselves operate at a PERFORMANCE level,
whereas the phenomena being tested are factors of COMPETENCE.)
Confirmation, in such a case, must be regarded as a probabil¬
istic matter, and an 80 per cent predominance in one direction
or the other is the most one can rely upon (1974: 91-2).
Hence '80%' in (E) above.
This 80% threshold serves another function in Leech's semantic
theory, namely, to help distinguish between logical and factual
implication. In keeping with the general practice of semanticists,
Leech treats synonymy as definable in terms of logical (or analytic)
bilateral implication only and not in terms of factual (or syn¬
thetic) bilateral implication. According to Leech, two words are
genuinely synonymous in a sentence if and only if their synonymy
has been established by virtue of logical bilateral implication
alone, without the interference of factual knowledge. Thus, while
'cop' and 'policeman' are synonymous in 'He chucked a stone at the
', 'Paris' and 'the capital of France' are not synonymous in
'Charlotte lives in ', their sameness being a matter of factual
knowledge. As is well known, the logical/factual (or, more or less
synonymously, analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent) distinction
is a vexed question. Leech sees a solution to this question in the
finding that
Reactions to logical implication and inconsistency appeared
to be far more absolute than reactions to their factual
counterparts. ... There are indications, therefore, that
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the T & C and I & I tests as they stand, with 80% chosen as
level of validation, already effectively differentiate
logical categories from the corresponding factual categories
(Leech, 1970: 358).
Thus we have what Leech calls "a behavioural criterion for the fac¬
tual/logical contrast" (1970: 358). It is clearly only for this
reason that Leech finds it unnecessary to introduce into the test
instructions the phrase 'whatever the situation', which is used in
a different type of test (cf. Leech, 1970: 344)» to keep logical
and factual categories apart. But 'true or false whatever the
situation' is clearly the response that Leech is interested in when
subjecting a synonymy hypothesis to test.
No less important than the factual/logical contrast in Leech's
treatment of synonymy (and in his semantic theory as a whole) is the
distinction between what he calls conceptual (i.e. cognitive) and
associative meaning (cf. Leech, 1974s 10-27). For, again in keeping
with general practice, Leech treats synonymy as a matter of same¬
ness of cognitive meaning. It follows that if the kind of test
described earlier is to prove successful, it must also be capable
of keeping cognitive and associative meaning apart. As evidence
that cognitive meaning can be successfully isolated, Leech cites
the finding that
Majority score is obtainable in this test type whether or
not the two statements differ markedly in style. It was
assumed that the two statements
X: He cast a stone at the policemen
Y: He chucked a stone at the cops
were cognitively synonymous, despite the contrast between
a very formal and a very colloquial level of style. A
90% YES response confirmed the hypothesis 'X implies Y'.
For a full confirmation of synonymy, one would have to
repeat the experiment reversing this order, to check
whether Y also implies X. Nevertheless, this was a ten¬
tative indication that at least in the I & I tests,
stylistic factors had little or no distorting effect on
the results (Leech, 1970: 357).
The difference in associative meaning between the two sentences is
obviously attributable to the difference in associative meaning
between 'cast' and 'chuck' and between 'policeman' and 'cop'. If
so, the above finding is also implicitly taken by Leech to show
that the I & I test provides a means of establishing cognitive syn¬
onymy free from the influence of differences in associative meaning.
On the basis of the above finding, Leech concludes that "informants,
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in making judgements about truth and falsehood, seem able to dis¬
count differences of associative (my underlining) meaning" (1974.:
92). And this is taken by Leech to "support the reality of that
abstraction of 'conceptual meaning' on which the present semantic
approach is founded" (1974.: 93).
To conclude our exposition of Leech's account of bilateral impli¬
cation, we may sum up Leech's position by saying (l) that it bases
bilateral implication on the concepts of truth and falsehood, (2)
that it treats bilateral implication as analytic, and (3) that it
tests bilateral implication by eliciting overt judgements from
informants (we will read more into this third characteristic in 7.6).
7.3. Lyons's account of bilateral implication
Lyons,, as we saw earlier, also defines synonymy in terms of
bilateral implication. However, while Leech draws a sharp distinc¬
tion between analytic and synthetic implication in order to define
synonymy in terms of analytic bilateral implication, Lyons sees no
need to do so. Instead:
The semantic analysis of language as it is used in everyday
discourse need not wait upon the solution of the philosophi¬
cal problems attaching to the distinction between contingent and
necessary truth. What the linguist requires is a pragmatic
concept of analyticity - one which gives theoretical recog¬
nition to the tacit presuppositions and assumptions in the
speech-community and takes no account of their validity
within some other frame of reference assumed to be absolute
or linguistically and culturally neutral. It was for this
purpose that we introduced earlier the notion of the
restricted context (Lyons, 1968: 44-5).
'Restricted contexts' are defined by Lyons as
Those in which the participants in a conversation do not
draw upon their previous knowledge of one another or the
'information' communicated in earlier utterances, but where
they share the more general beliefs, conventions and pre¬
suppositions governing the particular 'universe of discourse'
in the society to which they belong (1968: 4-19).
Here already there emerges an important difference between Leech's
position and that of Lyons. For Leech, synonymy, as defined via
bilateral implication, is a meaning-relation which holds 'whatever
the situation'. Lyons, on the other hand, treats implication and,
by the same token, synonymy as relative to the restricted context
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consisting, as we have just seen, of "the more general beliefs,
conventions and presuppositions" involved.
In fact, this difference seems to go much further. Recourse to
the notion of the restricted context is treated by Lyons only as
"a matter of methodological decision" (1968: 420). 'For under the
normal circumstances of communication restricted contexts
... are comparatively rare, since most utterances depend
for their understanding upon the information contained in
previous utterances. We must not lose sight of the rela¬
tionship between utterances and particular contexts (Lyons,
1968: 419).
Thus, although methodologically implication may be treated as rela¬
tive to the restricted context (as in Lyons, 1968), theoretically
(as well as methodologically where circumstances permit) it is to
be determined with reference to all the relevant features which
make up the context of situation in question (as in Lyons, 1963).
Lyons refers to his concept of context-bound implication as 'prag¬
matic implication' and his concept of context-bound bilateral
implication as 'pragmatic equivalence' (1963: 88).
How, then, does Lyons propose to test whether bilateral implica¬
tion holds between two sentences in a particular context of situ¬
ation? Implication, as Leech points out, is not directly testable.
It is therefore necessary to reduce it to one or more primitive
concepts. For Leech,
Implication, a relation between two assertions, is reduc¬
ible to judgements of truth value, in many respects the
"safest" of all starting-points for semantic investigation.
One assertion X implies another assertion Y within a given
language L, if the speakers of L are agreed that if X is
true, Y cannot be false (1969: 9).
In Lyons's (1963, 1968) theory, on the other hand, there is no re¬
course to the concept of truth (see, however, Lyons, 1977: 204).
Instead,
Both pragmatic implication and pragmatic equivalence can be
defined in terms of assertion and denial. And within lin¬
guistics the notions of 'assertion' and 'denial' are to be
accepted as postulates (1963: 88).
One sentence, S-^, is said to imply another Sp ... if
speakers of the language agree that it is not possible to
assert explicitly S-, and to deny explicitly Sp (1968: 445).
This difference is significant, particularly in that it matches a
difference in testing methods (see next paragraph), which in turn
not only leads to different test results but, even more importantly,
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is symptomatic of a difference as regards the conception of bilateral
implication and synonymy, as we shall see in 7.6.
Using as illustration the two sentences 'We have a vide range of
cigars' and 'We have a wide selection of cigars', Lyons proposes
the following testing method:
The question now is to decide whether the forms range and
selection have the same meaning in these utterances. This
does not simply consist in asking the informant; for this
would be merely to invite him to invent some difference -
say, for example, that the use of selection implies that he
has chosen his stock with care. But the problems connected
with testing the informant's response to the substitution
of the two items in the frame, though they exist, are prob¬
lems of a practical nature, as are the problems of devising
tests for identifying variants in phonology. The aim is to
inveigle the informant, without prejudice to the issue, into
accepting or refusing to accept utterance a as a 'repetition'
of utterance b. If a has not the same meaning as b it will
either not imply something which b implies or imply something
which b does not imply (1963: 76).
Here we see a further respect, referred to in the last paragraph,
in which Lyons's position differs from that of Leech. While Leech
resorts to overt judgement tests, Lyons regards overt judgement
tests as distorting and favours instead the use of performance
tests through the elicitation of actual performance in an oblique
fashion. Although Leech does not approach informants with the
direct question as to whether two sentences have the same meaning,
it seems clear that his indirect approach via the notion of truth
would be seen in the light of Lyons's observations quoted above as
equally open to the danger that it will encourage informants to
'invent' differences which are not relevant in everyday communica¬
tion (cf. Lyons, 1963: 76).
To conclude our exposition of Lyons's account of bilateral impli¬
cation, we may sum up Lyons's position by saying (1) that it bases
bilateral implication on the concepts of assertion and denial, (2)
that it treats bilateral implication as pragmatic, and (3) that it
tests bilateral implication by obliquely eliciting actual perform¬
ance from informants (we will read more into this third character¬
istic in 7.6).
It will have emerged that in their respective accounts of bilat¬
eral implication Leech and Lyons differ in three prominent respects,
which we may conveniently refer to as (1) truth/falsehood versus
assertion/denial, (2) analytic versus pragmatic equivalence, and
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(3) judgement versus performance equivalence (we will, however, see
this third difference in a new light in 7.6). As it will become
clear in the next few sections, the first set of alternatives is
essentially a matter of method (although it is linked with the third
set), while the other two sets of alternatives represent fundamental
differences as regards the conception of bilateral implication and
synonymy. We said earlier that bilateral implication is open to
different interpretations. Now (2), (3) and, to a lesser extent,
(l) present us with, broadly speaking, what I believe to be the major
sets of alternatives. Our next task, then, will be to decide which
alternative in each set, particularly (2) and (3), to choose. From
the conjunction of our choices will emerge our sameness of meaning
criterion.
To guide our choice, two criteria should be borne in mind, both
of which derive from our concern with synonymy as a phenomenon in
everyday communication. The first criterion is that a character¬
ization of bilateral implication must be compatible with occurrence-
synonymy - that is, with the conception of synonymy as sentence-
bound and context-bound. When a particular sentence/context is in
question, a second criterion is required, namely: a characterization
of bilateral implication must conform to such standards of exacti¬
tude as operate in everyday communication, as opposed to those
operating in some artificial situation. Needless to say, a char¬
acterization of bilateral implication must also be adequate from an
operational point of view.
7.4-. Truth/falsehood versus assertion/denial
There are three problems with Leech's use of the concepts of
truth and falsehood as the means of testing bilateral implication.
These problems arise largely from an operational point of view.
What may be questioned first, on Leech's own terms, is that
"informants, in making judgements about truth and falsehood, seem
able to discount differences of associative meaning" (Leech, 1974s
92). It will be remembered that the evidence cited in support of
this claim is that 'He cast a stone at the policemen' and 'He
chucked a stone at the cops' were judged to be (cognitively)
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synonymous "despite the very different stylistic meanings of the two
sentences" (Leech, 1974.: 93). There is no reason to question the
evidence as such, but all the evidence shows is that differences of
stylistic meaning are discounted in judgements about truth and
falsehood. This is not yet to say, as Leech appears to do, that the
same must apply to associative meaning as a whole. For in Leech's
typology of meaning (1974.: 10-27) stylistic meaning is but one type
of associative meaning, which also includes, among other types,
'affective meaning' and 'reflected meaning'.
Leech characterizes affective meaning by saying that "language
can also reflect the personal feelings of the speaker, including
his attitute to the listener, or his attitude to something he is
talking about" (1974.: 18). In the light of this characterization,
it is doubtful that differences of affective meaning can be suc¬
cessfully discounted, if at all, in judgements about truth and
falsehood. Pairs of words such as 'slim'/'skinny', 'brave'/'fool¬
hardy' and 'trustful'/'credulous', for example, are commonly treated
as differing in affective meaning alone. It also seems in keeping
with Leech's characterization of affective meaning to treat them
in this way. Now it seems reasonable to predict that lay inform¬
ants will tend to respond with 'no' (or possibly 'yes/no') rather
than 'yes' to the question, say, as to whether, given that 'She is
slim' is true, 'She is skinny' must also be true and vice versa,
in which case truth/falsehood judgements will have failed to dis¬
count differences of affective meaning.
The reason for the failure lies in the distinction between
truth as an everyday notion and truth as a technical concept in
terms of truth conditions. To clarify this distinction, we need to
invoke another distinction, the distinction between what is overtly
stated and what is presupposed in a statement, where a speaker's
"attitude to the listener, or his attitude to something he is talk¬
ing about", which is a matter of affective meaning, belongs to
what is presupposed (cf. Wilson, 1975: 113-52). Now while in the
technical concept of truth what is overtly stated is distinguished
from what is presupposed in a statement and is treated alone as
bearing on truth conditions, no such distinction exists in the
everyday notion of truth. It follows that differences of affective
meaning cannot be discounted by truth/falsehood judgements if truth
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is taken in its everyday sense. The trouble is that only the every¬
day notion of truth is available to Leech for his truth/falsehood
tests, and it is with this everyday notion of truth in mind that,
in the last paragraph, I cast doubt on the claim that truth/false-
hood judgements are not influenced by affective meaning. It is
true that differences of affective meaning are discounted under the
operation of the technical concept of truth conditions, but this
technical concept is not fit for Leech's purpose. For if what is
stated were to be distinguished from what is presupposed in ques¬
tions put to informants in judgement tests, the distinction would
lead to very considerable complication and would in all probability
cause the tests to fail the criterion of intelligibility to lay
informants, on which Leech rightly insists.
Reflected meaning, as Leech defines it, is "the meaning which
arises in cases of multiple conceptual meaning, when one sense of a
word forms part of our response to another sense" (1974-5 19). Here
doubts must be raised as to whether differences of reflected mean¬
ing can always be discounted in judgements about truth and false¬
hood. What gives rise to such doubts is the fact that there need
not always be a sharp line between cognitive and reflected meaning.
In fact, there may well be disagreement as to whether a particular
difference consists in the former or the latter.
Take, for example, 'on' and 'about', of which Bennett says:
The prepositions on and about can both mean 'on the subject
of' and yet there is a difference in meaning between a book
on astronomy and a book about astronomy. The former sug¬
gests a more serious, scholarly work than the latter.
I would now like to propose a third definition of syn¬
onymy, which it seems to me corresponds to a fairly wide¬
spread use of the term.
DEFINITION 3. If there is one or more environment in which
two lexemes are substitutable for each other without any
change in COGNITIVE meaning, then they are synonymous in
that environment or those environments.
According to this definition ... on and about (in the
environment a book ... astronomy) are synonymous, because
the difference in meaning is ... 'reflected' (1968: 158).
This alleged difference in reflected meaning is attributed by Bennett
to the fact that "the spatiotemporal sense of on and about describe
a precise or an approximate relationship respectively, cf. on or
about October 1" (1968: ), Now if the difference in question
is indeed one of reflected meaning, it seems doubtful that it will
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be discounted in judgements about truth and falsehood. Indeed, it
would be perfectly possible to assert 'I've written a book about
astronomy' while denying 'I've written a book on astronomy'.
Our next example of difference in reflected meaning comes from
Hofmann:
Leech (1974) has discussed a variety of meaning called
reflected meaning, which I shall extend a bit. The expecta-
tional meaning of a word, even though its descriptive mean¬
ing is well established, may influence or temper the meaning
of a word somewhat. Thus large & grand both seem bigger
than big because of their vowels (1976: 14)•
Here again insofar as Hofmann is right, 'They live in a large house',
say, does not have to be true even if 'They live in a big house' is
true. If, on the other hand, both of these statements turn out to
have to be true or false at the same time, then the difference in
reflected meaning between 'big' and 'large' indicated by Hofmann
will have been shown not really to exist.
There are undoubtedly examples of synonymy candidates, such as
'cock' and 'rooster', where judgements about truth and falsehood
concerning the statements in which they occur will not be affected
by their difference in reflected meaning. But what we have here is
reflected meaning of a rather crude kind. Reflected meaning can be
much more subtle, and at some point along the line it becomes dif¬
ficult to tell whether the difference is indeed one of reflected
meaning or in fact one of cognitive meaning.
Take, for example, the following pairs of sentences:
(7.1) (a) Our school boasts a fine swimming-pool.
(b) Our school has a fine swimming-pool.
(7.2) (a) The newscaster sports a red tie whenever he reads
the news.
(b) The newscaster wears a red tie whenever he reads
the news.
(7.3) (a) I have great faith in his abilities.
(b) I have great confidence in his abilities.
(7.4) (a-) Vienna is celebrated as a centre of music.
(b) Vienna is famous as a centre of music.
(7.5) (a) I've never met anyone so dumb.
(b) I've never met anyone do stupid.
Are the two statements in each pair such that they have to be true
or false at the same time? The answer that is quite likely to
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emerge from the kind of test proposed by Leech will be 'yes/no' for
at least some of these pairs. In the event of a * yes/no• answer,
the cause would quite plausibly be attributable to one or more
senses of the one lexeme not shared by the other lexeme. But this
is only to show that there is often no sharp line between cognitive
meaning and reflected meaning.
From the nature of the relationship between cognitive and re¬
flected meaning, two points follow. First, from the fact that the
difference between two senses is somehow 'reflected', it will be
erroneous to automatically infer that they must be synonymous. In
his handling of 'on' and 'about' Bennett seems to have committed
this error. Second, and more importantly, if we take into account
the all-pervasiveness of reflected meaning - where there is poly¬
semy, there is reflected meaning - it is easy to see that in Leech's
characterization of synonymy, with its insistence on analytic
equivalence and its reliance on overt judgement tests, reflected
meaning acts as an important factor in preventing otherwise per¬
fectly legitimate instances of synonymy from being treated as such.
We will come back to this point in 7.6.
All this is not to object to Leech's postulation of affective or
reflected meaning, nor yet to object to Leech' use of truth/false-
hood judgements in testing synonymy hypotheses, although we will
raise this objection later. What we have argued is that judgements
about truth and falsehood cannot be relied on to distinguish cogni¬
tive meaning from two types of associative meaning as the distinc¬
tion is drawn by Leech. Insofar as this argument is valid, we have
uncovered a gap between Leech's test concepts on the one hand and
his cognitively-oriented approach to meaning and synonymy on the
other. To bridge this gap, either the test concepts or the con¬
ception of cognitive meaning and cognitive synonymy will have to be
modified.
The second problem with the concept of truth as
the means of testing bilateral implication is its limited appli¬
cability. In the first place, it is applicable only to sentences,
but not generally applicable to longer stretches of discourse; in
fact, even as regards sentences, the concept of truth becomes less
applicable as they increase in complexity. In the second place,
with regard to sentences, it is applicable only to statements, but
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not to imperatives, interrogatives and so on (of. Davidson, 1967:
311).
As far as longer stretches of discourse are concerned, it might
be suggested that the problem can be solved by taking the sentences
concerned out of their context and judging them in isolation. But
this would constitute a departure from occurrence-synonymy (i.e. a
breach of our first criterion).
With regard to sentences other than statements, a solution might
be put forward whereby every such sentence is converted into its
corresponding statement and then judged as a statement. Such a
solution, however, would equally amount to a departure from occur¬
rence-synonymy.
There might be yet a further approach to the problem, according
to which neither longer stretches of discourse nor sentences other
than statements pose any difficulties, since to determine whether
A and B are synonymous it is sufficient to test them in one pair of
statements. This is the approach that Leech seems to imply. For
this approach to work, however, we have, firstly, to conceive A and
B as senses or lexemes and, secondly, to assume that A and B will
be synonymous in all sentences/contexts if they have been established
as synonymous in one sentence/context. While the first move would
constitute a departure from occurrence-synonymy, the second move
would be completely unwarranted (see Chapters 9 and 10).
We come now to the third problem with the concept of truth as
the means of testing bilateral implication. It is this: even when
we are only concerned with statements, the concept of truth is far
from always clear. It is perhaps more accurate to say that even
though truth and falsehood are "concepts which seem to have a
fairly definite purport for all psychologically normal users of the
language" (Leech, 1974.: 87) judgements about truth and falsehood are
often made uncertain, to a greater or lesser extent, by the semantic
vagueness of the words under focus.
The reason for this uncertainty is easy to appreciate. On the
one hand, in order to judge with certainty whether two statements
are true or false at the same time, one has to know implicitly (i.e.
in the sense of "know how") the necessary and sufficient conditions
that each statement is required to satisfy to be counted as true.
When the two statements differ formally only in the choice of one
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word at the same point in their structure - and this is the situ¬
ation that concerns us - the knowledge in question boils down to
that of the necessary and sufficient conditions that each word is
required to satisfy to be correctly applied (cf. Rynin, 1966: 128-
31; Blose, 1965: 305). On the other hand, such knowledge, as is
well known, is in many cases inherently unavailable in natural
language (cf. Black, 194-9; Carnap, 1955; Scheffler, 1979; Tarski,
1956; Waismann, 194-5).
In this regard, the certainty with which 'He cast a stone at the
policemen' and 'He chucked a stone at the cops' are judged to have
the same truth value can give a rather misleading impression to the
contrary. One must not overlook the fact that the two pairs of
words under focus - 1 cast'/'chuck' and 'policeman'/'cop' - have
denotata of an easily observable kind. In fact, both sentences
fall well within the narrow range of what have been called observa¬
tion sentences (cf. Rynin, 1966).
Earlier we saw the difficulty of distinguishing between cognitive
and reflected meaning with references to sentences (7.1) to (7.5).
This difficulty, we may now point out, is due entirely to the
semantic vagueness of the words under focus in those sentences. In
addition to (7.1) to (7.5), now consider how informants might
respond to questions about truth and falsehood when confronted with
the following:
(7.6) (a) He has a fast gait.
(b) He has a rapid gait.
(7.7) (a) He has no aim in life.
(b) He has no purpose in life.
(7.8) (a) Their friendship ended in disaster.
(b) Their friendship ended in calamity.
(7.9) (a) She looked very cheerful when I last saw her.
(b) She looked very happy when I last saw her.
(7.10) (a) I derive great .joy from going to concerts.
(b) I derive great pleasure from going to concerts.
(7.11) (a) He is from a rich family.
(b) He is from a wealthy family.
(7.12) (a) She is a pretty girl.
(b) She is a good-looking girl.
Since we have not subjected these pairs of statements to Leech's
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type of test, we cannot be sure what the results would be. But it
seems reasonable to predict that, given a combination of the arti¬
ficiality of the test situation and the strict instructions (i.e.
'If you think S(y) must be true, write "yes"'), uncertainty is
likely to lead to '?' or 'yes/no' responses. In the event of such
responses, of course, the prediction regarding the synonymy of the
two words in question will have been proved wrong.
By giving '?' responses, informants directly register their un¬
certainty. Admittedly, '?' responses as such do not vitiate Leech's
use of the concept of truth as the means of testing bilateral impli¬
cation. They do so, however, from two specific points of view.
First, vagueness of meaning is widespread in the vocabulary of Eng¬
lish; it is thus to be expected that '?' responses or 'yes/no'
responses or both would be common in Leech's type of test. If we
assume '?' responses to be common, it must be said that no test can
be regarded as fully satisfactory which produces a large number of
uncertain responses. Secondly, '?' responses in judgement tests
need not entail a corresponding experience of uncertainty in every¬
day communication: they are sometimes due, as we have already hinted,
to a combination of the artificiality of the test situation and the
strict test instructions. Where this is the case, Leech's type of
test must be rejected, as far as the nature of our inquiry into
synonymy is concerned, for failing to reflect what happens in
everyday communication (i.e. it is a breach of our second criterion).
We will return to this point in 7.6.
In the case of 'yes/no' responses, what happens is that the
semantic vagueness of the words under focus leads informants to
deny their synonymy. It is not difficult to see why this should
happen: given, on the one hand, the greater or lesser degree of
semantic vagueness attaching to the words in question and, on the
other hand, the ever-present possibility of further differentiation
within what is broadly the same denotatum, it is tempting to see
the two words in each pair as the vehicle of such differentiation
and thus to attribute some (nebulous) difference, in degree or
quality, to their meaning (cf. Wimsatt, 1954-J 196-7). In this
regard, Ullmann rightly singles out "the vagueness of the sense"
as one of "two forces (which) militate against complete synonymy"
(1957: 108; cf. also Ullmann, 1962: 14-2). Now, as with '?'
- 102 -
responses, 'yes/no' responses in judgement tests need not reflect
what happens in everyday communication, for the differences thus
perceived are sometimes absent from everyday communication and are
brought into informants' awareness only by a combination of the
artificiality of the test situation and the strict test instructions.
In such cases, Leech's type of test must be rejected, as far as the
nature of our inquiry into synonymy is concerned, for giving scope
to the imagination for perceiving differences which are absent from
everyday communication (i.e. it is a breach of our second criterion).
We will come back to this point in 7.6.
These, then, are the three problems with Leech's use of the con¬
cepts of truth and falsehood as the means of testing bilateral im¬
plication. It may now be asked whether they also apply to Lyons's
use of assertion and denial as the means of testing bilateral impli¬
cation. The answer as regards each problem is 'no'.
The first problem does not exist for assertion and denial for
the simple reason that in Lyons's account of bilateral implication
assertion and denial are not assigned the job of distinguishing
cognitive meaning from affective meaning on the one hand or from
reflected meaning on the other. In fact, no prior distinctions are
drawn between different types of meaning. As far as affective
meaning is concerned, however, it should be mentioned that we must
interpret Lyons as implicitly acknowledging that what Leech refers
to as affective meaning can bear on bilateral implication. For, to
take up again an example used earlier, one can perfectly well assert
•She is slim' while denying 'She is skinny', and vice versa, in
which case a difference in affective meaning will have prevented
'slim' and 'skinny' from being treated as synonymous in this sen¬
tence.
As regards the second problem, unlike the concepts of truth and
falsehood, assertion and denial are flexible enough to be appli¬
cable not only to all types of sentences but also to longer
stretches of discourse. For it is perfectly possible to "inveigle
the informant, without prejudice to the issue, into accepting or
refusing to accept utterance a as a 'repetition' of utterance b"
(Lyons, 1963: 76) regardless of whether a and b are statements or
other types of sentences, and regardless of whether they are sen¬
tences or longer stretches of discourse.
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The third problem with Leech's use of the concepts of truth and
falsehood as the means of testing bilateral implication, it will be
remembered, is twofold: that the semantic vagueness of many words
results in too large a number of uncertain responses, and that it
can lead to the perception of differences between synonymy candi¬
dates which are absent from everyday communication. It will also
be remembered that both these consequences arise only because of
two additional factors, i.e. the artificiality of the test situ¬
ation and the strict test instructions. Now since Lyons uses
assertion and denial in the oblique elicitation of performance in
actual communication, neither of the two additional factors is pres¬
ent in his method of testing bilateral implication. And so it
follows that Lyons's use of assertion and denial does not incur
either of the two consequences which constitute the third problem
for Leech. We will pursue this point further in 7.6.
7.5. Analytic versus pragmatic equivalence
Lyons, in treating bilateral implication as a matter of prag¬
matic equivalence, holds, as we have seen, that synonymy and
bilateral implication must be relativized not only to the actual
world but also to the actual context. It is only natural, there¬
fore, that synonymy, in Lyons's view,
arises in particular contexts as a consequence of the more
fundamental structural relations, hyponymy and incompati¬
bility. It frequently happens that the distinction between
two lexical items is contextually neutralized. For instance,
the difference between the marked term bitch and the
unmarked term dog is neutralized in a context, like My,
has .just had pups, which determines the animal referred to
as female (1968: 452).
Another natural consequence of defining synonymy in terms of prag¬
matic rather than analytic equivalence is that
The structural determination of a lexical item may be
probabilistic rather than absolute. For instance, the sub¬
stitution of buy for get in I'll go to the shop and get
some bread would not generally be held to introduce any
additional implications: buy and get would normally be taken
as synonymous in this context. The standard conventions
and presuppositions of the society are such that, unless
there is some evidence to suggest the contrary, it will be
assumed that what is obtained from a shop is obtained by
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purchase. At the same time, it must be admitted that get
is not necessarily synonymous with buy (even with the syn¬
tagmatic support of from the shoo) (Lyons, 1968: 4-53).
In sharp contrast with-Lyons, Leech adopts, as we have seen,
analytic equivalence as the criterion of synonymy. In so doing,
Leech seems to be following the practice of those philosophers who
treat meaning with reference to 'all possible worlds'. At the very
least, Leech insists, as his criterion of synonymy, on bilateral
implication in all possible situations in the actual world. Thus
Leech's characterization of synonymy, via his concept of analytic
equivalence, departs from occurrence-synonymy by taking us outside
the immediately relevant context, though, somewhat curiously, it
does not, unlike most characterizations of synonymy that depart from
occurrence-synonymy, take us outside the immediately relevant sen¬
tence.
It will be obvious, then, that, under Leech's definition of syn¬
onymy in terms of analytic equivalence, the fact that 'I'll go to
the shop and get some bread' does not imply 'I'll go to the shop
and buy some bread' in all possible situations means that 'get' and
'buy' cannot be synonymous in any situation. By the same token,
'dog' and 'bitch' will not be regarded as synonymous in 'My
has just had pups' (where 'have' is used in the sense of "give birth
to"), either. For, with a stretch of the imagination, it is con¬
ceivable that in some possible world 'My dog has just had pups'
does not imply 'My bitch has just had pups' (cf. Palmer, 1976:
64-5)•
Having contrasted analytic and pragmatic equivalence side by
side, we should now be in no doubt that of the two alternatives
only pragmatic equivalence is compatible with occurrence-synonymy. By
subscribing to pragmatic equivalence, we hold that bilateral impli¬
cation must be bound to sentence and context. Subscribing to prag¬
matic equivalence in this sense, however, need not commit us to
accepting Lyons's view (though we will accept this view in practice)*
seen earlier, that a superordinate term and a hyponym on the one
hand (e.g. 'get'/'buy') and an unmarked term and a marked term on
the other (e.g. 'dog'/'bitch') are to be treated as synonymous in
contexts where the difference between the two terms in each case is
neutralized. We will return to this point in 7.7.
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7.6. Judgement versus performance equivalence
We have already touched on the third set of alternatives (i.e.
judgement versus performance equivalence) at a number of points in
7.3 and 7.4-. I will now bring these observations together and see
them, along with further observations, in a new light.
We saw in 7.3 that Lyons treats bilateral implication as reduc¬
ible to the primitive concepts of assertion and denial. These
concepts lend themselves naturally to, though they do not entail,
performance tests, which Lyons favours. We saw in 7.2 that Leech,
on the other hand, treats bilateral implication as reducible to
the primitive concepts of truth and falsehood. These concepts
lend themselves equally naturally to, though they do not entail,
judgement tests, which Leech uses.
Lyons's performance tests and Leech's judgement tests, as we
mentioned in passing, yield different test results as to whether
two sentences imply each other and whether two synonymy candidates
are in fact synonymous. More precisely, Leech's judgement tests,
by a combination of the artificiality of the test situation and
the strict test instructions, impose conditions of bilateral impli¬
cation and synonymy which are harder to meet than those required by
Lyons's performance tests. We specifically drew attention to this
point, in 7.4, with reference to the widespread vagueness of mean¬
ing, of which reflected meaning is an important cause. It should
now be stressed that, although vagueness of meaning is no doubt
particularly conducive to the falsification of synonymy hypotheses
in Leech's judgement tests, Lyons's performance tests and Leech's
judgement tests can give different results regardless of whether
the synonymy candidates involved are semantically vague. Some
exemplification may be necessary.
For this purpose, let us look at two versions of the ending to
the following story:
Introduction
A boastful king had one courtier who was his great
friend, and to whom he confided his most delicate secrets.
One of his favorite topics was the beauty of his queen, a
lady of unparalleled modesty. The courtier politely agreed
with his royal master's eulogies, but never with enough
enthusiasm to satisfy the monarch,
"He must see for himself", the king decided. So he
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insisted upon his friend's hiding behind a door in the
corner of the royal bedchamber. The courtier, not liking
the idea, at last very grudgingly obeyed; and the queen
saw him when he was slinking from the bedroom.
She was outraged. Next day she sent for the courtier
and gave him the choice of two courses. Either he must
kill the king, or he must die himself. She would never
tolerate her present disgrace. What was the courtier's
decision?
Ending (first version)
The bewildered courtier begged her not to bind him to
so terrible a choice. But since he could not persuade her,
and he realized that he had either to kill or be killed, he
considered it more advisable to remain alive. "Your
Majesty," quoth he, "since you pitilessly compel me to take
the life of my king, let me hear the manner in which we
shall set upon him." "Of a truth," replied she, "our trea¬
son shall be performed on the very spot where he shamed me.
The assault shall be given when he is asleep." The wretched
courtier, unable to escape this predicament, obliged to kil1
or to be killed, went with the queen to her room, and stood
secretly in the corner; afterwards emerged and assassinated
the king, thus winning his spouse and his kingdom.
Ending (second version)
The dumbfounded gentleman entreated her not to hold him
to such a hard condition. Yet as all his arguments were
in vain, and he saw that it was necessary to slay or be
slain, he deemed it better to live himself. "My Lady,"
said he, "as you force me without mercy to become guilty
of the blood of my sovereign, tell me by what means the
deed must be accomplished." "In sooth," she answered, "the
treachery must be effected in the same place in which he
betrayed me. The attack must be made while he is sleeping."
The poor gentleman, placed in this dreadful dilemma of hav¬
ing to slay or be slain, followed his lady to her chamber
and hid behind the door; whence later he came out and mur¬
dered his sovereign, and gained both his lady and his crown,
(taken from Walpole, 1961: 107-8)
Walpole comments:
When we come to discussing the difference between the two
endings, there is little to discuss. They are the same.
The same pictures or events or ideas came to the reader's
mind in both cases - if he really read them referentially,
remembering that words are not things and using his thoughts
to build up pictures of the referents (1961: 109).
Though we may be critical of the view of meaning underlying these
remarks, Walpole's main point is clearly valid. That is to say,
the two versions of the ending relate essentially the same story
despite a very considerable difference from a formal point of view.
They are, as it were, repetitions of each other.
Hovever, since what we are concerned with is word-synonymy in
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otherwise identical environments, the two endings do not exactly
illustrate our point. They differ, as is obvious, not only in
vocabulary but also in structure. However, it is perfectly easy, cn
the basis of the second version, to create a third version which
differs from the first in choice of vocabulary alone, thus:
Ending (third version)
The dumbfounded "courtier entreated her not to hold him
to so hard a condition. But since he could not persuade
her, and he saw that he had either to slay or be slain, he
deemed it better to remain alive. "Your Majesty," said he,
"since you pitilessly force me to take the life of my king,
let me hear the manner in which we shall set upon him."
"Of a truth," replied she, "our treachery shall be effected
on the same spot where he betrayed me. The attack shall be
made when he is asleep." The poor courtier, unable to
escape this dilemma, obliged to slay or to be slain, went
with the queen to her chamber, and stood secretly in the
corner; and afterwards came out and murdered the king, thus
gaining his lady and his crown.
Now to the extent that the story-teller will not 'deny' the third
version if he has 'asserted' the first version, then all the corre¬
sponding sentences will have passed Lyons's performance tests and
must therefore be taken to imply each other. To the same extent,
it follows that all the following pairs of items are synonymous in
this story:
bewilder/dumbfound, beg/entreat, bind/hold, terrible/hard,
choice/condition, realize/see, kill/slay, consider/deem,
more advisable/better, compel/force, treason/treachery,
perform/effect, very/same, shame/betray, assault/attack,
give/make, wretched/poor, predicament/dilemma, room/chamber,
emerge/come out, assassinate/murder, win/gain, spouse/lady,
kingdom/crown.
However, it is very likely that at least some of these pairs of
items - for example, 'terrible'/'hard', 'more advisable'/'better',
'shame'/'betray', 'predicament'/'dilemma' - will fail Leech's judge¬
ment tests of synonymy. And, in the event of their failing, this
would no doubt be due to the combination of the artificiality of
the test situation and the strict test instructions.
By way of further accounting for this divergence of test results,
I shall postulate what may be called a 'rule' of everyday communi¬
cation. Now a great deal of our language activity consists in
recounting what we have heard or read. In the course of our every¬
day use of language, we convey messages, retell stories, pass on
information and engage in countless other similar activities.
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There is a sense in which in all these activities what we are doing
is repeating what somebody else has said in our own words. It is
true that we use not only our own vocabulary but also our own
structures and that in most cases our sentences do not neatly match
the sentences of which, as a whole, they are intended as a 'rep-
/ |
/ etition', but this does not affect the point being made here. The
point is that at work in such activities is a tacit rule whereby
there is plenty of room for linguistic manoeuvre, as it were, before
we become guilty of misrepresentation. Those who are too quick to
spot differences are open to the charge of being pedantic and hair¬
splitting or else of being engaged in mere word play. These
charges are tantamout to saying that a 'rule' of everyday communi¬
cation has been broken.
It seems to me that when Lyons says that "the aim is to inveigle
the informant, without prejudice to the issue, into accepting or
refusing to accept utterance a as a 'repetition' of utterance b"
(1963: 76), the aim, to be more explicit, is to ensure that this
'rule' of everyday communication will not be broken. In Leech's
judgement tests, on the other hand, the 'rule' is broken by the
strict test instructions, a violation which is compounded by the
artificiality of the test situation. The strictness (of the test
instructions) that I have in mind lies in the unqualified use of
the word 'must', to which can be roughly attributed two distinguish¬
able effects. One effect is ensuring analytic as opposed to prag¬
matic equivalence; where this effect is concerned, 'must' may be
interpreted as "whatever the situation". The other effect is
alerting informants to the slightest difference between synonymy
candidates (in the context in question or otherwise); where this
effect is concerned, 'must' may be interpreted as "strictly speak¬
ing". It is particularly by virtue of this second effect that the
'rule' of everyday communication ceases to operate. And once this
rule is thus removed, the way is open to perceiving differences
between words which normally go unnoticed in everyday communication.
We have been talking about the difference between Lyons1s per¬
formance tests and Leech's judgement tests. But tests, however
they are designed, are but means to an end. There is reason to
believe that this difference in means is symptomatic of a difference
in ends. By a difference in ends I mean a difference in the way in
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which Lyons and Leech conceive bilateral implication and synonymy.
Lyons does not just test bilateral implication and synonymy through
the elicitation of spontaneous performance: he conceives bilateral
implication and synonymy as a matter of spontaneous performance.
Leech, on the other hand, does not just test bilateral implication
and synonymy through the elicitation of strict judgements: he con¬
ceives bilateral implication and synonymy as a matter of strict
judgement. It is this difference in conception, rather than the
difference in testing methods as such, that is precisely meant by
the distinction between performance equivalence and judgement
equivalence.
We have already seen that Leech's judgement tests depart from
the conception of synonymy as a phenomenon in everyday communica¬
tion. By straightforward inference, the same must now be said of
Leech's concept of judgement equivalence. As our concern is with
synonymy as a phenomenon in everyday communication, we must reject
both.
It should be stressed, however, that what we reject in principle
is Leech's concept of judgement equivalence; we reject his judge¬
ment tests only derivatively: not because of their status as judge¬
ment tests as such, but because their results reflect judgement
equivalence. By the same token, what we subscribe to in principle
is Lyons's concept of performance equivalence; we accept his per¬
formance tests only derivatively: not because of their status as
performance tests as such, but because their results reflect performance
equivalence. I want now to show that it is possible to make judge¬
ment tests reflect performance equivalence and to sketch the lines
on which they may be designed.
If, as we have implied above, tests are to be judged not by
their form (as long as they are operationally adequate) but by see¬
ing whether their results reflect performance equivalence, there is
no reason why we should not use judgement tests (or different per¬
formance tests from Lyons's, for that matter), provided they can
be so designed as to reflect performance equivalence. The motiv¬
ation behind this obssrvation is that if adequate judgement tests
can be found they will have the advantage over performance tests of
generally being easier to carry out. How, then, should judgement
tests be designed?
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We have made it clear all along that Leech's judgement tests
depart from performance equivalence by virtue of two factors, the
artificiality of the test situation and the strict test instructions,
of which the second is the chief factor. The lesson here is that
in designing judgement tests care should be taken to minimize the
artificiality of the test situation and, especially, not to make
the test instructions unduly strict. In fact, we may see the lesson
in a more general way. There is a sense in which, as far as bilat¬
eral implication and synonymy are concerned, the tacit standards
operating in the passing of judgements are more strict than the
tacit standards operating in spontaneous performance. In designing
judgement tests aimed at reflecting performance equivalence, there¬
fore, measures should be taken to cancel out this difference. One
measure is to minimize the artificiality of the test situation.
Another measure is to make the test instructions less strict than
it may appear at first sight that they should be, the exact extent
being determinable by comparison with results of approved perform¬
ance tests.
In practice, it seems sufficient to adopt the second measure.
This measure can take one or both of two forms. We may, in the
first place, stress explicitly to our informants that what is being
tested is synonymy as a phenomenon in everyday communication, as in
the following test instruction: Imagine yourself in the context of
everyday communication: do the two sentences mean the same? In the
second place, we may attach qualifications to the idea of sameness
of meaning, as in either (1) Do the two sentences mean essentially
the same? or (2) Do the two sentences mean more or less the same?
It may appear that by introducing qualifications like 'essentially'
or 'more or less' we are testing what may be called near-synonymy.
This may be true if synonymy is conceived as a matter of strict
judgement and reflection. As far as synonymy as a phenomenon in
everyday communication is concerned, however, what is being tested
is not near-synonymy but synonymy. And, in the light of the last
paragraph, it is only natural that, in principle, synonymy as a
phenomenon in everyday communication can be tested via near-syn¬
onymy as a matter of strict judgement and reflection. It is almost
as if people will use two sentences as meaning the same in every¬
day communication provided they have judged the two sentences to
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mean essentially or more or less the same upon strict reflection.
To conclude the first part of this section, let me stress that
performance equivalence is our end and that this end may be achieved
both by means of performance tests and by means of judgement tests.
We have discussed in some detail all three sets of alternatives,
and it is time to bring the three strands of our discussion together.
It will be remembered that the three sets of alternatives are (1)
truth/falsehood versus assertion/denial, (2) analytic versus prag¬
matic equivalence, and (3) judgement versus performance equivalence,
and that we have decided in favour of the second alternative in each
set. The first set of alternatives, it will have become clear, is
essentially a matter of method (although it is linked to the third
set of alternatives), as is the difference between judgement and
performance tests. The other two sets of alternatives, however,
involve more fundamental differences, in that they represent dif¬
ferent ways in which synonymy is conceived.
In the light of this twofold conceptual difference between Leech
and Lyons, we may formulate Leech's conception of synonymy more
explicitly as follows:
If x is a synonym of y and X and I are two assertions
identical except that X contains x where Y contains y,
then X analytically and strictly implies Y and vice versa.
'Analytically' represents Leech's stand on the analytic/pragmatic
equivalence distinction while 'strictly' represents his stand on
the judgement/performance equivalence distinction. Such a concep¬
tion of synonymy, as I have tried to show, is divorced from the
standards of sameness of meaning that operate in everyday communi¬
cation. It must be rejected, therefore, in favour of Lyons's
conception, which is free from this drawback.
Using the same framework, ye may formulate Lyons's definition of
synonymy more explicitly as follows:
If x is a synonym of y and X and Y are two sentences or
longer stretches of discourse identical except that X
contains x where Y contains y, then X pragmatically and
normally implies Y and vice versa.
'Pragmatically' represents Lyons's stand on the analytic/pragmatic
equivalence distinction while 'normally' represents his stand on
the judgement/performance equivalence distinction. Such a concep¬
tion of synonymy, as I have tried to show, reflects the standards
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of sameness of meaning that operate in everyday communication, and
is the one to which we subscribe in principle.
As far as methods are concerned, we have seen, in the first
place, that assertion and denial are preferable to the concepts of
truth and falsehood from an operational point of view. It should be
pointed out that the usefulness of assertion and denial is not con¬
fined to performance tests, although there is a natural connection
between the two. In the second place, we have seen that performance
tests using assertion and denial can serve as a satisfactory method
of testing performance equivalence, but that it is also possible to
design satisfactory judgement tests for the same purpose. Both
methods can also be used for testing pragmatic equivalence; in fact,
pragmatic equivalence poses little difficulty as far as testing is
concerned, since it is fairly easy to focus informants' attention
on the sentence and context in question.
Our sameness of meaning criterion, then, is made up of two parts.
The first part is a conception of sameness of meaning in terms of
pragmatic and performance equivalence. It is backed up by the
second part, which consists of testing methods, in regard to which
we may adopt Lyons's performance tests using assertion and denial or
adopt any other performance or judgement tests, provided they are
operationally and materially adequate.
While enough has been said about testing methods for our pur¬
pose, more needs to be said in defence and clarification of prag¬
matic equivalence on the one hand and performance equivalence on
the other. In the next two sections I will further defend and
clarify pragmatic and performance equivalence respectively.
7.7. In defence of pragmatic equivalence: meaning versus reference
It is a commonplace of discussions of synonymy that synonymy is
a matter of sameness of meaning and not mere identity of reference.
We do not depart from this well-established view. In subscribing
to pragmatic equivalence, however, we may appear open to the charge
that this is exactly what we are doing.
This charge is only to be expected, given the nature of prag¬
matic equivalence. The thesis of pragmatic equivalence is that
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bilateral implication and, by the same token, synonymy must be
bound to context. Behind this particular thesis is the general
theory of meaning according to which "all sense-relations are in
principle context-dependent" (Lyons, 1968: 4-52). But then so is
reference, with the consequence that both sameness of meaning and
identity of reference are context-bound, and the further consequence
that, unless measures are taken, the one will be confused with the
other. Herein lies a potential trap in the handling of synonymy
which one must find a way of avoiding if one treats synonymy as
context-bound and at the same time as a matter of sameness of mean¬
ing rather than mere identity of reference. It is the aim of this
section to fulfil just this obligation. But first we will take a
closer look at the problem by considering the way in which Harris
(1973) has objected to Lyons's concept of pragmatic equivalence.
Harris subjects Lyons's concept of pragmatic equivalence to a
number of criticisms, the most notable being that Lyons has fallen
into the trap which we identified above. To be more precise,
instead of objecting to pragmatic equivalence on the specific
ground of its (alleged) failure to distinguish meaning from refer¬
ence, Harris does so on the more general ground of its (alleged)
"failure to distinguish semantic from extralinguistic knowledge"
(1973: 129). And:
The argument in support of this criticism is simply that
if the interpretation of an expression depends on certain
features of the communication situation, as distinct from
the expression used, then to that extent the interpreta¬
tion is not a matter of semantic knowledge. Thus, to take
Lyons's example, supposing the linguist's investigation is
confined to the semantics of 'shopping English' or, more
strictly still, to the semantics of 'tobacconist's English',
even then the method proposed offers no sound basis for
reaching the conclusion that e.g. range and selection are
(or are not) synonymous. For it incorporates no way of
distinguishing between the respects in which the speaker's
commitment is based on knowledge of certain facts about the
situation, and the respects in which the speaker's commit¬
ment is based on knowledge of the meanings of the words
used. To know that X is a tobacconist, or a journalist, or
a bank manager, or to know that a conversation is taking
place in a tobacconist's shop or a newspaper office, or a
bank, is to know - so the argument would run - something
about the world in which one lives, not something about
the language one speaks. If the purpose of semantic des¬
cription is to account for communication by postulating
semantic knowledge shared by language-users, it requires
a method of investigation which distinguishes evidence of
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semantic knowledge from evidence of extralinguistic knowl¬
edge (Harris, 1973: 129).
Among the examples cited by Harris to illustrate this failure
are 1 Everest'/'the highest mountain in the world' and 'flower'/
'rose', which, according to Harris, will be treated, given appro¬
priate informant response, by Lyons's criterion of pragmatic
equivalence as context-bound synonyms in 'Everest is the highest
mountain in the world and Hilary climbed ' (1973: 136) and
'John grows s, and roses are the only flowers John grows'
(1973: 133-4) respectively.
It is important to note that in both these examples two terms
are rendered synonymous - let us assume for the sake of argument
that they are synonymous by virtue of having passed Lyons's syn¬
onymy tests - by facutal knowledge of a trivial kind: trivial in
the sense that we are literally told that A is B (i.e. 'Everest
is the highest mountain in the world' and 'Roses are the only
flowers John grows'). And because we are told that A is B, the
(assumed) synonymy between A and B does not depend on the exercise
of our semantic judgement. In other words, A and B need not have
meaning over and above reference; or if they do, their meanings
will be irrelevant (apart from their possible effect on the
appropriateness of A and B as referring expressions in this context).
We may use 'Everest' and 'the highest mountain in the world' to
identify a second type of case, by considering them in the frame
'Hilary climbed '. Here informants are not told that Everest
is the highest mountain in the world, but they may well know that
this is so. And if they do know, their response to synonymy tests
on 'Everest' and 'the highest mountain in the world' will be the
same as if they are explicitly told. If so, 'Everest' and 'the
highest mountain in the world' will have been rendered synonymous -
let us assume that they will pass Lyons's synonymy tests - by a
piece of general knowledge already in the informants' possession.
Another example would be 'Paris' and 'the capital of France',
which we earlier saw used by Leech in 'Charlotte lives in ' as
an example of factual equivalence.In this type of case,one of the two
terms need not have meaning over and above reference; or if it
does, its meaning will be irrelevant (apart from its possible .
effect on the appropriateness of the term as a referring expression
in this context).
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Though the factual knowledge involved is of a trivial kind in the
one and of a general kind in the other, both of these types of case
involve expressions which are rendered synonymous (under our present
assumptions) by such factual knowledge as presents us with a
straightforward equation.
There is, however, a third type of case, which is not mentioned
by Harris. This third type is exemplified by 'dog'/'bitch' and
'get'/'buy', which, as we saw in 7.5, are treated by Lyons as syn¬
onymous in 'My has just had pups' and 'I'll go to the shop and
some bread' respectively. What differentiates this type from
the other two is, in the first place, that although factual knowl¬
edge plays some part in giving rise to context-bound synonymy it
does not present us with a straightforward equation. In the case
of 'dog'/'bitch', context-bound synonymy results from the knowledge
that only female dogs are capable of giving birth to pups; in fact,
it is debatable whether the knowledge involved is factual or
semantic, or perhaps both. In the case of 'get'/'buy', context-
bound synonymy results from the factual knowledge that "unless
there is some evidence to suggest the contrary, it will be assumed
that what is obtained from a shop is obtained by purchase" (Lyons,
1968: 4-53). Not only are we not presented with a straightforward
equation, we must also note that, because of the absence of a
straightforward equation, the synonymy between A and B in this type
of case is also attributable to the meaning of A and B. Thus in
the case of 'dog'/'bitch', the synonymy between A and B is partly
attributable to the semantic knowledge that 'bitch' is the marked
term denoting female dogs while 'dog' is the unmarked term denoting
dogs of both sexes. In the case of 'get'/'buy', the synonymy be¬
tween A and B is partly attributable to the semantic knowledge that
'buy' is a hyponym of 'get' or, to put it another way, buying is a
way (or kind) of getting. If we now take factual and semantic
knowledge into account simultaneously, the rationale whereby A and
B are rendered synonymous may be put as follows: as a matter of
semantic knowledge, A differs from B by being less specific; this
semantic difference is neutralized by factual knowledge, which
adds to A what specific element of meaning B has over and above
the meaning of A. What we have here, in other words, is context-
bound synonymy which is the product of the interaction between
semantic knowledge and factual knowledge. As we shall see in
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Chapter 10, the interaction can be quite subtle.
Having identified these three types of case, let us, for the
sake of argument, add, to the assumption that it is possible for
all three types of case to pass Lyons's synonymy tests, the further
assumption that it is wrong to treat any of these types of case as
involving synonymy. Given the conjunction of these two assumptions,
the question naturally arises as to whether Lyons's synonymy tests,
and hence his concept of pragmatic equivalence, do not fall foul of
the generally accepted view that synonymy is a matter of sameness
of meaning.
The answer is 'no'. To justify this answer, I will invoke the
distinction between semantic tests conceived as hypothesis-testing
procedures and semantic tests conceived as 'discovery procedures'.
Leech sums up the distinction as follows:
(a) Hypothesis testing. As it is usually understood (and
not to insist on refinements), the process of scientific
investigation involves setting up, within the context of
a general theory, a hypothesis (how the hypothesis is
arrived at is immaterial) to be tested against observa¬
tions. If the observations are as predicted, the hypoth¬
esis is confirmed; otherwise, it is proved wrong, and an
alternative hypothesis must be sought.
(b) Discovery procedures. A discovery procedure, strictly,
is a procedure for deriving a linguistic analysis direct
from data. Following Chomsky's remarks, it is generally
accepted that to frame the empirical basis of linguistics
in terms of discovery procedures is to aim at too high a
goal. Within such an approach, it would be impossible to
justify theoretical notions such as 'competence'and logical
'implication'; moreover, any factor affecting informants'
judgements, however eccentric, would have to play a part
in the semantic description (1970: 350).
Given this distinction, it is clear that Lyons's synonymy tests
are open to objection only if they are conceived as discovery
procedures. Once we conceive tests as hypothesis-testing procedures,
it is up to us to choose what hypotheses to form and put to the
test. It follows that we will be able to steer clear of the three
types of case simply by not forming hypotheses about them. This
applies not only to the three types of case that we have identified
but also to any type of case whatsoever which it is considered
wrong to treat as involving synonymy but which the tests employed
cannot eliminate.
The conception of synonymy tests as hypothesis-testing procedures,
then, offers protection, as it were, for the concept of pragmatic
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equivalence. Such protection, however, is only partial: all it
amounts to is making sure that the concept of pragmatic equivalence
will not be open to objection simply because, in the absence of
constraints on permissible hypotheses, the tests which back it up
can yield wrong' results. Once partially protected in this way, it
is then up to anyone who propounds the concept of pragmatic equiv¬
alence to further defend it by delimiting the range of permissible
hypotheses. What, then, do we see as the range of permissible
hypotheses when we say that we subscribe to pragmatic equivalence?
To provide an answer, I will first give up the second assumption
that we made earlier, i.e. that it is wrong to treat any of the
three types of case as involving synonymy. With this assumption
out of the way, I will now draw the line between the first two types
(e.g. 'flower'/'rose' in 'John grows s, and roses are the only
flowers John grows' and 'Everest'/'the highest mountain in the
world' in 'Hilary climbed ' respectively) and the third type
(e.g. 'get'/'buy' in 'I'll go to the shop and some bread'),
treating the latter as the lower bound of synonymy and thus the
lower bound of permissible synonymy hypotheses. To put it more
explicitly in the terms used earlier, the line is between such
sameness as results from a straightforward, non-semantic equation
and such sameness as results from the interaction of semantic and
factual knowledge.
In drawing the line where it is, we conform to the view, men¬
tioned at the beginning of this section, that synonymy is a matter
of sameness of meaning and not mere identity of reference or, more
generally, mere factual identity. We have thus answered the
charge that we are treating identity of reference or factual ident¬
ity in general as a sufficient condition of synonymy. It is true
that we allow for the possibility that factual knowledge may help
produce synonymy (i.e. sameness of meaning) between terms which
semantic knowledge alone would not make us treat as synonymous;
but we take factual knowledge into account, not in its own right,
but only insofar as it influences the behaviour of meaning. To
those who object to this position, I can only say that it is not
incompatible with the condition of material adequacy to treat the
third type of case as involving synonymy (cf. Naess, 1957: 91) and
that I find this type of case worth investigating under the rubric
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of synonymy as a phenomenon in everyday communication.
7.8. In defence of performance equivalence: degrees of sameness
Judgement equivalence, we have seen, requires a higher degree of
sameness of meaning than performance equivalence. As far as this
set of alternatives is concerned, we may indeed treat Leech's con¬
ception of synonymy as one of 'strict synonymy', in contrast with
Lyons's conception, which may be treated as one of 'normal synonymy'.
We have thus explicitly introduced the notion of degrees of same¬
ness, a notion worth pursuing both by way of further defending per¬
formance equivalence and by way of doing fuller justice to judgement
equivalence.
To talk of two degrees of sameness - 'strict' and 'normal' - is
of course an oversimplification. The issue is in fact far more
complex, since many degrees of sameness (i.e. sameness up to a cer¬
tain point) are distinguishable, all within what has quite commonly
been regarded as the domain of synonymy by psychologists (cf.
Hermann, et al. 1978), synonymists (cf. Webster) and linguists (cf.
Weinreich, 1962). By 'distinguishable' I do not mean that the
degrees of sameness in question are amenable to strict quantifica¬
tion by means of such techniques as componential analysis (cf.
Weinreich, 1962; Nunnally & Hodges, 1965).. That such methods have
not proved successful in quantifying semantic relatedness in gen¬
eral and degrees of sameness of meaning in particular is well
recognized (cf. Harris, 1973: 3-4; Lyons, 1968: 447; Lyons, 1977:
552-3). However, their lack of success does not alter the undoubted
correctness of the intuition that sameness of meaning is a matter of
degree.
We may refer in this connection to a method for measuring same¬
ness of meaning that has been used by psychologists. Herrmann.
et al. for example, as a preliminary in an experiment on synonymy
response latency, obtained a similarity rating for two 'synonym
sets' in the following way:
Method: Hierarchical Clustering Analysis
Subjects, A group of 25 people, consisting of students,
businessmen, housewives, and professors, filled out a syn¬
onym-evaluation questionnaire without pay.
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Materials and Procedure. A booklet was constructed of
an instruction page and two sections of 11 pages each.
One section presented stimuli from a synonym set referred
to here as appetitive emotions (i.e. covet, desire, dream,
hope, long (for), lust, need, strive, want, wish, and
yearn) and one for a synonym set of mental ability terms
(i.e. bright, clever, cunning, intelligent, quick, sharp,
sly, smart, tricky, witty, and wise). Each stimulus page
was headed by one of 11 different stimulus words, below
which was a column of the remaining 10 words (in random
order) with a line alongside of each word. Half of the
booklets presented the appetitive emotions first, and
half presented the mental ability terms first. The direc¬
tions asked the subject to judge the similarity between
each of the 10 stimulus words on each page and the stimulus
word at the top of the page on a 7-point scale, with 7
representing identical meanings and 1 representing very
dissimilar meanings. The subject recorded his/her judge¬
ments on the line alongside each comparison word. The
questionnaire was completed at home by the subject. The
means of similarity ratings were analyzed by the hier¬
archical clustering program of OSIRIS (1978: 151).
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Figure 1. A hierarchical clustering solution for two synonym
sets as a function of mean similarity rating (where ratings of one
and seven represent low and high similarity, respectively).
What is of interest to us is not so much the hierarchical
analysis itself as the intuitive rating from which the former was
derived. One may not entirely agree that "inspection of either
solution reveals that the hierarchical clustering analyses arranged
the terms in an intuitively satisfactory manner" (Herrmann et al.
1978: 151), just as one may disagree with other aspects of the
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method. But what for us is the main point should not be in doubt,
namely, that it is consistent with native speakers' intuitions to
postulate degrees of sameness of meaning.
Although what we have just seen is the rating of synonymity in
abstraction from context, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
perception of degree also applies to judgements of synonymy in con¬
text (i.e. pragmatic equivalence). In fact, this is the position
held by Blose when, having defined synonymy in terms of mutual
entailment (as we saw earlier), he says that "two expressions are
synonymous to the extent that this mutual entailment holds; degrees
of synonymy are thus admitted" (1965: 310).
Given that sameness of meaning is a gradable notion, no degree
of sameness is inherently more correct than any other. Instead,
whether a degree of sameness is the right one in a particular case
depends on whether it conforms to the point of view from which syn¬
onymy is being studied. As far as degrees of sameness are con¬
cerned, therefore, the task of formulating a definition of synonymy
consists in trying to identify the degree of sameness judged to be
sufficient from the point of view being adopted. By the same token,
an objection to treating a particular degree of sameness as synonymy
is well-directed only if the degree in question is at variance with
the guiding point of view. One may, of course, object to the guid¬
ing point of view in the first place, but that is a different
matter.
The point of view that has guided us in our search for a char¬
acterization of synonymy is that of everyday communication. It
is because performance equivalence reflects a degree of sameness
which conforms to this point of view that we subscribe to it. And
from the point of view of everyday communication the degree of
sameness in question is not near-synonymy, but synonymy. For near-
synonymy is any degree of sameness which falls short of the criteria
of synonymy in question but which one nevertheless wants to treat
as a secondary phenomenon under the same rubric.
In treatments of synonymy the temptation is often, as in Leech's
case, to insist on the highest degree of sameness (of cognitive
meaning). We have no objection to the highest degree of sameness
as such, but only if the aim is to explicate synonymy as it normally
manifests itself in everyday communication, in which case there will
- 121 -
be incompatibility between the degree of sameness chosen and the
point of view adopted. It is precisely on account of such incom¬
patibility that we have found judgement equivalence unsuitable for
our purpose.
When we say that judgement equivalence requires a higher degree
of sameness of meaning than performance equivalence, what we mean,
more precisely, is that there can be such a degree of cognitive
difference between two terms as to falsify a hypothesis of synonymy
between them in terms of judgement equivalence but not one in terms
of performance equivalence. So far we have taken the line that any
such semantic difference is irrelevant or immaterial in everyday
communication. In so doing, however, we have locked at only half
the picture. For a fuller and more accurate view of the matter, we
must now draw attention to the other half.
What this other half of the picture reveals to us is that the
kind of cognitive difference we are talking about is relevant in
everyday communication: relevant, however, in a sense that is com¬
patible with the sense in which we have so far treated it as irrel¬
evant. As we have seen, the kind of cognitive difference in ques¬
tion is irrelevant in the sense that two otherwise identical sen¬
tences would be 'repetitions' of each other. That is to say, the
cognitive difference, which we may grant to be real enough in care¬
ful judgement and reflection, is cognitively irrelevant in every¬
day communication. However - and this is the half of the picture
now under focus - the kind of cognitive difference may be relevant
in the sense, say, that it makes us prefer one term to the other
for being more appropriate or more accurate, and so forth. The
sense in question, to be more explicit, is stylistic. Warburg's
conception of style is akin to the one that I have in mind, if in
the following quotation we understand "roughly, but only roughly,
the same" as implying the criterion of judgement equivalence:
Good style, it seems to me, consists in choosing the
appropriate symbolization of the experience you wish to
convey, from among a number of words whose meaning-area
is roughly, but only roughly, the same (1964: 39; cf. also
Hockett, 1958: 556).
The full picture, then, represents a situation in.which the kind
of cognitive difference we are talking about is neutralized by a
'rule' of everyday communication such that it is no longer
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cognitively, but only stylistically, relevant. It is this possi¬
bility of neutralization that makes synonymy the widespread phe¬
nomenon in everyday communication that it is.
7.9. From occurrence-synonymy to sense-synonymy and lexeme-
synonymy: 'recalcitrant' sentences
Having established both an interchangeability criterion and a
sameness of meaning criterion, we now have at our disposal a full
characterization of occurrence-synonymy, which we may condense into
the following definition:
(1) Occurrence-synonymy: A° and B° are synonymous in a sen¬
tential frame and context (a) if and and only if both A and
B are grammatically and collocationally acceptable in the
sentential frame and (b) if and only if the two resulting
sentences pragmatically (i.e. in the context in question)
and normally imply each other.
Now that we have characterized occurrence-synonymy, we have, by
implication, also characterized sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy.
It will be remembered that we provided partial definitions of sense-
synonymy and lexeme-synonymy in 3.1, namely:
s s
(2) Sense-synonymy: A and B are synonymous if and only if
for each and every occurrence assignable to A there is
assignable to B an occurrence which is synonymous with it
and vice versa.
(3) Lexeme-synonymy: A1 and B1 are synonymous if and only
i£ for each and every occurrence (or sense) assignable to
A there is assignable to B an occurrence (or sense) which
is synonymous with it and vice versa.
These two definitions are partial because the underlined portions
of them are left uninterpreted. We can now make these partial
definitions complete by simply stipulating that the underlined por¬
tions of (2) and (3) are to be interpreted in accordance with (l).
There is, however, a problem with our definitions of sense-syn¬
onymy and lexeme-synonymy as they stand, and it is similar to a
familiar problem that confronts any characterization of synonymy in
terms of interchangeability salva veritate (cf. Harris, 1973: 117-9;
Fodor, 1977: 44-6).
Cooper describes the problem confronting interchangeability
salva veritate as follows:
The theory of synonymy I want to discuss and amend is
often called the 'interchangeability theory'. Put loosely,
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the claim is that synonymy is a function of words being
interchangeable in sentences without altering the truth-
values of those sentences. The extreme version of the
theory is well stated by Benson Mates as follows:
Two expressions are synonymous in a language L
if and only if they may be interchanged in each
sentence of L without altering the truth value
of that sentence.
So, for example, 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are syn¬
onymous if any true sentence containing 'bachelor' remains
true when 'unmarried man' replaces 'bachelor' - similarly
for false sentences.
There seems to be an immediate problem for this extreme
version - for there are sentences in which it would be
quite hopeless to expect any two words to be generally
interchangeable salva veritate (i.e. without altering
truth-values). If so, then by the extreme theory, it is
quite hopeless to suppose that there are any synonyms.
Let us call any sentence in which it would be hopeless to
expect interchangeability a 'recalcitrant' sentence. I
shall now mention some types of recalcitrant sentences
(1973a: 167).
Of these types one type is exemplified by '"Bachelor" has eight
letters', and another type consists of the so-called 'intensional'
sentences. Common to all recalcitrant sentences, as Cooper discovers,
is the fact that the failure of one expression to be interchange¬
able with another expression salva veritate in them is due to
factors that have nothing to do with meaning. And since synonymy
is a matter of meaning, it is only reasonable to disqualify recal¬
citrant sentences from serving as evidence against (sense-) syn¬
onymy hypotheses. This consideration leads Cooper to formulate the
following, more 'mellow', definition of synonymy:
Two expressions are synonymous if and only if they are
interchangeable salva veritate in all those sentences
attempted confirmation of which presupposes giving a
semantic interpretation of the expressions (1973a: 170).
Although Cooper has postulated recalcitrant sentences in relation
to interchangeability salva veritate, the essence of what he has to
say applies equally to our definitions of sense-synonymy and lexeme-
synonymy. Just as, say, 'unmarried man' cannot replace 'bachelor'
in '"Bachelor" has eight letters' without changing the truth value
of the sentence, so '"Bachelor" has eight letters' will not prag¬
matically and normally imply '"Unmarried man" has eight letters'.
And just as sentences like this should not be treated as evidence
against (sense- or lexeme-) synonymy hypotheses in the one case, so
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they should not be so treated in the other case, either.
Cooper characterizes recalcitrant sentences as follows:
A sentence is recalcitrant, relative to an expression 'A'
appearing in it, if attempted confirmation of the sentence
does not presuppose a semantic interpretation of 'A'
(1973b: 268).
Since our treatment of synonymy is not in terms of interchange-
ability salva veritate. we may adapt Cooper's characterization so
that it reads:
A sentence is recalcitrant, relative to an expression 'A'
appearing in it, if 'A' resists substitution by another
expression for reasons which have nothing to do with the
meaning of either expression.
I believe this adapted characterization will be sufficient for our
purpose.
In the light of the notion of recalcitrant sentences, we must
reformulate our definitions of sense-synonymy and lexeme-synonymy,
so that they now stand as follows:
(2') Sense-synonymy: AS and BS are synonymous if and only
if for each and every occurrence in non-recalcitrant sen¬
tences assignable to A there is assignable to B an occur¬
rence which is synonymous with it and vice versa.
(3') Lexeme-synonymy: A"*" and B"*" are synonymous if and only
if for each and every occurrence ^or sense) in non-recal-
cjtrant sentences assignable to A there is assignable to




FROM DEFINITION TO DESCRIPTION
This brief chapter is designed as a transition between Part One
of the thesis, which has been concerned with the definition and
explication of synonymy, and Part Two, which will be devoted to
problems in the description of synonymy. It will therefore be
partly retrospective and recapitulatory, and partly prospective and
preparatory in nature. I will begin by recapitulating parts of
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. From the conclusions that will emerge
from this brief summary, I will next derive three types of synonyms,
which will in turn give rise to three tasks of description. These
descriptive tasks will then be carried one by one in the three
chapters that follow.
In Chapter 3 we were concerned with the relationship between
lexical units and the definition of synonymy. To recapitulate, we
may start by noting that the relation which holds between occur¬
rences and senses (we may conveniently leave lexemes out of account
for the purpose of this chapter) may be seen as one of assignment,
whereby an occurrence realizes a sense and is Assignable to it.
Given this assignment relation, it is possible to define occurrence-
synonymy independently and then to define sense-synonymy deriva¬
tively through the assignment relation. Thus for A and B to be
occurrence-synonymous it is both necessary and sufficient that they
meet the requisite criteria in one sentence and context. From this
can easily be derived a definition of sense-synonymy in the follow¬
ing terms: For A and B - each now construed as a sense - to be
sense-synonymous it is both necessary and sufficient that for each
and every occurrence assignable to A there is assignable to B an
occurrence which is synonymous with it, and vice versa. It follows
that a single instance where occurrence-synonymy does not hold
between an occurrence assignable to A and an occurrence assignable
to B constitutes sufficient evidence that A and B are not sense-
synonymous. From this it is clear that sense-synonymy entails
occurrence-synonymy, but not conversely. Herein lies a measure of
the 'strength' of the two definitions, with sense-synonymy imposing
conditions harder to meet than is the case with occurrence-synonymy.
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The question then arises as to whether occurrence-synonymy as such
can be properly regarded as synonymy. Here considerations of both
operational and material adequacy point to an affirmative answer.
At the end of this line of reasoning, we came to the conclusion,
which is important in the present connection, that the definition of
synonymy should be such as to accommodate occurrence-synonymy. Such
a definition need not exclude sense-synonymy, unless one is a strict
contextualist. On the contrary, once criteria of occurrence-syn¬
onymy have been established, it is perfectly straightforward, as we
have seen, to derive from them criteria of sense-synonymy, provided
certain measures concerning sense-identity and recalcitrant sen¬
tences are taken.
Our attention in Chapter 4 was on the relationship between
lexical units and the description of synonymy. The basic argument
presented there was as follows. When adequate criteria of occur¬
rence-synonymy are applied to language data, they will yield, under
appropriate circumstances, descriptive statements of occurrence-
synonymy, that is, statements to the effect that A and B are syn¬
onymous in a particular sentence/context or particular sentences/
contexts. Though such statements are correct, they need not always
constitute the best description. For the best description is one
which achieves the highest possible degree of economy compatible
with descriptive adequacy. This naturally leads to the conclusion,
which is again important in the present connection, that when, as is
often the case, descriptive adequacy can be satisfied on the level
of sense, statements of senses-synonymy - conceived as the merging
of statements of occurrence-synonymy - are to be preferred for
being more economical. At the same time, statements of occurrence-
synonymy will still have a useful function to fulfil, for there
are many instances of synonymy between occurrences whose corre¬
sponding senses are not sense-synonymous.
If we now place our respective conclusions from Chapter 3 and
Chapter U side by side, it will be obvious that we regard both
sense and occurrence as legitimate levels of meaning and, more
particularly, both sense-synonymy and occurrence-synonymy as
legitimate levels of synonymy.
It will be recalled that both the conception of synonymy as a
meaning-relation between senses and the conception of synonymy as
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a meaning-relation between occurrences have tended to be held by-
people who regard their own conception as incompatible with the
other. This is attributable to two opposing views of lexical mean¬
ing: the autonomist view, which underlies sense-synonymy, and the
contextualist view, which underlies occurrence-synonymy. Given this
conflict, the question may appear to arise as to which of the two
conceptions of synonymy is the right one. For our part, however,
we do not subscribe exclusively to either conception, for we believe
that the two conceptions need not be mutually exclusive and that
both the level of sense and the level of ocurrence have an essential
role to play in a systematic treatment of synonymy.
But in holding this belief we face objections from both the
autonomists and the (strict) contextualists. We have already par¬
tially responded to such objections, and we will try to counter
them more systematically and thoroughly in 10.4-. For the present,
however, it is far more important to underline the consequence
arising out of the conjunction of the two conclusions mentioned
above.
To put this consequence into perspective, it is helpful to
bring in the autonomist and the contextualist position for compari¬
son. Thus, for those who regard sense as the sole legitimate level
of meaning and consequently sense-synonymy as the sole legitimate
level of synonymy, it does not make sense to talk in terms of occur¬
rence-synonymy. Conversely, for those who regard occurrence as the
sole legitimate level of meaning and consequently occurrence-syn¬
onymy as the sole legitimate level of synonymy, it makes sense to
talk only in terms of occurrence-synonymy. Only when both sense
and occurrence are regarded as legitimate levels of meaning and
both sense-synonymy and occurrence-synonymy as legitimate levels
of synonymy, as is with our position, does it make sense to talk
in terms of occurrence-synonyms whose corresponding senses fall
short of sense-synonymy.
What it is legitimate to talk about, to put it another way, are
senses which are synonymous in some sentences/contexts but not
synonymous in others. Adopting, but also adapting, the terms
'communis1 and 'propria' as used by Bloch (1953: 60) in relation
to types of relative distribution, we may refer to those sentences/
contexts in which two senses are synonymous as their communis, and
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those sentences/contexts in which two senses are not synonymous as
their propria. Once we recognize both a commmunis and a propria,
it is natural to ask why two senses can be synonymous in some sen¬
tences/contexts but not synonymous in others.
Where communis and propria co-exist, however, they are usually
not in equal need of explanation. Thus, when we find occurrence-
synonyms whose corresponding senses fall short of sense-synonymy,
two types are distinguishable, though not always sharply. The
first type consists of cases where, though the two senses involved
are not synonymous in all sentences/contexts, when they are syn¬
onymous their synonymy is not due to accidental factors in the
sentences/contexts in question and is therefore not unexpected.
One example is provided by 'generous1 and 'handsome', where, when
carrying the sense-meaning of "generous", 'handsome' cannot be
predicated of human beings. Another example consists of 'consider¬
able' and 'tidy', where, when carrying the sense-meaning of "con¬
siderable", 'tidy' is more or less restricted to collocation with
amounts of money. We will examine these and other cases in Chapter
9. Where occurrence-synonyms of this type are concerned, it is
obviously more natural, and often sufficient, to try and account
for the propria, the propria being what is somewhat unexpected and
thus in need of explanation. The second type differs from the
first in that it comprises cases where two senses normally not
synonymous happen to be synonymous in one or more sentences/contexts
by virtue of accidental factors in the sentences/contexts in ques¬
tion. This type is exemplified by 'dog'/'bitch' and 'get'/'buy',
which we discussed in Chapter 7. Further examples are 'hard' and
'cold' when modifying or being predicated of 'winter', and 'improve'
and 'increase' when 'understanding' serves as their subject or
object. I will discuss the latter two pairs and other cases in
Chapter 10. In such cases, in contrast to occurrence-synonymys of
the first type, it is obviously more natural, and often sufficient,
to try and account for the communis, for here, it is the communis
rather than the propria that is somewhat unexpected and thus calls
for explanation.
It should be stressed that the distinction we have just drawn
between the two types of occurrence-synonyms is entirely motivated
by considerations of explanatory naturalness. It is important to
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stress this point because, it will be remembered, we also distin¬
guished two types of occurrence-synonyms in Chapter A, with regard
to the making of synonymy statements. These two distinctions are
different, as the latter is entirely motivated by the search for
descriptive economy. In practice, they overlap considerably but
they do not coincide. Where they do overlap, it will also be more
economical to try and account for the propria and communis
(respectively) in the two types of cases identified above.
In the light of what has just been said, three types of synonyms
may now be identified, namely: sense-synonyms (as well as lexeme-
synonyms insofar as they exist), occurrence-synonyms of the first
type, and occurrence-synonyms of the second type.
From this rough classification there can be seen to emerge three
tasks in a comprehensive description of synonymy (cf. Lyons, 1981:
50-1 for 'partial synonyms' in the sense of not being 'totally syn¬
onymous' or not being 'completely synonymous'; cf. Ullmann, 1957:
109-10 for 'rational synonymy'). First, to account for the propria
of otherwise synonymous senses. Second, to account for the communis
between otherwise non-synonymous senses. And thirdly, to describe
the various dimensions of communicative relevance on which synonyms
can differ, whichever of the three types they belong to.
I have brought together these three phenomena (corresponding to
the three tasks) for description not only because they are a natural
consequence of our decision to treat both sense and occurrence as
legitimate levels of meaning and both sense-synonymy and occurrence-
synonymy as legitimate levels of synonymy, but also because I think
that, taken together, they go a long way towards accounting for the
way in which native speakers of English make use of one delimitable,
though internally heterogeneous, domain of its lexical resources,
i.e. synonyms. A description of these phenomena would thus be a
description of native speakers' competence in the domain of synonymy.






ACCOUNTING FOR THE PROPRIA OF OTHERWISE SYNONYMOUS SENSES
9.1. The delimitation of propria
We saw in the last chapter that occurrence-synonyms whose corre¬
sponding senses fall short of sense-synonymy can be divided into
two types. Our concern in the present chapter is with the first
type, which, it will be remembered, comprises cases where the com¬
munis between two senses is expected while the propria stands out
in need of explanation. To put it briefly, the question which we
we will try to answer in this chapter is why, given that two senses
are synonymous in some sentences/contexts (communis), the same two
senses fail to be synonymous in other sentences/contexts (propria).
Between two senses four types of relative distribution concern¬
ing synonymy are possible, namely, complementary, coincident,
incorporating and overlapping (cf. Bloch, 1953: 60). It is obvious
that the first two do not come within our present purview. In the
case of complementary distribution there is simply no communis,
which means there is no synonymy. As regards coincident distribu¬
tion, since what we have here is full sense-synonymy, there is no
propria to explain. Our concern, then, is with incorporating and
overlapping distribution alone. The former presents us with one
set of propria to account for while the latter presents us with
two.
Since we conceive propria as a matter of two senses not being
synonymous (in some sentences/contexts-), we must automatically
exclude types of case where what appears to be propria is in fact
attributable to factors which take us beyond the two senses in ques¬
tion. It is my concern in the remainder of this section to draw
attention to such types of case by way of delimiting what for our
present purpose may be referred to as genuine propria.
Now when two words fail to be synonymous in a sentence/context,
this may be either because they are not interchangeable in that
sentence/context or because, though interchangeable in that sentence/
context, they do not carry the same meaning therein. As we are
concerned with the propria pertaining to the same two senses, the
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second explanation is automatically inapplicable. For if the sub¬
stitution of one word for the other results in a change in the mean¬
ing of one sentence when the same substitution preserves the meaning
of another sentence, it is clearly right to infer that there is one
sense which is not shared by the two words and that this is why they
are not synonymous in the first sentence. In other words, the
recognition of polysemy (for one of the two words) offers a suffi¬
cient explanation of the facts in question.
Take, for example, 'also* and 'too', which have been treated in
detail by Lee. According to Lee,
Too is always replaceable by also in the same position of
occurrence and without material change of meaning, but ...
in some instances al3o is not replaceable in this way by
too (1965: 256).
Thus,
In many of the instances ... replacement of also by too in
the same position would materially affect meaning. It is
often necessary to examine a considerable portion of con¬
text to discover whether or not replacement would have this
effect. Examples:
But now he also had two private and opposite memories to
deal with ... (S)
(The substitution of He too, i.e. he in addition to
someone else, would change the meaning, as the wider con¬
text would make clear.)
... they also suspected that the ruling classes in these
states might ... (L)
(From the wider context it is clear that the suspicion
is a further one of theirs. They too suspected would, on
the other hand, mean that they in addition to someone else
suspected this.)
On August 29 Hitler also gave a nominal acceptance ... (L)
(Substitution of too here makes no difference of meaning:
another government had already accepted the proposals, as the
context makes clear.) (Lee, 1965: 257).
From this it is clear that where the substitution of 'too' for 'also'
changes the meaning of the sentence this is due to the fact that
'also' has a sense not shared by 'too'. That this is the case is
also testified by the fact that 'also' can cause ambiguity in a
way that 'too' cannot. Some dictionaries, though not all, do in fact
clearly distinguish these two senses of 'also' (cf. SOE, A New
English-Chinese Dictionary (henceforth NECD)). Thus the failure of
'too' to replace 'also' in the sentences/contexts cited by Lee does
not constitute what we would regard as genuine propria.
It is thus in the nature of genuine propria that it is caused by
the failure of two words to be interchangeable or, in other words,
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the unacceptability of one word in certain sentences/contexts where
the other word is acceptable. Our task of accounting for the
propria, then, may be seen to boil down to determining the nature
of the unacceptability in question. It will be recalled that in
Chapter 6 we identified four types of unacceptability - grammatical,
semantic, purely collocational and situational - of which the first
three constitute necessary conditions of interchangeability. It is
in terms of these three types of unacceptability that we shall
investigate the nature of propria.
But first it is necessary to clear the ground by mentioning some
further types of propria which do not satisfy our criterion of
'genuine'. We have already seen that change of meaning (of the
sentence), as opposed to unacceptability, is a sure indication that
genuine propria is not involved. It hardly needs to be said that
the converse, i.e. unacceptability is a sure indication of genuine
propria, does not hold. In the first place, unacceptability due to
homonymy clearly does not fall within the range of genuine propria.
Nor, in the second place, does unacceptability due to clear-cut
polysemy constitute genuine propria. We shall count, for example,
as instances of this type of unacceptability what Ullmann, Palmer
and Seuren have drawn attention to with regard to 'broad'/'wide•,
'deep'/'profound' and 'landscape'/'scenery' respectively:
Broad and wide are synonymous in some of their uses: the
'broadest sense' of a word is the same thing as its
'widest sense', etc. In other contexts, only one of the
two terms can be used: we say ... a 1 broad accent', not a
wide one (Ullmann, 1962: 14-3).
Some words are interchangeable in certain environments only,
e.g. that deem or profound may be used with sympathy but
only deep with water (Palmer, 1976: 63).
Such perfect synonyms as tibia and shinbone are relatively
rare. Much more common are 'incidental' synonyms, i.e.
synonyms in certain environments, but not in others, such
as landscape and scenery, which are commutable without
change in meaning in many contexts, but not in, for instance:
(93) Archibald bought a landscape.
The problem of how to account for incidental synonyms has
never been solved (Seuren, 1969: 223).
When it is as clear as in these cases that two different senses of
one or both words are involved, the propria is only to be expected
and calls for no other explanation than in terms of straightforward
polysemy. And where distinct polysemy is involved, I do not think
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what Seuren calls 'incidental' synonyms pose any serious problems.
Nor, indeed, in my view, is it fitting to describe such synonyms as
'incidental'•
Problems do arise, however, when, as is often the case, polysemy
is not as clear-cut as this. It is, for example, somewhat more
difficult and less obviously convincing to invoke polysemy in
explaining the propria of 'big'/'large' and 'strong'/'powerful'
exemplified by Lyons and Halliday respectively as follows:
There are many contexts in which 'large' and 'big' are not
interchangeable without violating the collocational restric¬
tions of the one or the other. For example, 'large' cannot
be substituted for 'big' in
'You are making a big mistake'.
And yet 'big' seems to have the same meaning here as it
does in phrases such as 'a big house', for which we could,
as we have seen, substitute 'a large house' (Lyons, 1981: 52).
The sentence he put forward a strong argument for it is
acceptable in English; strong is a member of that set of
items which can be juxtaposed with argument, a set which
also includes powerful. Strong does not always stand in
this same relation to powerful: he drives a strong car is,
at least relatively, unacceptable, as is this tea's too
powerful. To put it another way, a strong car and power¬
ful tea will either be rejected as ungrammatical (or
unlexical) or shown to be in some sort of marked contrast
with a powerful car and strong tea: in either case the
paradigmatic relation of strong to powerful is not a
constant but depends on the syntagmatic relation in which
each enters, here with argument, car or tea (Halliday,
1966: 150).
I take it as self-evident that an explanation of the propria
between two words in terms of polysemy is more powerful than one
which assigns the occurrences of each word to a single sense. If
so, in cases like the above we should first seek a satisfactory
explanation in terms of polysemy. Only failing such an explanation,
should we then recognize genuine propria, which is to be accounted
for in ways which will be discussed presently. In the two cases in
question, it happens that a plausible explanation in terms of
polysemy is available or partially available. Thus, in the first
case, we can, following CED, identify three relevant senses for
'big': (1) "of great or considerable size ...", (2) "having great
significance; important" and (3) "(intensifier usually qualifying
something undesirable)" (these appear as 1, 2 and ^ under the
entry for 'big', p.1,43). Given these three senses, it is clear
that the occurrence of 'big' in 'a big house' is assignable to the
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first sense while its occurrence in 'You are making a big mistake'
is assignable, depending on context, to either the second or the
third sense. We can now account for the propria by pointing out
that of the three senses of 'big' only the first is shared by
'large'. In the case of 'powerful'/'strong', it is at least poss¬
ible to explain the set of propria in favour of 'strong' by ident¬
ifying a sense of 'strong' (i.e. "6. concentrated; not weak or
diluted" (CED: 1442)) such that it is neither shared by 'powerful'
nor is the sense to which the occurrence of 'strong' in 'He put
forward a strong argument for it' is assignable.
In addition to unacceptability due to homonymy or polysemy, we
will also treat as not constituting genuine propria such unaccepta¬
bility as is attributable to the fact that one of the words in
question lies astride two or more different word-classes one or
more of which are not shared by the other word. However, as we
shall see later, propria may be caused by grammatical unacceptability
of a less obvious or categorical kind. To take just one example far
the time being, 'bear', 'endure', 'stand' and 'abide' are synonymous
in (9.1) and (9.2),
(9.1) He can't that old man.
(9.2) He can't seeing animals cruelly treated.
but, unlike the first two words, 'stand' and 'abide' are unaccept¬
able in (9.3),
(9.3) He can't to see animals cruelly treated.
because they are incapable of being followed by an infinitive
construction. While it is normal lexicographic practice to treat
different word-classes under different word entries or different
senses, the fact that a word is capable of occurring in more than
one construction, one or more of which do not admit of an other¬
wise synonymous word, is not in itself seen to warrant the estab¬
lishment of more than one sense. The kind of propria we have just
seen, though less obvious and categorical than that involving two
different word-classes, is far from subtle. But, as we shall see
later, there are cases of propria where the underlying grammatical
unacceptability is of a somewhat more subtle kind. These latter
cases in particular but also, though to a somewhat lesser extent,
all cases of grammatical unacceptability short of involving two
different word-classes seem to me to require some treatment, and
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I will accordingly regard all these as constituting genuine propria.
It will have become clear what I exclude from genuine propria.
We are now in a position to consider how genuine propria is to be
accounted for.
9.2. Propria due to grammatical unacceptability
As far as propria due to grammatical unacceptability is concerned,
there is little need for theoretical discussion. What follows,
therefore, will consist of practical analyses, whose main aim is
to indicate the variety, as well as sometimes the subtlety, of the
grammatical factors which can cause propria. Needless to say, our
list of such grammatical factors is far from exhaustive.
(1) Direct object versus infinitive
We have already touched on one kind of grammatical unaccepta¬
bility in relation to 'bear', 'endure', 'stand' and 'abide'.
Another example is provided by 'merit' and 'deserve' when they both
carry the sense-meaning of "be worthy of". 'Merit' and 'deserve'
are synonymous in many sentences where they combine with a direct
object, as in
(9.4) This problem deserves/merits our attention.
(9.5) He deserves/merits promotion.
(9.6) These people deserve/merit our help.
However, only 'deserve' is capable of being followed by an infini¬
tive construction, so that if we replace 'deserve' with 'merit' in
(9.7) and (9.8) grammatical unacceptability will result:
(9.7) He deserves/*merits to be punished.
(9.8) He deserves/*merits to be more widely read.
(2) Noun phrase versus that clause as object
'Stress', 'emphasize' and 'underline' (fig.) are synonymous in a
wide range of sentences where they are followed by a noun phrase as
object, as in
(9.9) The speaker stressed/emphasized/underlined the import¬
ance of tolerance.
Unlike the first two senses, however, 'underline' cannot take as
object a that clause, and is thus incapable of replacing 'stress' or
'emphasize' in, for example
(9.10) The speaker stressed/emphasized/*underlined that
tolerance was important.
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(3) 'Of' + complement versus that clause
'Unaware' and 'ignorant' are synonymous when followed by 'of'
plus a complement, as in
(9.11) You are not unaware/ignorant of the reasons for his
behaviour.
(9.12) He was unaware/ignorant of my presence.
(9.13) I am quite unaware/ignorant of what his plans are.
However, when 'unaware' is followed by a that clause, it cannot be
replaced by 'ignorant'. In (9.14) and (9.15), for example, only
'unaware' is acceptable:
(9.14.) You are not unaware/*ignorant that he behaved badly.
(9.15) He was unaware/*ignorant that I was present.
(4) Attributive versus predicative
While 'uphill' is among the class of adjectives which are gram¬
matically confined to the attributive position, no such restriction
attaches to 'difficult'. Thus it is possible for the two senses to
be synonymous only in attributive position, as in
(9.16) It is a (an) difficult/uphill task.
When 'difficult' is used in the predicative position, 'uphill' cannot
serve as an acceptable replacement even when, as in (9.17), the
argument is within its semantic range:
(9.17) This task is difficult/*uphill.
(5) Affirmative versus negative
'Stand', 'endure', 'bear' and 'abide' can be simultaneously syn¬
onymous only in sentences where the feature of negation is present,
as in
(9.18) He can't stand/endure/bear/abide teasing.
Of the four senses, only 'stand' and (to a lesser extent) 'endure'
are not limited to such sentences and are therefore acceptable in,
for example
(9.19) He can stand/endure/*bear/*abide teasing.
For 'bear' and 'abide' to be used acceptably, there is the further
requirement, according to OALDCE, that they be preceded by the
modal auxiliaries 'can' or 'could'.
(6) Different surface orderings of the same case array
A clear example here is the set 'notify', 'report' and 'inform',
whose relative distribution concerning synonymy is exemplified by
(9.20) They notified/reported/*informed the theft to the police.
(9.21) They notified/informed/*reported the police of the theft.
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As we can see from (9.20) and (9.21), 'notify' is the only sense
out of the three that is acceptable in both sentences, where it
shares a communis with 'report' and 'inform' respectively. The
other two senses are each grammatically restricted in its own way,
and there is no communis between them. Now the propria concerning
the three senses can be explained in terms of the surface orderings
in which they are allowed to appear for realizing the same case
array, which consists of A(gentive), D(ative) and O(bjective) (cf.
Fillmore, 1968, 1971). This will become clear if we represent the
permissible surface ordering(s) of the three cases for 'notify',
'report' and 'inform' as follows:
nr +••<» f A V(erb) 0 to D 7Notify { A „;erbj D of 0 J
Report (A V(erb) 0 to D)
Inform (A V(erb) D of 0)
(7) Different case arrays
Verbs that are synonymous in some sentences may also fail to be
interchangeable in others because they do not coincide in their
permissible range of underlying case arrays. For example, 'crowd'
and 'throng' are synonymous in (9.22) and (9.23), but only 'crowd'
can be used in (9.24) and (9.25):
(9.22) They crowded/thronged through the gates into the
stadium.
(9.23) The railway station was crowded/thronged with people.
(9.24) They crowded/*thronged the bus with passengers.
(9.25) They crowded/#thronged people into the bus.
The case array exemplified in (9.22) consists of Agentive, Path and
Goal. In (9.23) we have.the case array of Locative and Objective.
A different case array underlies (9.24) and (9.25), where we find
Agentive, Locative and Objective with two alternative surface order¬
ings. Both 'crowd' and 'throng' are permissible within the first
two case arrays, but only 'crowd' can occur in the third.
(8) Restriction on phrasal conjunction
'Distinguish' and 'tell', when carrying the sense-meaning "dif¬
ferentiate", are synonymous in a construction such as
(9.26) He can't distinguish/tell £®argarine from butter.x & ' Lbutter from margarxne.
When phrasal conjunction is involved, however, as in (9.27), only
'distinguish' is acceptable:
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(9.27) He can't distinguish/*tell between {^tter^d^rga^e!
(9) Obligatory syntactic constituents
'Grateful' and 'indebted' are synonymous in
(9.28) I am grateful/indebted to you for your help.
But if we take away 'to you', to yield
(9.29) I am grateful/*indebted for your help.
then only 'grateful' is acceptable. It seems reasonable to gener¬
alize that a prepositional phrase of the form 'to + person(s) (to
whom gratitude is due)', while optional for 'grateful', is obliga¬
tory for 'indebted'; hence the unacceptability of 'indebted' in
(9.29). The same seems to apply, though perhaps less strictly, to
their nominal cognates, i.e. 'gratitude' and 'indebtedness'.
(10) Positions in a sentence
When two senses share the same meaning and the same word-class,
propria may nevertheless arise because they differ as regards the
positions in a sentence in which they can occur. Thus 'however'
and 'though', when serving as sentence connectors and meaning
roughly "all the same", are synonymous in
(9.30) Later, however/though, he was persuaded to go.
(9.31) He was later persuaded to go, however/though,
but only 'however' is acceptable in
(9.32) However/fcthough, he was later persuaded to go.
(9.33) He was, however/*though, later persuaded to go.
(9.34-) He was persuaded later, however/*though, to go.
It is safe to suggest that in this particular use 'though' is not
acceptable in initial position, and this explains (9.32). As for
(9.33) and (9.34-) > it is difficult to give a definite explanation.
But it seems that, unlike 'however', 'though' is normally used only
when there is a major break in the sentence, such as we find in
(9.30).
The same phenomenon is exemplified by 'enough' and 'sufficient'.
When used as an adjective, 'enough', but not 'sufficient', "may
either precede or follow a noun" (OALDCE: 290). Thus, while the
two senses are synonymous in
(9.35) There is enough/sufficient food for everybody,
only 'enough' can be used in
(9.36) There is food enough/#sufficient for everybody.
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A further example comes from Lee's study of 'also' and 'too',
which we have already had occasion to refer to. Among the sentences
instanced by Lee where 'also' is not replaceable by 'too' in the
same position are the following (1965: 257):
(i) Also, there was a cat's affronted look in its eyes.
(ii) Mr D., who is also Minister for External Affairs, can
retain his Cabinet post ...
(iii) The British and French governments, and especially the
former, also showed little understanding of ...
(iv) Well, there's also a coastal southern type.
(v) 'Very jolly', the Ormerod man murmured, also looking at
Jenny ...
(vi) Also drawn up outside it was a newer and much more
expensive-looking car ...
By way of accounting for cases like these Lee says:
About one seventh of the occurrences of also where it is
irreplaceable, or not normally replaceable, by too in the
same position, have been classed as initial. These
include not only initial occurrence in the sentence but
initial occurrence in the clause or phrase (1965: 258).
The rest of the examples are more difficult to classify, but it is
certainly correct to say that 'too' is much less flexible as regards
the positions in a sentence in which it can occur.
(11) Gradable versus non-gradable terms
'Nearly' and 'almost' have been cited by Collinson (1939: 58)
and Ullmann (1962: 142) as rare examples of terms which are univer¬
sally interchangeable without any change in meaning, cognitive or
otherwise. But, as Baldinger has pointed out, this is in fact not
the case, for "only nearly is negatable or gradable" (1980: 239).
Thus, while 'nearly' and 'almost' are synonymous in
(9.37) He nearly/almost succeeded.
'almost' is not acceptable in •
(9.38) In fact, he did not nearly/*almost succeed.
(9.39) All the same, he more nearly/*almost succeeded than
last time.
(9.40) He very nearly/*almost succeeded.
9.3. Propria due to semantic unacceptability
When two items are found to be synonymous in some sentences but
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not synonymous in other sentences because one of the items is
unacceptable or odd, it is perfectly plausible in many cases to
seek a semantic explanation in terras of polysemy, as we saw earlier.
Such an explanation, however, is clearly not open to us as regards
the following:
(9.4.1) depend/hinge
(a) The outcome of the election depends/hinges on how the
floating voters will cast their vote.
(b) The outcome of the election depends/*hinges only to a
small extent on how the floating voters will cast
their vote.
(9.42) result/fruit
(a) His success is the result/fruit of method
(b) His success is the result/*fruit of luck.
(c) His failure is the result/*fruit of bad method.
(9«43) obstacle/impediment
(a) The border dispute is a (an) obstacle/impediment to
peace in the region.
(b) The lack of books in the library is a (an) obstacle/
?impediment to his academic progress.
(c) His lack of concentration is a (an) impediment/?obstacle
to his academic progress.
Now in none of these cases is it plausible to account for the
co-existence of communis and propria by postulating for one or both
items two sense-meanings only one of which is shared by both items.
Nor is there any plausibility in attributing the propria to gram¬
matical unacceptability. It is somewhat less certain whether or not
we should attribute the propria to purely collocational unaccepta¬
bility. What is clear, however, is that, given that semantic
unacceptability is 'motivated' while purely collocational unaccepta¬
bility is arbitrary, a semantic explanation of propria is more
powerful than, and therefore preferable to, a purely collocational
one. There will thus be an unnecessary loss in explanatory power
if we are content with a purely collocational explanation when a
semantic one can be found - as I think it can in the three cases in
question.
We thus find ourselves again searching for a semantic explana¬
tion, but this time not in terms of polysemy. Instead, our expla¬
nation will be on roughly the following lines: Although all the occur¬
rences of the one item are assignable to a single sense and the
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same applies to all the occurrences of the other item, there is a
difference in meaning between the two senses such that propria
occurs when what element of meaning of the one sense is not shared
by the other sense comes into conflict with some aspect of the sen¬
tence or context in question. What we have here is essentially an
explanation of the facts which is (1) semantic in character and
yet (2) does not invoke polysemy.
In adopting such an explanation, however, we will lay ourselves
open to the charge of inconsistency unless we are at the same time
prepared to concede that the same difference in meaning between the
two senses that accounts for the propria is also somehow (we will
come back to this crucial word presently) present between the two
senses in sentences where they are interchangeable. To concede this
is indeed what we must do. There is a sense in which the difference
in question is disguised in those sentences permitting interchange-
ability but is accentuated in other sentences by the presence of
what might be called diagnostic elements - so called because they
help to diagnose, as it were, the difference between the two senses.
It is sometimes difficult to identify the diagnostic elements and
more difficult still, once the diagnostic elements have been found,
to pinpoint the features in them that render a sense unacceptable.
These latter we may refer to as diagnostic features. But whether
successful or not in discovering the diagnostic elements and
features, we must concede the point made at the beginning of this
paragraph.
Once we concede that such semantic difference as is responsible
for the propria attaches somehow also to the occurrences of the two
senses in sentences where they are interchangeable, however, will
we not overcome one inconsistency only to commit another if, having
conceded this point, we then treat these occurrences as synonymous?
The answer is 'no', because the semantic difference exists between
these occurrences of the two senses only in one of two ways (hence
'somehow') neither of which is inconsistent with the presence of
synonymy as we conceive it (i.e. in terms of pragmatic and per¬
formance equivalence). In the first place, the semantic difference
may exist only as a mere reflection of the semantic difference on
the level of sense - a 'mere reflection' because the semantic
difference on the level of sense is neutralized on the level of
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occurrence by sentential or contextual factors (exemplification
later). And since it is neutralized in a sentence/context, the
semantic difference will not prevent two occurrences from being
synonymous, given our conception of synonymy in terms of pragmatic
equivalence. In the second place, the semantic difference may
exist to just such an extent that it is noticeable by the standard
of careful judgement and reflection but not by the standard of every¬
day communication. And since it is not noticeable by the standard
of everyday communication in a sentence/context, the semantic dif¬
ference will not prevent two occurrences from being synonymous,
given our conception of synonymy in terms of performance equivalence.
It is beyond the scope of the present study to make systematic
proposals as to how to ascertain the semantic difference between
senses: to do so would be to embark on a highly complex task in its
own right (cf. Bendix, 1971). Nevertheless it behoves us to give
at least some rough indication of the semantic differences to which
the propria in our three examples is attributable respectively.
'Depend' and 'hinge', as (9.-41 a, b) suggests, seem to be in
incorporating distribution in that 'hinge' seems to be universally
replaceable by 'depend' but not conversely. In (9«41b) the
unacceptability of 'hinge' appears to be attributable to the pres¬
ence of 'only to a small extent', which may thus be looked upon
provisionally as the diagnostic element. As to the likely diag¬
nostic feature, we may work on the initial hypothesis that it has
something to do with the notion of degree. This hypothesis can be
rendered more powerful (i.e. more specific) by observing what will
happen to 'depend' and 'hinge' when the hypothesized diagnostic
element is replaced by other expressions of degree. To make the
results systematic and revealing, we will sort these expressions
into a number of sets, each representing a particular degree, as
follows:
(a) completely, entirely, etc.
(b) largely, in large part, to a large extent, to a great
extent, considerably, etc.
(c) (only) partly, (only) to some extent, somewhat, etc.
(d) (only) to a small extent, etc.
Now while 'depend' remains invariably acceptable, we find some
interesting variety in the way in which 'hinge' responds to these
substitutions. There are essentially three observations to make.
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First, although the (a) expressions will not render 'hinge' unac¬
ceptable in (9.11b), they themselves seem to be somewhat redundant,
in a way that they are not when occurring with 'depend'. From this
it seems reasonable to draw the inference that something like
"entirely" (or "completely") constitutes part of the meaning of
'hinge'. Apparently, however, this inference comes into conflict
with our second observation, namely, that 'hinge' is acceptable in
(9.11b) when used in combination with the (b) expressions. For
from this observation there follows the inference that "entirely"
need not constitute part of the meaning of 'hinge': otherwise (b)
expressions would render 'hinge' unacceptable. Before we try to
resolve this apparent contradiction, let us complete the picture
with the third observation, which is already partially revealed to
us in (9.11b) in its original form. It is this: 'hinge' is incom¬
patible with the (c) and (d) expressions. We are thus led to make
the further inference that part of the meaning of 'hinge' must
consist in the stipulation of a degree that is greater than what
is represented by the (c) and (d) expressions.
In the light of these three observations and inferences, it is
now possible to piece together a more powerful hypothesis concern¬
ing the meaning of 'hinge' and one which is free from contradiction.
Over and above "depend" (i.e. the meaning of 'depend'), according
to this hypothesis, the meaning of 'hinge' contains a disjunction
of two further features, i.e. "entirely or largely". Hence the
inability of 'hinge' to combine with (c) or (d) expressions. But
there is the further point that of the two additional features
"entirely" is unmarked while "largely" is marked (cf. Hofmann,
1976: 11 for a type of meaning which he calls 'presumptions').
Hence in the absence of any indication to the contrary, as in
(9.11a), 'hinge' will mean something like "depend entirely"; hence
the felt redundancy of (a) expressions when used with 'hinge'; and
hence also the need for some accompanying (b) expressions when
'hinge' is intended to mean "depend largely" instead.
At this point it is worth looking at how 'hinge' is characterized
in Webster:
Hinge is sometimes used interchangeably with depend; it may
retain much of its literal suggestion of a movable part (as
a door or a gate) that opens or closes upon hinges and then
usually implies the cardinal (my underlining) point upon
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which a decision, a controversy, or an outcome ultimately
(my underlining) rests. ... (the outcome of the war hinges
on the ability of our forces to outmove every strategic
move of the enemy) (the point on which the decision must
finally hinge ...) (the whole case being built up by Mr.
Kennon was going to hinge in large part upon a single
issue - was Clifford under the. influence of liquor ...)
(p.227).
I have underlined 'cardinal' and 'ultimately' because they help to
bring out what there is in common between this characterization and
the account which we have just given. When, as in the second
example in the above characterization, an (a) expression (i.e.
'finally') is used to modify 'hinge', what it does seems more to
add emphasis to an element of meaning already present in 'hinge'
than to make a new semantic contribution to the phrase.
Now that we have sketched the semantic difference between 'de¬
pend' and 'hinge' which seems to be responsible for the propria, we
may next inquire briefly, in the light of this hypothesized dif¬
ference, whether and to what extent the occurrences of the two
senses are synonymous when they are interchangeable. To simplify
the issue somewhat, we may break down the question into two, the
first concerning 'depend' and 'hinge' when they are unmodified,
the second concerning the two senses when they are modified by (b)
expressions. With regard to the first question, it seems that
while 'hinge' means "depend entirely" when unmarked (or unmodified),
a similar principle is at work in the case of 'depend' such that
when unmodified 'depend' itself leans in the direction of "depend
entirely" (cf. Grice, 1975 for his maxim of 'quantity'). Needless
to say, this presumption can be perfectly well negated or contra¬
dicted by (c) or (d) expressions, but in that event 'hinge' will
not be interchangeable with 'depend'. If in this first type of
case 'depend' and 'hinge' are close enough in meaning to be syn¬
onymous, the two senses are even closer in meaning in the second
type of case, where they are modified by (b) expressions. For
here what relevant meaning of 'hinge' is lacking in 'depend' (i.e.
"largely") is explicitly made up for by the presence of (b)
expressions. To put it another way, the difference between 'depend'
and 'hinge' on the level of sense is here neutralized on the level
of occurrence by sentential factors.
We turn now to our second example, which concerns 'result' and
'fruit'. On the level of semantic acceptability 'result' and
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'fruit' also seem to be in incorporating distribution. However that
may be, let us focus on our example sentences, where we do find
'result' and 'fruit' in incorporating distribution. Now what mean¬
ing 'result' and 'fruit' have in common consists in a relation
involving cause and effect. Where, as in (9.42), we have the simple
structure 'X is the result/fruit of Y', Y expresses the cause and X
the effect. While 'result' seems to be fairly unrestricted as
regards the nature of either cause of effect, 'fruit' is subject to
restrictions as regards both.
In (9.42b), where 'fruit' is unacceptable, the diagnostic element
is quite clearly 'luck'. As to the likely diagnostic feature, com¬
parison with (9.42a) suggests the hypothesis that the meaning of
what occurs in the cause-position in the case of 'fruit' has to
contain (explicitly or by implication) some element of agency,
which is present in "hard work" and "good method" but missing from
"luck". It is worth referring in this connection to GED, where the
relevant sense of 'fruit' is defined as "the result or consequence
of an action or effort" (p.585). We may indeed follows CED in
regarding "action or effort" as the restrictions on what can normally
fill the role of cause for 'fruit'. The above hypothesis gains
support from the fact that 'fruit' will remain acceptable in (9.42a)
when 'hard work' or 'good method' is replaced by other expressions
denoting some kind of action or effort (e.g. 'dedication', 'perse¬
verance' and 'trial and error') while 'fruit' will remain unaccept¬
able in (9.42b) when 'luck' is replaced by other expressions which
lack any implication of action or effort (e.g. 'chance', 'lack of
obstacles/opposition' and 'favours from patrons').
Moving on to (9.42c), it seems plausible to attribute the
unacceptability of 'fruit' to what occurs in the effect-position,
i.e. 'failure'. Here again comparison with (9.42a) is revealing.
In the light of this comparison we may form the hypothesis that
'fruit' requires of what occurs in the effect-position that in
normal, non-sarcastic use it should express a consequence that is
desired by the person(s) most directly involved. This hypothesis
is plausible in view of the fact that the unacceptability of
'fruit' is unaffected when 'failure' is replaced by other expressions
in which no implication of desirability is present (e.g. 'defeat',
'lack of success' and 'inefficiency'). It should also be noted
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that from this hypothesis there follows yet a further restriction en
'fruit' as regards cause; Since the effect is desired, the cause
must be such that it is normally regarded as conducive to the
bringing about of the effect. Thus (9.42a) will become unaccept¬
able if we replace 'good' with 'bad' in 'good method'.
The relevant sense of 'fruit' may now be roughly characterized
as "the desired result of an action or effort conducive to the
achievement of the result". By exhibiting the difference between
'fruit' and 'result' in a systematic way, this characterization
explains why in (9.42b) and (9.42c) 'result' is not replaceable by
'fruit'. But what happens when, as in (9.42a), the two senses are
interchangeable? It seems, at least in (9.42a), that what is
implied by 'fruit' as regards the nature of cause and effect without
the aid of sentence/context we may, when 'result' is used in place
of 'fruit',infer without much difficulty with the aid sentence/con¬
text. Differences between the two senses, in the respects to
which we have drawn attention as well as possibly in others,
undoubtedly exist even when the two senses are interchangeable, but
these differences will in sentences like (9.42a) be neutralized to
an extent sufficient for the two senses to function synonymously
within our conception of synonymy.
While a case of hypothesized incorporating distribution is easily
in danger of falsification upon the discovery of a counter instance,
by the same token a hypothesis of overlapping distribution can be
verified with much greater certainty, as is the case with 'obstacle'
and 'impediment'.
For an account of the semantic difference between these two
senses which is responsible for the propria in (9.43b) and (9.43c)
respectively, it is relevant to distinguish for 'obstacle' and
'impediment' two senses each, of which (from a purely synchronic
point of view) one may be said to be literal and the other somewhat
figurative. The latter senses of 'obstacle' and 'impediment' are
already exemplified in (9.43b) and (9.43c) respectively. It is
only when these somewhat figurative senses are in operation that
'obstacle' and 'impediment' are sometimes interchangeable, as in
(9.43a). We are not concerned with the literal senses in their
own right, but only to the extent that they help throw light on the
figurative senses. The literal senses are exemplified in
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^ (9.44) The horse tripped over the last obstacle.
(9.4-5) He has a serious speech impediment.
What meaning is shared by the four senses may be specified by
means of a proposition consisting of three arguments, namely, 'X
hinders/prevents Y for Z' , in which X stands for the entity that
hinders/prevents, I for the action or state hindered or prevented,
and Z for the entity affected by the hindrance/prevention. All the
four senses, it seems, imply these three arguments, although they
may not all be realized or, when they are realized, realized in a
discrete manner. In (9.4.3a) 'the border dispute' is X, 'peace' is
Y, and 'the region' is Z. In (9.4-3b) 'the lack of books in the
library' is X, 'academic progress' is Y, and 'him' (inferrable from
'his') is Z. (9.4-3c) is the same as (9.4-3b) except that 'his lack
of concentration' is X. The arguments are less tangible in (9.44)
and (9.4-5), but they can still be identified or, when not overtly
present, inferred. In (9.4-4-) 'the last obstacle' is X while 'the
horse' is Z; Y is not overtly present, but we can safely infer that
it is something like 'advance'. In (9.4-5) 'a serious ... impediment'
is X, 'speech' is Y, and 'he' is Z.
It may be mentioned in passing that what differentiates the
literal from the figurative senses is the nature of X. More rel¬
evantly, we may observe that an important difference between the
two literal senses lies in the nature of relationship between X and
Z. In the case of 'obstacle', it is clear that X is outside of, or
separate from, Z. In the case of 'impediment', on the other hand,
there is a sense in which X is within, or part of, Z. We now come
to the important point, namely, that the difference we have just
identified between the two literal senses applies also to the two
figurative senses, though - and this is also an important point -
in a less strict way (as we shall see presently).
We are now in a position to account for (9.4-3b) and (9.4-3c).
In (9.4.3b), 'impediment' is unacceptable because it is clear that
the X in question is external to Z. It is just the opposite in
(9.4-3c), where it is equally clear that the X in question is
internal to Z, so that 'obstacle' is unacceptable.
In view of the reasons for which 'impediment' and 'obstacle'
are unacceptable in (9.4-3b) and (9.43c) respectively, it must be
asked why they are interchangeable in (9.4-3a). The explanation, I
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think, lies in the observation already hinted at at the end of the
last paragraph but one. Now there are sentences/contexts where
the relationship between X and Z is not a straightforward matter of
X being internal or external to Z and where consequently it is
often possible to make out a case for both. This is particularly
true when Z refers to a geographical area rather than one or more
individuals. In (9.43a), for example, it seems reasonable to say
that X.is internal to Z,since the border dispute clearly takes
place within the region. On the other hand, it is also plausible
to say that X is not internal to Z in any simple and straightfor¬
ward manner, because perhaps not all the states in the region and
certainly not all the individuals living in the region are necess¬
arily involved, in which case these other states and individuals
are not to be identified as Z. From this indeterminacy it follows
that there will be no definite incompatibility between either
'obstacle' or 'impediment' and what in clear-cut cases like (9.43b)
and (9.43c) would constitute a diagnostic feature. There is corre¬
spondingly no definite semantic reason why 'obstacle' and 'impedi¬
ment' should not be interchangeable. What is more, to the extent
that the relationship between X and Z is inherently indeterminate,
thi3 determinacy will not be resolved by the use of the one sense
rather than the other. If so, then the semantic difference between
'obstacle' and 'impediment' on the level of sense is prevented from
making any material contribution on the level of occurrence, which
means that they are synonymous according to our conception of syn¬
onymy.
Examples like these could be multiplied, but the three we have
given will suffice to illustrate the argument that in many cases of
propria it is plausible to supply a semantic explanation without at
the same time having either to invoke polysemy or to imply that
communis does not in fact exist. Although the examples themselves
may well be open to question, I believe the substance of the argu¬
ment is valid. There must thus be a place in our explanatory
framework for the type of propria which in the heading of this
section we referred to as 'propria due to semantic unacceptability'.
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9.4. Propria due to purely collocational unacceptability
A semantic explanation of propria, as we have already pointed
out, is more powerful than, and consequently preferable to, a purely
collocational one. But equally, to be adequate, a semantic expla¬
nation must satisfy the requirement that there be identifiable
semantic difference between the two senses in question also when
they are interchangeable, although we may then add that this dif¬
ference is neutralized or immaterial. When this requirement is not
met under otherwise identical circumstances (i.e. having ruled out
a grammatical explanation and a semantic explanation in terms of
polysemy), we must seek instead a purely collocational one.
Such an explanation is called for, for example, in the case of
•generous' and 'handsome' (cf. Katz, 1972: 44). Now one of the
senses of 'handsome' may be glossed as "generous", as is commonly
done in dictionaries. When used in this sense, 'handsome' is not
applicable to human beings. From this fact we may for our present
limited purpose derive, to adopt Katz and Fodor's (1963) formula¬
tion and form of representation, the selection restriction (-Human) .
This means that, of the noun phrases of which 'generous' can be
predicated, 'handsome1 is capable of being predicated of only those
which contain, or imply, the semantic marker (-Human). 'Generous',
which is otherwise synonymous with 'handsome' as regards the rel¬
evant sense, is not subject to this particular selection restriction.
Thus, of the following sentences, 'generous' is replaceable without
change of meaning by 'handsome' only in the first two:
(9.4-6) He gave me a generous/handsome gift.
(9.4-7) He was offered generous/handsome terms.
(9.48) He is a generous/#handsome man.
(9.49) He is generous/*handsome with his money.
(9.50) He is generous/*handsome in giving help.
When the noun phrases in question contain the semantic marker
(Human), as in the last three sentences, 'handsome' cannot serve as
a synonymous replacement for 'generous'. That 'handsome' in the
sense of "generous" is not applicable to human beings is further
testified by the fact that
(9.51) He is a handsome man.
does not feel ambiguous. It might also be mentioned in passing that
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when used in the sense of "generous" 'handsome' seems normally to
prefer the attributive position. Thus while 'handsome' is perfectly
acceptable in (9.4-6) and (9.4-7) it is somewhat less so in, say
(9.52) His gift to me was very generous/?handsome.
(9.53) The terms offered to him were generous/?handsome.
The question now arises as to what is the justification in cases
like this for postulating different selection restrictions (i.e.
giving a purely collocational explanation) as opposed to differences
of meaning (i.e. giving a semantic explanation). McCawley, for
example, objects to the concept of selection restrictions thus:
I see no reason for believing that selectional restric¬
tions have any independent status in linguistics. All of
the selectional restrictions which I have seen cited either
are completely predictable from the meaning of the lexical
item in question or are not in fact real restrictions. ...
As regards the status of selectional restrictions as an
independent factor in language, if selectional restric¬
tions were not predictable from the meanings of the lexical
items in question, then it would be possible to have dif¬
ferent lexical items which had the same meaning but differed
in selectional restrictions. While a number of examples of
such lexical items have been proposed, in each case the
difference between the lexical items has turned out actually
to be one of meaning rather than one of selectional restric¬
tions (1970: 167).
These objections seem to me to be clearly invalid as regards the
relative distribution of 'generous' and 'handsome' exemplified in
the above sentences. Here the justification for attributing the
propria to different selection restrictions rather than to dif¬
ferences in meaning is simply that there is no identifiable semantic
difference, potential or actual, between 'generous' and 'handsome'
in the communis (i.e. (9.46) and (9.47)) (such that it would
account for the propria in (9.48) to (9.50)). In fact, it is not
implausible, though undesirable (we will give the reasons presently),
to seek a semantic explanation for the propria in terms of polysemy
by distinguishing two senses for 'generous' differing only in
selection restrictions, such that the sense with the selection
restriction (-Human) would be in coincident distribution with
'handsome'. If so, just as it is wrong automatically to infer that
s s s s'
A and B differ in meaning when A differs in meaning from B
(i.e. another sense assignable to the same lexeme, B), it is
equally wrong automatically to infer the existence of some semantic
difference between 'generous' and 'handsome' in (9.46) and (9.47)
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from their propria in (9.4-8) to (9.50). When, for reasons to be
given presently, we establish one sense for 'generous' instead of
two, exactly the same point holds. And once we decide to attribute
the occurrences of 'generous' in (9.4-6) to (9.50) to a single sense,
then as a matter of consistency we must account for (9.4-8) to (9.50)
by postulating selection rather than semantic differences between
'generous' and 'handsome', for the simple reason that there is no
identifiable difference between the two items in (9.46) and (9.4-7)
(such that it would account for the propria in (9.4-8) to (9.50)).
There are two reasons why it is undesirable to distinguish two
senses for 'generous' in the manner hypothetically suggested above.
First, it would be gratuitous to do so from the broad point of view of
semantic description as opposed to the narrow point of view of the
description of synonymy. Secondly, it would be less economical to
distinguish two senses than to identify one sense and then supply
it with selection restrictions. It is our refusal, for these rea¬
sons, to distinguish two senses for 'generous' that gives rise to
the need for a purely collocational explanation.
Let us look now at another example where the propria requires a
purely collocational explanation. Although 'considerable' and
'tidy' have a sense-meaning in common, which may be glossed as
"much; a lot of" (CED), they differ in their collocational restric¬
tions (hereafter I will use 'collocational restriction' as a general
term in discussing purely collocational unacceptability and reserve
'selection restriction' for referring to a particular type of
collocational restriction). While 'considerable' is widely appli¬
cable, 'tidy' is highly restricted, though in a way which is
difficult to pin down. We may start with the following sentences:
(9.54-) It cost a considerable/tidy sum of money.
(9.55) It took a considerable/?tidy amount of time.
(9.56) He has written a considerable/?tidy number of books.
(9.57) It is a considerable/?tidy distance.
In the light of these sentences it is tempting to form the
hypothesis that 'tidy' is subject to a collocational restriction
specifiable as 'sum of money'. It is important to note that as a
collocational restriction 'sum of money' can be construed in two
radically different ways: as a concept on the one hand and as an
expression on the other. If we follow the first interpretation, it
- 153 -
is obvious that the above hypothesis will prove false. For despite
the fact that the concept of "sum of money" is present in, say, the
meaning of 'expense1 and 'salary', 'tidy' remains odd in
(9.58) He bought the house at considerable/?tidy expense.
(9.59) He earns a considerable/?tidy salary.
In fact, even 'tidy amount of money' does not sound quite as natural
as 'tidy sum of money'. If we now follow the second interpretation
and construe 'sum of money' as an expression instead, the above
hypothesis will prove partly true - but only partly true, because
not only is 'tidy amount of money' also acceptable there are also
other combinations into which 'tidy' can enter, such as 'a tidy
penny' and 'They do swear a tidy bit' (SOED). Let us make the
assumption - one which, if false, will not affect the point being
made - that 'sum of money', 'amount of money', 'penny' and 'bit'
are the only expressions that 'tidy' can modify. This would mean
that, instead of being able to attach to 'tidy' a generic colloca¬
tional restriction by means of a concept, we are reduced to actually
listing these expressions.
There thus emerge two different types of collocational restric¬
tion. In the one type, exemplified by 'generous' and 'handsome',
the collocational restriction is specifiable in terms of a concept
(or a disjunction of concepts), whereby it will cover all the
expressions possessing that concept. In the other type, exemp¬
lified by 'considerable' and 'tidy' (under the assumption we have
made), the collocational restriction has to be stated by actually
listing the one or more expressions involved, which makes general¬
ization impossible and, where only one expression is involved, also
unnecessary.
These two types of collocational restriction seem to correspond
to the last two types of collocational restriction identified by
Palmer in the following:
We can, perhaps, see three kinds of collocational restric¬
tion. First, some are based wholly on the meaning of the
item as in the unlikely green cow. Secondly, some are based
on range - a word may be used with a whole set of words that
have some semantic features in common. This accounts for
the unlikeliness of The rhododendron passed away and equally
of the pretty boy (pretty being used with words denoting
females). Thirdly, some restrictions are collocational in
the strictest sense, involving neither meaning nor range,
as addled with eggs and brains. There may, of course, be
borderline cases (1976: 97).
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Palmer's first type of collocational restriction may be seen to
correspond to what we have chosen to set up as a radically separate
category, namely, propria due to semantic unacceptability. Thus,
although Palmer is not dealing with collocational restrictions in
relation to synonymy, to the extent that his categories coincide
with ours they will have been shown also to apply to the nature of
the propria of otherwise synonymous senses.
A very similar distinction is drawn by Lehrer, who identifies
Two opposing hypotheses on the co-occurrence of words: the
lexical and the semantic hypothesis. The lexical hypoth¬
esis states that co-occurrence restrictions are a function
of particular lexical items; this is the position argued
by Firth and Halliday. The semantic position is that co¬
occurrence restrictions are a function of the meaning of
words, and such restrictions must be stated, not for
lexical items per se, but for some sort of abstract semantic
features (1974: 173).
And, as far as synonymy is concerned, Lehrer is certainly right, as
our foregoing discussion will have shown, when she says:
Although the two positions conflict, they may both be
partially true - that is, each may be true for different
parts of the vocabulary (1974: 173).
It should be noted, however, that what Lehrer refers to as the
semantic position appears to conflate what in our classification are
distinguished as propria due to semantic unacceptability and propria
due to the first kind of purely collocational unacceptability (as
exemplified by 'generous' and 'handsome'). As we have already
argued, there is a valid and necessary distinction to be drawn
between the two. By way of shedding further light on this distinc¬
tion as well as on the distinction between the two kinds of purely
collocational unacceptability, it will be helpful now to consider
how 'selection restrictions' fit into our account as these are
conceived by Katz and Fodor (1963).
In Katz and Fodor's proposal, a reading (or path) in a diction¬
ary entry consists of four portions, reconstructed in the light of
conventional dictionaries (1963: 191). These are (1) a grammatical
marker, (2) one or more semantic markers, (3) (optionally) one or
more semantic distinguishers, and (4) a specification of selection
restrictions. Semantic markers, according to Katz and Fodor,
are the elements in terms of which semantic relations are
expressed in a theory. ... The semantic markers assigned
to a lexical item in a dictionary entry are intended to
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reflect whatever systematic semantic relations hold between
that item and the rest of the vocabulary of the language
(1963: 187)1
Separate from these are distinguishers, which "are intended to
reflect what is idiosyncratic about its meaning" (i.e. the meaning
of the lexical item in question) (1963: 187). In addition, a spec¬
ification of selection restrictions
will be affixed to the terminal element of a path (either
the distinguisher or the last semantic marker if there is
no distinguisher) and will be construed, relative to the
projection rules, as providing a necessary and sufficient
condition for a semantically acceptable combination (1963:
191).
Now, for our purpose, the first portion of a lexical reading, i.e.
the grammatical specification, may be ignored. As regards the rest
of the reading, two points are of interest to our present concern.
First, semantic markers and distinguishers may be seen to make up
the semantic characterization of a lexical reading. This will give
us a two-way distinction between the semantic characterization of a
sense on the one hand and its selection restrictions on the other.
Secondly, distinguishers have no place in selection restrictions,
which are stated purely in terms of semantic -fand syntactic) markers.
As far as the first point is concerned, Katz and Fodor are
clearly justified in distinguishing between the semantic character¬
ization of a sense (i.e. a reading or a path) and the selection
restrictions attaching to it. Elsewhere Katz (1972: 89-97) has
provided a comprehensive defence of this distinction. With regard
to the explanation of the propria of otherwise synonymous senses,
we have also seen the need for such a distinction in order to do
justice to the facts to be explained.
When we come to the second point, we will at once notice that,
as conceived by Katz and Fodor, selection restrictions coincide
(to the extent that they do) with only the first kind of colloca¬
tional restriction we discussed earlier, i.e. such collocational
restrictions as can be stated as a generalization in terms of one
or more concepts. Semantic markers, out of which selection restric¬
tions are made, may indeed be looked upon as concepts. Thus, while
Katz and Fodor's theory would account for the propria of 'generous'
and 'handsome' in terms of selection restrictions, it cannot
account for the propria of 'considerable' and 'tidy'. For in the
latter case, it is not possible to identify, as the selection
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restriction of 'tidy', a semantic marker which is demonstrably
absent from the semantic characterization of those expressions with
which 'tidy' cannot enter into acceptable combination. As a conse¬
quence, the unacceptability of 'tidy' in these combinations will
have to be given a different treatment, if and when the need is seen
to arise. While Katz and Fodor view such a treatment as outside
the scope of a semantic theory, they are certainly right in prin¬
ciple in distinguishing between these two types of collocational
unacceptability.
While on the subject, we may refer to a criticism of Katz and
Fodor's concept of selection restrictions by Weinreich:
If ... addled were to be marked in its selection as
restricted to eggs and brains, the restriction would be
unlikely to be statable in terms of legitimate markers
(without distinguishers); and again we would lack an
explanation of how we know that in It's addled, the
referent of it is an egg or a brain (1966: 4-07).
Now it seems clear that, like the unacceptability of 'tidy' in
certain combinations, the unacceptability of 'addled' in, say,
'addled meat' or 'addled milk' is unlikely to be attributable to a
breach of selection restrictions and therefore will not be accounted
for in Katz and Fodor's theory. To this extent, Weinreich is
unjustified in making the above criticism. Whether Katz and Fodor
are right in leaving this type of collocational unacceptability out
of the scope of a semantic theory is a different matter, with which
we need not be concerned.
A more important point concerns the precise nature of the dis¬
tinction between markers and distinguishers. Since the publication
of Katz and Fodor's proposal in 1963, this aspect of their theory
has come under a great deal of criticism (cf. Bolinger, 1965;
Weinreich, 1966). Much of the criticism seems to boil down to the
objection that there is no principled way of determining whether a
particular feature is to be treated as a semantic marker or a
distinguisher. When applied to selection restrictions, the objec¬
tion would amount to saying that there is no principled way of
determining whether a particular collocational restriction is or
is not a selection restriction. Katz (1972: 82-8) has made an
attempt to answer this objection, which, however, still persists.
For our part, while not subscribing to the distinction between
markers and distinguishers, we would do well to pay heed to the
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motivation behind this distinction. Katz and Fodor write:
The distinction between markers and distinguishes is
meant to coincide with the distinction between that part
of the meaning of a lexical item which is systematic for
the language and that part which is not (1963: 188).
The distinction between what is systematic and what is idiosyncratic,
which has motivated the distinction between markers and distin¬
guishes, is one which is clearly relevant to the statement of
collocational restrictions. It is something of this distinction
that underlies what we have decided to treat as two types of collo¬
cational restriction, which for ease of reference we may now call
•selection restrictions' and 'lexical restrictions' respectively.
Beyond this point, however, we need not follow Katz and Fodor any
further.
As we conceive the two types of collocational restriction, a
selection restriction is one where descriptive generality is
achieved by means of one or more concepts. A lexical restriction,
on the other hand, is one which consists in actually listing the
one or more expressions involved. Once this distinction is drawn,
we may then follow the straightforward principle of maximum economy
of statement, whereby provided descriptive adequacy can be achieved
we automatically prefer selection restrictions to lexical restric¬
tions, which we adopt only after attempts at finding selection
restrictions have failed (cf. Lehrer, 1974: 176; Leech, 1974: 20).
In place of Katz and Fodor's form of a lexical reading, we will
adopt, for our limited goal of accounting for the propria of other¬
wise synonymous senses, one which is made up of an undifferentiated
semantic characterization and a specification of collocational
restrictions, the latter being of two kinds. We are now in a
position to provide a somewhat more formal and precise character¬
ization of three types of unacceptability (or propria). An
expression, A, is semantically unacceptable in a sentence, S, if and
only if a diagnostic feature, DF, can be found which is incompatible
with the semantic characterization of A. A is selectionally (collo-
cationally) unacceptable in S if and only if a DF can be found
which is incompatible with the collocational restriction of A.
A is lexically (collocationally) unacceptable in S if and only if
only a diagnostic element (but no DF) can be found which is
incompatible with the collocational restriction of A. The first
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two types of unacceptability have in common the fact that a system¬
atic (as opposed to idiosyncratic) explanation is available through
the discovery of one or more diagnostic features (i.e. concepts).
The second and third types of unacceptability have in common the
fact that their existence does not justify the reasoning that if
s si
A is not interchangeable with B in S then there must be some, at
s g 2
least potential, difference in meaning between A and B in S ,
where they are interchangeable. On account of the feature shared
by the second and third types of unacceptability, we have grouped
them together under the heading of collocational unacceptability,
in contradistinction to the first type, which we examined in the
last section under the heading of semantic unacceptability.
9.5. Exclusive versus preferred collocational range
It will be remembered that when dealing with 'tidy' we made the
assumption that its collocational range consists only of 'sum of
money', 'amount of money', 'penny' and 'bit'. Now if this assump¬
tion tested as a hypothesis were confirmed, we would have avail¬
able a statement of what might be called the exclusive collocational
range of 'tidy', showing all and only the environments in which
'tidy' can occur. In fact, however, it is far from certain that
this hypothesis, or for that matter any hypothesis concerning the
exclusive collocational range of 'tidy', will be confirmed; any such
hypothesis is much more likely to meet with falsification. In this
respect, 'tidy' is typical of numerous senses whose collocational
range is limited as compared with an otherwise synonymous sense and
yet whose collocational range is difficult or impossible to pin
down with certainty. To the extent that such uncertainty can be
shown to exist, a statement of exclusive collocational range must
be regarded as unwarranted.
Instead, by way of acknowledging this uncertainty, it will be
more appropriate to attach to such a sense a statement of what
might be called its preferred collocational range, which comprises
the one or more environments in which the sense has a propensity to
occur. Once outside this range, the sense need not be unacceptable
but will only have to be somewhat less natural, normal or expected.
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As what seems to be an indication of preferred collocational range,
conventional dictionaries sometimes resort to such informal devices
as ' (esp.. of )', ' (usu. of )' or '(of etc.)', where
what is placed in the blank serves to specify the preferred collo¬
cational range. Even when no such overt indications are given, it
is often possible to infer the preferred collocational range of a
sense from the similarity, or even identity, of examples to be
found in diverse dictionaries.
'Tidy' is an example where we find both overt (or explicit) and
covert (or implicit) indications. Thus, in OALDCE, for instance,
the relevant sense of 'tidy' is partially defined as "fairly large
(esp. of money)", while in this as well as in a host of other
dictionaries the only examples given are 'a tidy sum of money' and
'(cost) a tidy penny'. To the extent that these dictionaries
reflect actual usage, 'a sum of money' and 'a penny',
the latter being an idiom, may be regarded as constituting the
preferred collocational range of 'tidy'. A statement to this effect
will tell us in what environments 'tidy' normally or most naturally
occurs, but it will not rule out any environments which fall outside
this preferred collocational range.
It is clear that a statement of exclusive collocational range is
more powerful than a statement of preferred collocational range.
We may therefore adopt the principle whereby we will always aim for
the former and will accept the latter only if no warranted state¬
ment of exclusive collocational range can be found. Natural lan¬
guage being the flexible instrument it is, a descriptive (as
opposed to prescriptive) approach to it must always allow for a
measure of indeterminacy and uncertainty as well as creativity (e.g.
'It will cost you a tidy yuan'). (Hence the need for '?' in
addition to '+' for marking what appear to be odd sentences or
expressions.) Subject to this caveat, there undoubtedly exist
cases where a statement of exclusive collocational range is war¬
ranted.
A clear example is provided by 'gutter', which can be used syn¬
onymously with 'popular' in
(9.60) He loathes the popular/gutter press.
But when 'gutter' is used attributively in the sense of "popular"
(though with a pejorative connotation largely absent from 'polular'),
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'press' constitutes it3 entire collocational range, so that 'gutter'
is unacceptable even in
(9.61) He loathes the popular/^gutter papers.
What we have here, then, is an example where we are able to
supply a statement of exclusive collocational range ('e-statement'
for short) with at least a reasonable amount of confidence. And,
as we made clear earlier, when such a statement is warranted, it is
to be preferred, for being more powerful, to a statement of preferred
collocational range ('p-statement' for short). However, even where
an e-statement is warranted there may still be a useful role for a
p-statement to play in specifying the collocational, properties of a
sense. Let us assume, going back to an earlier example, that the
e-range (i.e. exclusive collocational range) of 'tidy' indeed com¬
prises 'a sum of money', 'a penny', 'a amount of
money' and 'a bit'. Let us assume further that the first
two of these environments indeed make up the j>-range (i.e. preferred
collocational range) of 'tidy'. Under these circumstances, a
combination of an e-statement and a p-statement would provide a more
powerful account of the collocational properties of 'tidy' than
either statement alone.
So far we have used 'collocational range' as a cover term while
our examples have all been confined to lexical restrictions. It
must now be stressed that the distinction between e-range and
p-range applies equally to selection restrictions. Just as a
lexical restriction can be given either as an e-statement or as a
p-statement, so a selection restriction can take either form,
depending on similar considerations to those which we have seen to
operate in the case of lexical restrictions. There is, however, a
further motivation for adopting a p-statement in the case of
selection restrictions. This is to safeguard a useful generaliz¬
ation against individual counter examples which would otherwise
falsify it. To complement the p-statement, such individual counter
examples may then be covered by a lexical restriction to the effect
that outside the scope (of the p-statement) of the selection
restriction these constitute the only (e-range) or normal (p-range)
environments in which the sense in question can be used.
To illustrate these points, we now turn to a brief examination
of the collocational properties of 'abundant (in)' with reference
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to its distributional relation with 'rich (in)'. We may start with
the observation that 'abundant (in)' and 'rich (in)' are synonymous
in any sentence provided that they are interchangeable in that sen¬
tence. Thus the question of synonymy reduces itself in the case
of these two items to the question of interchangeability. Now it
seems beyond reasonable doubt that 'abundant' and 'rich' are inter¬
changeable in
(9.62) The covintry is rich/abundant in minerals.
(9.63) The area is rich/abundant in coal.
(9.64.) The Middle East is rich/abundant in oil.
It is highly doubtful, however, that 'abundant' is acceptable in
(9.65) He is rich/?abundant in experience.
(9.66) The art gallery is rich/?abundant in paintings.
(9.67) Meat is rich/?abundant in protein.
On the basis of these two limited sets of data, we may advance
two hypotheses concerning the collocational properties of 'abundant'.
First, on what can occur in the subject position there is the
selection restriction that it contain the concept (Geographical
area). Secondly, what is permissible in the complement position
is subject to the selection restriction that it contain the concept
(Natural resources). Since a geographical area can possess things
other than natural resources whereas natural resources must be
located in a geographical area, the second selection restriction
appears to determine the first. Of neither selection restriction
are there any overt indications to be found in dictionaries (at
least, in those that I have consulted). As regards the second
selection restriction, on the other hand, strong covert indications
are available in the shape of examples which confirm our second
hypothesis. However, we shall be proved wrong if we turn these
hypotheses into e-statements of selection restrictions. For
'abundant' seems to be perfectly acceptable in, say
(9.68) The dictionary is rich/abundant in quotations.
Now if 'abundant' is indeed acceptable in (9.68) (and let us assume
that it is), then (9.68) will constitute a counter instance against
both of our hypotheses. However, even assuming this to be the case,
we need not abandon these hypotheses, and should not do so if there
are enough confirming instances (such as (9.62) to (9.64.)) to make
them useful as generalizations. To retain them without doing
violence to actual usage, all we have to do is to assign to them
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the status of p-statements. Provided this is done, the one or more
counter examples can then be accommodated in a complementary lexical
restriction,and/or a complementary selection restriction if and
where generalization is possible.
Just as e-statements are sometimes warranted in the case of
lexical restrictions, so they may equally be warranted in the case
of selection restrictions. In this regard, 'handsome1, which we
have already discussed in relation to 'generous', may serve as an
example. Another example is 'pass away', concerning which Mcintosh
(1961) has drawn our attention to the fact that unlike 'die' it is
not applicable to plants. Thus knowledge of its collocational
properties "forbids me to say (except in some kind of whimsical
register) 'The rhododendron passed away*" (1961a: 335). It is
necessary, however, to narrow down the collocational range of
'pass away' still further, for in addition to plants it is inappli¬
cable to many other things, including animals (but excluding pets),
to which 'die' is perfectly applicable. In fact, 'pass away' is
normally predicated only of persons. We may thus attach to 'pass
away' an e-statement to the effect that what occurs in the subject
position must contain the concept (Person). I have used (Person)
rather than (Human) because it seems perfectly acceptable to apply
'pass away' to animals when, as pets, they are given the sentimental
status of persons (cf. Quirk et al. 1972: 187).
By way of underlining the frequent need for p-statments, we will
now examine part of a lexical field where p-statements are required
for both selection and lexical restrictions. In the process of
this examination we shall deliberately rely as much as possible on
information extracted or inferred from dictionaries. The senses in
question are 'mighty', 'precious' and 'rattling', all of which mean
"very" but each of which can replace 'very' only in a limited range
of environments.
As far as 'mighty' is concerned, where dictionaries gloss the
relevant sense as "very" they give no indication as to its collo¬
cational properties. It would be wrong, however, to assume that
'mighty' has the same collocational range as 'very'. Apart from
the obvious situational restrictions (i.e. 'mighty' is somewhat
informal and is more prevalent in American English), there seem to
be identifiable collocational restrictions at work as well, and
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it is these that concern us. As far as collocational restrictions
are concerned, the examples supplied by dictionaries to illustrate
the use of 'mighty' all point clearly in one direction. This is
manifest in the following sentences, where all the 'mighty + adjec¬
tive' combinations are taken from various dictionaries, in which no
other combinations are given:
(9.69) I'm very/mighty pleased.
(9.70) He's very/mighty clever.
(9.71) It was a very/mighty good meal.
In these examples it is not difficult to detect a concept (or seman¬
tic property) that is shared by all the adjectives. If for all
these adjectives we bring to mind their antonyms, i.e. 'displeased',
'stupid' and 'bad' respectively, it is easy to see a sense in which
the former are the semantically positive members of each pair. The
presence of (Positive) in the adjectives in these examples does not
seem to be a mere coincidence, for 'mighty' will become somewhat
less natural or normal in (9.69) to (9.71) if the adjectives are
replaced by their corresponding negative terms. That 'mighty' tends
to occur with semantically positive adjectives is not entirely
arbitrary, in view of what may be regarded as its reflected meaning
emanating from its more salient, semantically positive senses. In
the light of these considerations, it will obviously be desirable
to capture the facts in question by means of a selection restriction.
But to the extent that adjectives lacking (Positive) are not ruled
out in amy hard and fast manner, or may even be perfectly accept¬
able (for some speakers) as in
(9.72) He was very/mighty tired (CED).
the selection restriction will be warranted only if it is given as
a p-statement.
Of the collocational properties of 'precious' no overt indica¬
tions are to be found in dictionaries, either. But here again the
examples found in them converge in such a way that one is left in
little doubt as to the likely p-range of 'precious'. Thus, with
few exceptions, we find 'precious' in the environment of '
little', as in
(9.73) I have very/precious little money left.
(9.74-) She spends very/precious little time working.
(9.75) (He understood) very/precious little of it.
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To these examples we may now add the following observations. First,
•precious' will remain acceptable in (9.73) to (9.75) no matter
what changes are made in these sentences provided that 'little' is
retained and that 'very' is acceptable in the altered sentences.
There is thus reason to abstract 'little' from (9.73) to (9.75) as
alone relevant in stating the collocational range of 'precious'.
Secondly, 'precious' can serve as a modifier for other items
similar in meaning to 'little', as in
(9.76) He has very/precious few friends.
(9.77) He earns a very/precious small income.
Thirdly, 'precious' will become downright unacceptable in (9.73) to
(9.75) if 'little' is replaced by its antonym 'much', while 'very'
will clearly remain acceptable. Here again, a generalization is
possible: as countless other examples will testify, the unaccepta-
bility of 'precious' as a modifier of 'much' applies regardless of
the surrounding environment. Fourthly, in addition to 'much', if
one picks an adjective at random, say, 'tall' or 'interesting',
the chances are that it will turn out not to be modifiable by
'precious'• Thus:
(9.78) He is very/*precious tall.
(9.79) It is very/*precious interesting.
In the light of these four observations we may form the hypothesis
that 'precious' is subject to the selection restriction (Small in
amount or number) . As in the case of the selection restriction
for 'mighty', this selection restriction has a ready explanation in
what may be regarded as the reflected meaning of 'precious'. Taken
as an e-statement, however, this selection restriction will not be
entirely warranted, for insofar as the dictionary in question is
right 'precious' is perfectly acceptable in
(9.80) (He) took very/precious good care of that (NECD).
But this isolated counter example does not mean that we have to
abandon the hypothesized selection restriction. To accommodate
this counter example and possibly a few others, all we have to do
is to cast the selection restriction in the form of a p-statement.
Now there is yet another fact to be taken into account, namely,
that although 'small' is within the p-range of 'precious' it occurs
somewhat less commonly or naturally with 'precious' than do
'little' and 'few'. To incorporate this fact into our specification
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of the collocational properties of 'precious1, we may adopt a
p-statement to the effect that within the preferred selectional
range of 'precious' 'little' and 'few' constitute its preferred
lexical range.
If 'mighty' and 'precious', in their different ways, are
restricted in their collocational range as compared with 'very',
'rattling' is even more so. As evidence for this we find unmis¬
takable covert indications in various dictionaries, from which the
following 'rattling + adjective + headword' combinations are taken:
(9.81) It is a very/rattling good lunch.
(9.82) It is a very/rattling good speech.
(9.83) It is a very/rattling good horse.
In addition, some dictionaries also provide overt indications.
Thus, in The Concise Oxford Dictionary we find "(good, etc.)" and
in CED we find "(intensifier qualifying something good, fine,
pleasant, etc.)". These overt indications are somewhat misleading,
however, in that they seem to encourage the hypothesis that
'rattling' is subject to the selection restriction (Good) . Quite
apart from restrictions on what can occur in the headword position,
this hypothesis can be easily proved false with regard to the
adjective position alone. Thus 'rattling', but not 'very', will
become unacceptable or at least odd in (9.81) to (9.83) if 'good'
is replaced by, say, 'fine' or 'nice' or 'pleasant', senses all of
which clearly satisfy the hypothesized selection restriction. In
fact, 'good' appears to be the only item normally modifiable by
'rattling' - subject, of course, also to restrictions concerning
the headword position as well as to situational restrictions. If
so, 'good' must be construed as an expression rather than a con¬
cept, and the hypothesized selection restriction must accordingly
be replaced by a lexical restriction. The latter is to be cast in
the form of an e-statement or a p-statement, depending on how
categorically items like 'fine' and 'nice' are ruled out.
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CHAPTER 10
ACCOUNTING FOR THE COMMUNIS BETWEEN OTHERWISE NON-SYNONYMOUS SENSES
10.1. The need for both sense and occurrence
In the present chapter we turn our attention to the second type
of occurrence-synonym, which, as we saw in Chapter 8, consists of
cases where two senses normally not synonymous happen to be syn¬
onymous in one or more sentences/contexts as a result of accidental
factors in the sentences/contexts in question. With regard to this
type, which we may appropriately call 'pure occurrence-synonyms',
we have judged it more natural, and often more economical, to
account for the communis, since here it is the communis rather than
the propria that is somewhat unexpected and thus calls for expla¬
nation. It is our concern in what follows to sketch the lines
along which such explanation might be provided. Our task, to put
it in clear contrast with the last and complementary chapter, is to
account for the communis between otherwise non-synonymous senses.
Given a conception of synonymy flexible enough to accommodate
occurrence-synonymy, it may be regarded as an empirical fact that
an extremely large number of forms behave irregularly as regards
synonymy, i.e. A and B may be synonymous in certain sentences/con-
texts, but not synonymous in others, either being interchangeable
but failing to preserve the meaning of the sentence in question, or
not even being interchangeable. This fact, in my view, requires
careful explanation in a comprehensive treatment of synonymy. It
may be accounted for, in the first instance and somewhat trivially,
by recognizing homonymy. Such is clearly the explanation required
for the fact that while 'illuminate' can replace 'light' in (10.1)
without changing the meaning of the sentence, it cannot do so in
(10.2): '
(10.1) The hall is lit by five chandeliers.
(10.2) He lighted upon a rare book in a secondhand bookshop.
Failing such an explanation, we may then try and invoke polysemy.
The fact that 'ill' can replace 'sick' in (10.3) without changing
the meaning, or rather one of the meanings, of the sentence but
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cannot do so in (10.4.) is susceptible of such an explanation:
(10.3) He is sick but refuses to take any medicine.
(10.4-) He is sick of travel.
These are somewhat trivial explanations, which I have mentioned
partly as background and partly for the sake of completeness. Much
more important for our present concern is the fact that there are
many cases with regard to which neither homonymy nor polysemy is of
any avail. Consider the following situation concerning 'improve'
and 'increase'. To begin with, one can say (10.5) but not (10.6):
(10.5) The budget has increased the burden of taxation.
(10.6) *The budget has improved the burden of taxation.
Conversely, one can say (10.7) but not (10.8):
(10.7) Working conditions have been improved.
(10.8) ^Working conditions have been increased.
However, one can say both (10.9) and (10.10) and under normal
circumstances the two sentences would mean the same:
(10.9) The book has improved my understanding of the subject.
(10.10) The book has increased my understanding of the subject.
With such instances of irregular behaviour as are exemplified by
'improve' and 'increase', a conception of synonymy allowing only
sense-synonymy (or lexeme-synonymy) faces serious problems as
regards their explanation. Now, in order to be consistent and
responsible in handling instances of synonymy, each time we recog¬
nize sense-synonymy between two terms we have to postulate a
distinct sense which they share and which is to be entered in the
lexicon if it is not already there. This puts us in a dilemma in
the case of such instances as 'improve' and 'increase'. On the
one hand, in attributing sense-synonymy to them, we will have
tacitly adopted a procedure which is liable not only to cause
excessive polysemy in the lexicon but also to run counter to
incontrovertible intuitions as regards polysemy. More importantly,
quite apart from the undesirability of excessive polysemy and of
incompatibility with intuitions, such a procedure is of no explana¬
tory value whatsoever. For by recognizing sense-synonymy every
time we encounter occurrence-synonymy we are left unable to offer
any explanation as to why it is that terms behave irregularly the
way they do. It is clear that this procedure would effectively
collapse the level of sense and the level of occurrence into one
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and, in so doing, would throw no light on the facts in question.
On the other hand, if for the sake of avoiding excessive polysemy
and conforming to intuitions we decide instead not to set up a
distinct sense shared by 'improve' and 'increase', then we cannot
attribute synonymy to the two terms without being guilty of incon¬
sistency. Thus we will be forced to reject their synonymy in the
environment of 'understanding', which in turn means that they do
not behave irregularly as regards synonymy after all. It then
follows that the question of explaining their irregular behaviour
as regards synonymy cannot be legitimately posed.
If we now retreat, as it were, to the level of occurrence, it
will be perfectly in order to treat 'improve' and 'increase' as
occurrence-synonymous in the environment of 'understanding'. But
we are in no better a position to explain their irregular behaviour.
In fact, the relevant question can no more legitimately arise on
the level of occurrence alone than on the level of sense alone.
The reason is simple: no units larger than occurrences (i.e.
senses) are recognized which can then be seen as behaving irreg¬
ularly on the level of occurrence, being synonymous in some sen¬
tences/contexts but not so in others.
There is thus no single level of meaning - be it sense-meaning
or occurrence-meaning - on which an explanatory framework can be
built to account for the irregular behaviour of senses as regards
synonymy. This suggests that what we need is an approach which
operates simultaneously on the level of sense and on the level of
occurrence.
10.2. Potential meaning and actual meaning; a simple rationale
The approach I will now propose is based on the distinction
between potential meaning and actual meaning.
A distinction in these terms was first drawn by Mcintosh. The
following is his definition of 'potential meaning':
By potential meaning I mean something that can perhaps
best be described negatively. Let us consider it, to
begin with, in reference to what I have called linguis¬
tic (that is ordinary) meaning. Let us think of any word,
say the word cat. Now there are many things which the
word cat cannot mean, and another way of saying this is
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that it is only appropriate in certain places in a piece
of English text and only appropriate even there in cer¬
tain situational contexts. In one way or another it
cannot, if it is to fulfil these conditions, substitute
for elephant or grapheme or (though for different reasons)
tomorrow or big. We can therefore say that it has only
a certain range of eligibility, just as these other words
have theirs. So for one reason or another, cat is a form
which is only occasionally appropriate, and in the very
large number of cases where it is not, some other form or
forms must be used.
The potential meaning of cat is then that which is
conventionally invested in it as against all other forms
in the language; this, as I have suggested, may be
described if not defined as its restricted appropriacy to
certain places in a text in certain situational contexts
(1961b: 113).
'Actual meaning' is defined as follows:
By my use of the term "actual" I intend nothing subtle.
Instance by instance, in the various allowed places in a
text in the appropriate situational contexts, a form (for
example cat) would appear to be capable of a variety of
differing meanings, perhaps in the last resort as many
such as there are instances. ... Because the meaning
appropriate to a given instance is specifically associ¬
ated with this actual living manifestation of a form in
its context, I apply the term "actual meaning" to such
cases.
The actual meaning depends on the actual context, tak¬
ing this latter term in as wide a sense as circumstances
may render necessary (1961b: 113-4-) •
Between potential meaning and actual meaning Mcintosh identifies an
intermediate level when he says that "where we wish to speak
explicitly of a cluster of instances, we may 3peak of this as a
'use'" (1961b: 114).
In this way three levels of meaning are postulated, though the
intermediate level is given less importance. How, then, do these
relate to the three levels of meaning that we have identified,
namely, lexeme-meaning, sense-meaning and occurrence-meaning.
Potential meaning, it seems, corresponds to lexeme-meaning. As far
as the rest are concerned, there is no one-to-one correspondence.
Mcintosh's level of use seems to conflate what we have distinguished
as sense-meaning and occurrence-meaning, once it is recalled that
occurrences, as we conceive them, are not unique events but consist
of such unique events as are considered identical from the relevant
point of view. It may appear at first sight that Mcintosh's level
of actual meaning corresponds to our level of occurrence-meaning,
but this is in fact not the case, since, as can be inferred from
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"... as many such as there are instances", actual meaning is con¬
ceived by Mcintosh as attaching to unique events.
In view of these differences, I will, for the purpose of this
chapter, take over the terms 'potential meaning* and 'actual mean¬
ing' - as well as the general motivation behind them - without
adhering to the definitions that have been given to them by Mcintosh.
Instead, I will equate potential meaning with sense-meaning, and
actual meaning with occurrence-meaning. Given this straightforward
equation, it may seem superfluous to introduce the terms 'potential
meaning' and 'actual meaning'. This is not so, because 'potential
meaning' and 'actual meaning' capture the spirit of the approach I
am about to present more aptly than their corresponding terms.
Now the explanatory value of the distinction between potential
meaning and actual meaning lies in the following statement: Poten¬
tial meaning is not the sole determinant of actual meaning, which
is rather the function of potential meaning and sentence/context.
It is not difficult to see how a general rationale of the communis
between otherwise non-synonymous senses can be derived from this state—
s s
ment. Given that A and B differ on the level of potential mean¬
ing, it is nevertheless possible for this difference to be neutral¬
ized in certain sentences/contexts in such a way that the occurrences
assignable to them become synonymous on the level of actual meaning.
Where the necessary neutralization has taken place, this gives rise
to occurrence-synonymy. Otherwise all or part of the difference
on the level of potential meaning is carried over onto the level of
actual meaning, whereby occurrence-synonymy is prevented and A and
g
B appear, as it were, in their true colours. Hence the irregular
behaviour of A3 and Bs as regards synonymy (cf. Lyons, 1968: 452;
Suokko, 1972: 26-7; Nida, 1975: 99-101).
10.3. Potential meaning and actual meaning: practical analyses
The rationale that has just been presented is a very simple one,
about which no more needs to be said on the theoretical plane. It
only remains to see how it works in practice. Let us turn, there¬
fore, to the analysis of specific examples.
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(l) 'Improve'/'increase'
As we have already devoted some discussion to 'improve' and
'increase', I will take them as my first example and look at them
in greater detail. For ease of exposition I will confine myself
to the transitive uses of these two verbs, but the essence of what
I have to say will apply to the intransitive uses as well.
Now it is almost superfluous to say that between 'improve' and
'increase' there is a sharp semantic difference which prevents
them from functioning synonymously in many sentences/contexts.
Thus, as we saw earlier:
(10.11) The book has improved/increased my understanding
of the subject.
(10.12) Working conditions have been improved/*increased.
(10.13) The budget has increased/*improved the burden of
taxation.
An explanation for the communis and, less importantly, the
propria in the above sentences can be found in two obvious, related
points of difference between the two senses. In the first place,
'improve' and 'increase' differ in the kind of items that are
semantically acceptable as their objects. 'Improve' requires of
its object that it should be capable of being appropriately
construed in terms of "quality". In the case of 'increase', on the
other hand, what occurs as object must be capable of being appro¬
priately construed in terms of "quantity" (or "amount"). The
second point of difference concerns the nature of the change that
is expressed: while to 'improve' is to "make better (in quality)",
to 'increase' is to "make greater (in quantity)". It is thus
obvious that semantically 'improve' and 'increase' do not entail
each other. Now the same is true as a matter of 'knowledge of the
world' or communication in situations. For one can make something
better without adding to its quantity, and conversely one can add
to the quantity of something without making it better.
However, there are situations in which the changes that are being
referred to converge in such a way that to make something better in
quality is to make it greater in quantity and vice versa.. What
happens in the case of 'understanding' in (10.11) represents just
such a situation. In the first place, 'understanding' is suscep¬
tible of both a qualitative and a quantitative interpretation.
This explains why 'understanding' can serve as the object of both
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'improve' and 'increase'. Moreover, to better the quality of one's
understanding is normally taken to be the same as to add to its
quantity, or at least one way of improving one's understanding is
by increasing it. This explains why, by the standard of everyday
•communication (particularly given our conception of synonymy in
terms of pragmatic equivalence), 'improve' and 'increase' are nor¬
mally synonymous in the environment of 'understanding'.
While knowledge of communication in situations can lead us to
perceive occurrence-synonymy between 'improve' and 'increase', we
also know by virtue of our experience of communication in situations
that an increase need not always produce a change for the better.
Instead, judgement will depend on what it is that has been increased
and on the standpoints adopted. While by increasing one's under¬
standing one will normally be deemed to have made it better, by
increasing the burden of taxation one will normally be deemed to
have made it worse. Hence the inability of 'improve' to replace
'increase' in (10.13) without changing the meaning of the sentence.
What makes 'improve' anomalous in this sentence is that one does
not normally think of the burden of taxation in terms of a quali¬
tative scale ranging from 'good' to 'bad'. Even if, despite its
normal incompatibility with a qualitative interpretation in terms
of a good-bad scale, the burden of taxation can be said in casual
conversation to be improved, as in, say 'My tax burden has been
improved', the improvement can only be taken to mean a reduction.
The situation is just the opposite with 'working conditions',
which is unacceptable in (10.12). Since, as a matter of normal
usage (as opposed to abstract semantic reasoning), 'working condi¬
tions' is not open to a quantitative interpretation in terms of
numbers, 'Working conditions have been increased' sounds very odd
in actual communication, although it makes perfect sense in terms
of abstract semantic reasoning.
(2) 'Disappear'/'fade'
As with 'improve' and 'increase', there is an obvious semantic
difference between 'disappear' and 'fade', which, when the two
senses occur in a simple tense or in the perfective aspect, is
transferred without loss onto the level of actual meaning. As a
result, (10.14-), for example, differs semantically in an important
way from (10.15):
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(10.14.) Interest in the book has disappeared.
(10.15) Interest in the book has faded.
However, we find this semantic difference neutralized or at least
significantly reduced when the two senses occur in the progressive
aspect, in in (10.16) and (10.17):
(10.16) Interest in the book is disappearing.
(10.17) Interest in the book is fading.
The explanation for this lies, it seems to me, in the interac¬
tion between the potential meaning of 'disappear' and the progress¬
ive aspect. To start with, we may draw attention to an important
difference between 'disappear' and 'fade' in terms of the distinc¬
tion between 'telic' and 'atelic' (cf. Comrie, 1976: 44--S; cf. also
Lyons, 1977: 711-2 for the identical distinction between accom¬
plishment and non-accomplishment verbs). 'Disappear' is a telic
verb denoting a process which reaches its natural completion with
the event of disappearing - the event in question also denotable by
the 3ame verb. 'Fade', on the other hand, is an atelic verb, in
that it denotes a process without an inherent terminal point. In
somewhat more semantic terms, 'disappear' denotes the process (or
event) of something going out of existence, while 'fade' denotes
the process of something coming, as it were, into a weaker form of
existence.
Now in (IO.I4) the perfective aspect indicates that the process
is already complete, with the implication that there is no longer
any interest in the book. The sentence in question thus differs
from (10.15), which has the different implication that there is
still some interest in the book. Once the progressive aspect is
used, however, as in (10.16), it will have the effect of indicating
that the process denoted by 'disappear' is not complete. If so,
then, unlike (10.14), (10.16) will carry the implication that there
is still some interest in the book. But then so does (10.17). In
this way the difference between 'disappear' and 'fade' is largely
neutralized by the presence of the progressive aspect, with the
result that the two senses are synonymous in this sentential frame -
at least much closer in meaning than when a simple tense or the
perfective aspect is used. It may be noted in passing that the same
point applies, for analogous reasons, when 'disappear' and 'fade'
are preceded by 'begin' or 'start, as in
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(10.18) Interest in the book has begun to disappear.
(10.19) Interest in the book has begun to fade.
(3) 1 Range'/'selection'
Here we are concerned to explain (a) and, less importantly, (b)
against the background of (c) and (d):
(a) 'Range' and 'selection' are synonymous in
(10.20) We have a wide range/selection of flowers.
(10.21) What a nice range/selection of flowers.
(10.22) The shop has a good range/selection of hats.
(b) However, 'range' is somewhat more natural in (10.20), while
'selection' is somewhat more natural in (10.21) and (10.22).
(c) Only 'range' is acceptable in
(10.23) The range/*selection of issues discussed in this book
is enormous.
(10.24-) He has collected a wide range/*selection of stamps.
(10.2$) The two heads of state exchanged views on a wide
range/*selection of topics.
(10.26) The factory produces a wide range/*selection of cars.
(10.27) The engineer has invented a wide range/^selection of
machines.
(d) Only 'selection' is acceptable in
(10.28) His selection/*range of authors shows good taste.
(10.29) A new selection/*range of poetry was published yesterday.
Now the relevant sense of 'range', from S0ED-(p.1745, II, 6), is
"the limits between which a thing may vary in amount or degree b.
a series or scale (of sounds, temperatures, prices, etc.) extending
between certain limits". The relevant sense of 'selection', also
from S0ED (1932, 2), is "a particular choice; choice of a particu¬
lar individual or individuals; concr. a number of selected things".
All the occurrences of 'range' and 'selection' in the above, it
seems, are assignable to these two senses respectively. So if we
treat these senses as individual wholes, there will be no hope of
accounting for the facts in terms of polysemy. However, it is
possible to break down these senses, each roughly into two. Of
these four resultant senses, two correspond roughly to the portions
that I have underlined in the respective definitions of 'range' and
'selection'. These two senses have in common the fact that both
function as collective terms for countable entities, in a manner
similar to, say, 'number' in 'a number of'. Like 'number', they
tend not to be used as headwords but as parts of modifiers. Thus,
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when they occur in subject position, they usually require plural
verbs for concord, as in
(10.30) A wide range/selection of flowers are on display.
A further characteristic of these senses is that they are preceded
by the indefinite article. It is only when these two senses are in
question that 'range' and 'selection' are sometimes interchangeable.
The occurrence of 'range' in (10.23) and the occurrence of
'selection' in (10.28) and (10.29) are clearly not assignable to
these two (narrowed-down) senses respectively. This will explain,
in terms of polysemy, why 'range' and 'selection' are not inter¬
changeable in these sentences.
From this point on we will concentrate on this pair of 'collec¬
tive' senses and explain their behaviour in the remaining sentences.
As a first step it is necessary to identify the difference in
potential meaning between 'range' and 'selection'. The crucial
difference seems to be that where the concept of "variety" is
prominent in the meaning of 'range', the concept of "choice" is
present or implicit in the meaning of 'selection'.
It should equally be noted that the concept of "variety" is some¬
what more prominent in the potential meaning of 'range' than the
concept of "choice" is in the potential meaning of 'selection'.
This will help to explain the asymmetry whereby 'range' is more
capable of replacing 'selection' than the other way round, as it
will become clear presently.
Now in most sentences/contexts where 'selection' is used (in the
relevant sense) it can be replaced by 'range': whether some change
of meaning results from such replacement is a matter that we will
look into later. The reason for this seems to be that in these
sentences/contexts the concept of "choice", though it may be pres¬
ent or implicit in the meaning of 'selection', is not of such
importance as to make 'range', which does not include the concept
of "choice" as part of its potential meaning, an unacceptable
replacement for 'selection'.
While 'range' is usually capable of replacing 'selection', it
is not the case the other way round, as is evident from (10.24.) to
(10.27). In (10.24) and (10.25) what makes 'selection' unaccept¬
able, or at least awkward, appears to be the fact that, although
the concept of "choice" is not incompatible with those sentences/
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contexts in terms of abstract reasoning, what is normally relevant
and significant in those sentences/contexts as a matter of actual
linguistic •practice is not the concept of "choice" but that of
"variety". Hence the resultant anomaly or awkwardness when 'selec¬
tion' is used in place of 'range'. A different factor is at work
in (10.26) and (10.27), namely, that the cars and machines in ques¬
tion are not in existence until they are produced or invented.
This fact is incompatible with the concept of "choice", for the
act of choosing normally presupposes the existence of the relevant
entities from which a choice is made. To bring out this point more
clearly, we may note that 'selection' is perfectly acceptable in
(10.31) The garage buys a wide range/selection of cars.
(10.32) The engineer has ordered a wide range/selection of
machines.
sentences which differ from (10.26) and (10.27) respectively only ty
containing verbs which imply the existence of the relevant entities.
The difference between 'range' and 'selection' in terms of
"variety" versus "choice" will also help to explain why 'range' is
more natural in (10.20) while 'selection' is more natural in (10.21)
and (10.22). The crucial words in this regard are 'wide' on the
one hand and 'nice' and 'good' on the other. 'Range' combines
more naturally with 'wide' than does 'selection' because - I take
this as fairly obvious - 'wide' is semantically more naturally
associated with the concept of "variety" than with that of "choice".
I take it as equally obvious, on the other hand, that 'nice' and
'good' are semantically more naturally associated with the concept
of "choice" than with that of "variety", so that 'selection' is
more natural than 'range' when used in combination with 'nice' or
'good'.
If it is the difference of "variety" versus "choice" that
accounts for the facts to which it has so far been applied, is not
this difference also present in (10.20) to (10.22), where 'range'
and 'selection' are interchangeable? The first part of the answer
is that this difference is largely neutralized in these sentences.
It is largely neutralized, in the first place, by the linguistic
context. Thus the presence of 'wide' in (10.20) plays down, as it
were, the concept of "choice" in the potential meaning of 'selec¬
tion' and invests 'selection' with the actual meaning of "variety",
while the presence of 'nice' and 'good' in (10.21) and (10.22)
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plays down, as it were, the concept of "variety" in the potential
meaning of 'range' and invests 'range' with the actual meaning of
"choice". In the second place, it is possible for the difference
in potential meaning between 'range' and 'selection' to be neutral¬
ized in a particular situational context by the fact that in that
situational context it is not relevant. What is important, it
seems, is whether 'range' and 'selection' are interchangeable in a
particular sentence/context. For when they are interchangeable,
they also tend to be synonymous by the standard of everyday
communication.
However, this is only the first part of the answer. The second
part is that although this difference in potential meaning tends to
be neutralized in the environment of 'a wide of' and 'a good/
nice of', it can nevertheless come into operation in these
environments, with the result, for example, that in (10.33) only
'range' is appropriate, and that in (10.34) 'selection' is far more
fitting than 'range':
(10.33) It is true that we have a wide of flowers,
but I'm afraid they are not terribly good, because
we arrived late at the flower sale and had to buy
what was left.
(10.34) There are so many different kinds of flowers to
choose from that it is difficult to decide what to
put on display, but with the help of experts a
nice of flowers are put on view for the pub¬
lic every year.
(4) 'Cold'/'hard'
There is an obvious difference in meaning between 'cold' and
'hard', such that in most sentences/contexts the two senses cannot
be used synonymously. Thus while 'a cold shower' is a perfectly
acceptable expression, 'a hard shower' clearly is not. Conversely,
one can normally say 'hard punishment' but not 'cold punishment'.
In the environment of 'winter', however, as in 'a cold winter' and
'a hard winter', the two senses are not only interchangeable but
are normally taken to convey (roughly) the same meaning (cf. Suokko,
1972: 26-7).
To account for this communis and, less importantly, the propria,
we may begin by spelling out the relevant potential meaning of
'hard', which, to adopt the definition in SOED, is "difficult to
endure". Now it is characteristic of 'hard' with this potential
meaning that when it is used to modify a particular expression it
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a.cquires as an additional actual meaning the property or properties
which make the referent of that expression difficult to endure.
Quite naturally, the additional actual meaning normally acquired by
'hard* when used to modify 'winter' is "cold", since this property
is what typically makes winters difficult to endure. Despite this
additional actual meaning, however, 'a hard winter' can still differ
from 'a cold winter' in three ways. First, in the environment of
'winter' 'hard' can acquire further actual meanings over and above
"cold",as coldness is not the only property that can make winters
difficult to endure. Secondly, even if no such further actual
meanings are acquired, 'hard' still carries, now on the level of
actual meaning, its potential meaning of "difficult to endure" -
a meaning which is not entailed by "cold", since it is possible
(in theory if not as a matter of normal linguistic practice) for
a winter to be cold but not difficult to endure. Thirdly, as one
sense of a polysemous lexeme, 'hard' ("difficult to endure") carries
the potential reflected meaning "solid and difficult to break".
This potential reflected meaning is naturally activated when 'hard'
is used to modify 'winter', since when coldness makes a winter
difficult to endure it will also cause the ground to become solid
and difficult to break.
Of these differences, the third is not a matter of cognitive
meaning and therefore will not have the effect of preventing 'hard'
and 'cold' from being synonymous. The other two differences can,
of course, have this effect. However, they can also be neutralized
or largely neutralized by context, as when coldness does make a
winter difficult to endure and is the only property that does so.
In such contexts, it seems reasonable to treat 'hard' and 'cold' as
occurrence-synonymous•
While 'hard' typically has "cold" as part of its actual meaning
in the environment of 'winter', "cold" need not be present in its
actual meaning in other environments. 'Hard punishment' is an
example of just such an environment, where "cold" does not normally
become an actual meaning of 'hard'. As is to be expected, there¬
fore, 'cold punishment' is anomalous.
We said earlier that the relevant potential meaning of 'hard'
is "difficult to endure". Now the suitability of 'hard' for mod¬
ifying an expression depends on whether this potential meaning is
- 179 -
applicable to that expression as a matter of normal cultural and
linguistic practice. This will explain why 'hard' is unacceptable
as a substitute for 'cold' in 'cold shower'. Now it is of course
possible, in terms of abstract reasoning, for a shower to be dif¬
ficult to endure, but in terms of normal cultural and linguistic
practice this is not a property that one normally associates with
showers. Hence the anomaly of 'hard' in this environment.
10.4-# In defence of potential, meaning and actual meaning
Behind the present approach is the belief that both potential
meaning and actual meaning should have an important place in a
semantic theory, and in particular in an account of synonymy. Thus
instead of subscribing totally either to the autonomist view of
lexical meaning or to the contextualist view, we believe that each
side represents half, but only half, the truth. With one side we
share the view that there is an autonomous level of lexical meaning
With the other side we go part of the way in sharing the view that
meaning derives from context.
In so doing, of course, we face objections from both directions,
so that we are put in a position of having to defend and criticize
each view at the same time. To overcome these objections, I will
try to show that, instead of being totally right or wrong, each
side is partially right and that only by combining some of the
views on both sides can we arrive at a conception of meaning which
is wholly tenable and does justice to the realities of linguistic
communication.
It will be recalled that one of our arguments in favour of
treating occurrence-synonymy as a legitimate level of synonymy is
that occurrence-meaning (i.e. actual meaning) is a legitimate level
of meaning (cf. 3.4-) • What follows is also intended to serve as a
vindication of that argument.
Let us begin with three representative statements of the con¬
textualist view of meaning:
(1) To the question: What is the meaning of (say) house? we
shall answer: It is its distinctive occurrence in certain
linguistic frames, or (as I would prefer to say) in cer¬
tain sentential functions such as (using x, y, z, etc. to
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mark positions): This x is big. I wish to buy a y. John's
_z, etc. House may be substituted in x, y, z, etc.: that
is its meaning (Haas (quoted by Waldron, 1979: 208)).
(2) The meanings which each minimal entity can be said to bear
must be understood as being a purely contextual meaning.
None of the minimal entities,nor the roots, have such an
"independent" existence that they can be assigned a lexical
meaning. ... In absolute isolation no sign has any meaning;
any sign-meaning arises in a context (Hjelmslev, 1953: 44-5).
(3) I consider that the theory of meaning will be more solidly
based if the meaning of a given linguistic unit is defined
to be the set of paradigmatic relations that the unit in
question contracts with other units of the language (in
the context or contexts in which it occurs), without any
attempt being made to set up 'contents' for these units
(Lyons, 1963: 59).
In my view, all these statements of the contextualist view of
meaning are open to the objections raised in the following quota¬
tions by scholars who hold the autonomist view of meaning:
(4) Is meaning independent of the context or not? In order
to answer this question we might revert to what we have
said in section 2. above. It is said there that meaning
is the rule for the use of a word or form. What does this
mean? It means that words are used according to their mean¬
ing, they are employed with a view to their meaning. Words
fall into their places in our speech not at random or by
accident, but on the basis of their meaning. Now we have
the clue to our question. If words are used according to
their meaning, then meaning comes before use, in the same
way as the use of a language presupposes the knowledge of
that language.
If, then, meaning comes before "the actual use of the
word, it is not the context that decides its meaning, but
the meaning, on the basis of which the word in question is
"set" in the various contexts.
What would be the consequence if meaning did not precede
actual use, if it were not independent of the incidental
context? First of all we should be deprived of the rule
with the help of which we can use the morphemes. It stands
to reason that if the meaning of a morpheme was not known
until it was put in a context, we should have no way of
getting at its meaning, and, what logically follows from it,
we could not use it. Furthermore, as the number of possible
contexts is unlimited every morpheme would have infinitely
numerous "meanings", and thus language would disintegrate
into chaos instead of falling into a well-organized system
(Antal, 1961: 217-8).
(5) Sometimes to the general question 'why is it that a kind of
expression possesses the properties it does possess?' it
is answered: 'This is how we have learnt to use these ex¬
pressions, terms, etc.' This answer implies that the
peculiar characteristics of terms like 'good' or 'pretty'
or the inherent incorigibility of 'I am in pain1 is due to
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the fact that we have learnt to use these terms or
expressions just in this way (p.424). This is clearly
a case of putting the cart before the horse. In order
to learn the use of these expressions correctly, they
must already have a correct use. And if, further, we
hold that their use is their meaning, then it follows
that they must already have their specific meaning.
Consequently, their meaning cannot be derived from or
explained by referring to our learning the language (p.426).
My argument is meant to apply to any view which denies
that it is possible to discuss meaning independently of
use, or to any view which holds that use necessarily
determines meaning (p.424)« (Weiler, 1967).
(6) It has been maintained by Ryle and others that words have
sense in an only derivative manner, that they are
abstractions rather than extractions from sentence-sense.
There is something we must acknowledge and something we
must reject in this doctrine. What we must concede is
that when we specify the contribution of words we specify
what they contribute as verbs or predicates or names or
whatever, i.e. as sentence-parts, to a whole sentence-
sense. Neither their status as this or that part of
speech nor the very idea of words having sense can exist
in isolation from the possibility of words' occurrence
in sentences. But this is not yet to accept that words
do not have sense as it were autonomously. And they
must. If our entire understanding of word-sense were
derived by abstraction from the senses of sentences and
if (as is obviously the case) we could only get to know
a finite number of sentence senses directly, there would
be an infinite number of different ways of extrapolating
to the sense of sentences whose meanings we have to work
out. But we do in fact have an agreed way of working them
out. This is because word-senses are autonomous items,
for which we can write dictionary entries (Wiggins, 1971:
24-5).
(7) The notion of use, as it ordinarily exists and is under¬
stood, presupposes the notion of meaning (in its central
and paradigmatic sense), and ... it cannot therefore be
used to elucidate the latter (Findlay, 1968: 118).
The objections voiced against the contextualist view of lexical
meaning (or the view of meaning as 'use', which is essentially the
same in the respect in question) boil down to two. First, the
contextualist view of lexical meaning is incapable of explaining
why words are not arbitrarily employed. Secondly, the contextualist
view is incapable of accounting for the manner in which the meaning
of sentences is arrived at through combining (in intricate ways)
the meaning of their parts.
Neither of these objections, it seems to me, can be overcome,
except by invoking something like the 'rules of use', as Miller
does in the following:
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When we use a word in a sentence (and I believe most psy¬
chologists and philosophers today agree that the sentence,
not the word, is the primary unit of speech, that it in
some sense comes "first") we choose our words according to
the previous ways we have used them in other sentences.
Instead of looking for word "meanings", then, we would do
better to describe the conditions under which a word is
USED (1966: 93-4).
But, strictly speaking, this is already going beyond the contextual-
ist view of lexical meaning and postulating something over and
above 'use1 in a given context. As Bolinger points out:
But "meaning is from context" can signify two entirely
different things. It can signify that a given unfamiliar
word is identified by a given context, or that a given word
is cumulatively identified by all the contexts in which it
occurs. In the latter case, the word brings to the hearer
or reader a reminder of all its previous contexts, and the
present context then makes a selection on the basis of
compatibility, with or without a certain amount of mod¬
ification.
Understandably, the latter sense does not sort well
with the principles of structuralism, for it implies that
a word can accumulate meanings and carry them with it
(1963: 133).
Thus what Miller postulates is to all intents and purposes auton¬
omous lexical meaning. The only difference between "conditions
under which a word is USED" and autonomous lexical meaning is an
ontological and/or terminological rather than a substantive one.
We must therefore conclude that, no matter what it is called or
whether it is called 'meaning' at all, an autonomous level of
lexical meaning must be postulated in order to explain facts of
linguistic communication - a level of meaning, that is, other than
that which directly results from 'use' or from meaning-relations
which forms contract in contexts.
However, just as the contextualist view on its own is untenable,
so the autonomist view, which finds expression in some of the
quotations we have cited earlier, does not hold water on its own,
either. In the first place, the autonomist view fails to give due
recognition to certain facts of language use. As Hirsch says:
If we did not, in actual speech, constantly adjust our
original meaning postulates, we could never speak or under¬
stand language with novelty, flexibility or precision.
Language requires not only our intuition of a firm isolated
meaning, but also our counter intuition that this meaning
is only provisional (1976: 63).
In the second place, if meaning is treated by the autonomists as
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preceding and determining use, it is only natural to confront them
with the question as to where meaning comes from in the first place.
This question can be interpreted in two ways - either as concerning
the very first origins of Autonomous Meaning (a chicken-and-egg type
problem), or as concerning the immediate source of current individ¬
ual autonomous meanings - of which the latter is what I particularly
have in mind. But whichever way the question is interpreted, it
will be of no avail to say that it resides in dictionaries, for the
question will then arise as to the source of dictionary definitions.
There is, so far as I can see, no other way to answer the question
than to conceive potential (i.e. autonomous) meaning as at least
partially deriving from actual meaning (i.e. use), which was
influenced by potential meaning, which was derived from actual mean¬
ing, and for practical purposes ad infinitum. Another way of giving
the same answer is to conceive sense-meanings as being obtained
through abstraction from occurrence-meanings. For these two reasons,
we must conclude that a contextualist level of meaning must be
postulated in order to explain certain facts of linguistic communi¬
cation.
The upshot of our discussion, it will have become clear, is that
to do full justice to the realities of linguistic communication we
must assign a place to both potential meaning and actual meaning in
a semantic theory (cf. Hirsch, 1976: 63). As it will have emerged
from the present study, this applies particularly to synonymy (cf.
Lyons, 1968: 4-52). On the one hand, in seeing potential meaning as
deriving from actual meaning and subject to revision by context,
we avoid such an unjustifiably cavalier attitude to actual meaning
as is expressed in the statement that "what the context provides is
not the meaning but the denotatum" (Antal, 1961: 219). An actual
meaning of a term is distinct both from its potential meaning and,
as 7.7 shows, from its denotatum or referent. On the other hand,
in treating potential meaning as an important determinant of actual
meaning, we avoid the equally unjustified cavalier attitude to
potential meaning typified by the statement that "the so-called
lexical meanings in certain signs are nothing but artifically
isolated contextual meanings" (Hjelmslev, 1953: 45). However
•artificial' potential meaning may be, once it is abstracted and
enshrined, as it were, in dictionaries, it cannot but help to
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determine actual meaning. As Bolinger says:
Though many words lack referents easy to single out, and
abstract their meanings from wide-ranging verbal contexts
(...), once the abstraction has been made a limit is set
on new contexts. The word is branded (1963: 134-).
To appreciate this, one only needs to be reminded of the enormous
influence that dictionaries have on our use of language, sometimes
directly when we look up a word in a dictionary, sometimes indi¬
rectly when we learn the meaning of a word from someone else whose
explanation of actual use of the word is in turn directly or indi¬
rectly influenced by dictionaries. Doroszewski writes:
The semantic content of a word and its uses in various
contexts are inseparable things. To penetrate a word's
semantic content is to become aware of its possible
applications, usages, and is the prelude to transforming
the potential content into actual uses. ...
The definitions of dictionary entries are documents of
a pragmatic character from the field of semantics con¬
ceived of from a lexicological-lexicographical point of
view: the aim of these definitions is to influence the
behaviour of the people who are going to use the words
defined in the dictionary (1973: 291-2).
If in addition to the postulation of these two levels of meaning
we recognize, as we did earlier, that actual meaning is a function
of potential meaning and sentence/context, we will have at our dis¬
posal a framework within which to account for the irregular behav¬
iour of senses as regards synonymy. We have seen that on any single
level of meaning synonymy is treated as an all-or-nothing matter,
the units in question being either homogeneously synonymous or not
synonymous at all. The question of explaining the heterogeneous
behaviour of senses as regards synonymy is thus one which simply does
not arise. The present approach clearly does not incur this conse¬
quence. By treating both potential and actual meaning as legitimate
levels of meaning, this approach allows for the phenomenon that two
senses may behave irregularly as regards synonymy and, in so doing,
opens the way to its subsequent explanation. What form such
explanation takes has been the concern of the last two sections.
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CHAPTER 11
DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SYNONYMS
11.1. Introductory
The concern of the present chapter is to investigate the various
dimensions of communicative relevance on which synonyms may be
differentiated.
As suggested earlier, to speak of difference between synonyms
need not involve a contradiction in terms as it may appear to do,
provided one's conception of synonymy is not such as to insist on
the unconditional total absence of difference as a necessary condi¬
tion. For in view of what happens in everyday communication it is
perfectly reasonable, and indeed useful, to fix an extent to which
two words are to be regarded as synonymous but beyond which the
same two words may then be seen to differ in one or more communi¬
catively relevant ways. In Chapters 6 and 7 we fixed the extent;
in the present chapter we will look beyond the extent in search of
differences between what in the light of that extent we will have
already identified as synonyms.
But do words which share (roughly) the same descriptive meaning
have to differ in communicatively relevant ways? There is clearly
logical reason why they should (cf. Harris, 1973: 5-20; Lyons, 1963
74.-7). However, assuming language to be a fairly (though far from
optimally) economical system, it will be advisable to assume that
synonyms do differ in communicatively relevant respects. In prac¬
tice, as we shall see later, it is almost always possible to find
some communicatively relevant potential difference or other between
any two given synonyms, although such a difference need not be
actualized (i.e. be communicatively relevant in a particular con¬
text). In other words, once potential differences are taken into
account, it will be correct to say that there are no 'absolute'
synonyms.
Thus to the extent that those who deny the existence of synonyms
in natural language deny in fact the existence of 'absolute' syn¬
onyms in the above sense, we are practically in agreement with them
There are, however, three important respects in which our position
- 186 -
differs from theirs.
In the first place, in their case prior criteria of synonymy are
set up which insist on the total absence of difference as a necess¬
ary condition and which therefore no words in natural language can
satisfy. .This leads those holding the position to lose sight of
the widespread empirical phenomenon of synonymy as it is manifested
in everyday communication. Our position, on the other hand, con¬
sists of two stages: at the first stage criteria of synonymy are
derived from observation of the corresponding empirical phenomenon,
thereby necessarily permitting the existence of synonyms; and only
at the second stage do we then proceed to try and discover dif¬
ferences between what have already emerged from the first stage as
synonyms.
In the second place, those who deny the existence of synonyms
fail to distinguish between differences that are potential and
differences that are actual, and thus fail to recognize that the
former do not entail the latter. In fact, their denial of the
existence of synonyms is only tenable if potential, as opposed to
actual, differences are adduced as grounds. The distinction between
potential differences and actual differences and the accompanying
recognition of their lack of co-extensiveness are both important
features of our position.
In the third place, although we share with those denying the
existence of synonyms an interest in the task of searching for
differences between what we would regard as synonyms or between
what they would regard as prima facie synonyms, we are engaged in
the search with different aims and hence different consequences.
Their aim is to ascertain whether synonyms exist, or, as it has
often turned out in practice, to prove that synonyms do not exist.
Thus, the search for differences is not pursued in its own right.
And as a consequence, such scholars do not deem it necessary to
conduct a comprehensive or detailed search. Our aim, on the other
hand, is to discover as many as we can of the factors that may
(though they need not) make a word preferable to its one or more
synonyms. Thus the search is pursued in its own right. And as a
consequence, what is needed is an account that is systematic,
comprehensive and detailed. Such an account is what we will try
and provide later in this chapter.
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Having made the aim of our pursuit clear, we should perhaps make
the nature of our pursuit more precise and specific by drawing two
distinctions. The first distinction is between an account of the
differences between synonyms insofar as they constitute part of the
stylistic or 'expressive1 (cf. Ullmann, 1964: 100-102) potential of
a language and an account of the actual employment and manipulation
of this potential. Our concern is mainly with the former, while
the latter is to be found in manuals of rhetoric (e.g. Brooks &
Warren, 1970) and stylistic analysis (e.g. Ullmann, 1964).
Within an account of synonyms as stylistic potential, there is
the further distinction between the description of differences
between individual synonyms and the classification of such differ¬
ences into types according to the kind of choice they make possible.
We shall not be concerned with the former task, which falls within
the province of lexicographers and, more particularly, synonymists.
It is the classification of types of difference between synonyms
that constitutes the concern of the present study.
The study of synonymy to be pursued in this chapter, it will
have become clear, is a stylistic one. To put this study into
perspective as regards its place within the whole study of synonymy,
it is worth referring to Ullmann, who sees the study of synonyms
as "an important borderline province between semantics, stylistics,
and lexicography" (1957: 113). We may leave the lexicographic
aspect out of account. Of the remaining two, a semantic study of
synonymy may be seen to consist in the establishment of criteria of
synonymy as an act of explication, while a stylistic study of syn¬
onymy may be seen to consist in the discovery of communicatively
relevant differences between synonyms. One might say that the
stylistic study of synonymy begins where the semantic study of syn¬
onymy leaves off.
To put the stylistic study of synonymy into perspective as
regards its place within the whole domain of stylistics, let us
refer to Ullmann again. According to Ullmann:
Stylistics is usually regarded as a special division of
linguistics; since, however, it has a point of view which
is peculiar to it and distinguishes it from all other
branches of linguistic study, it would perhaps be more
logical to regard it as a sister science concerned not with
the elements of language as such, but with their expressive
potential. On this reading, stylistics will have the same
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subdivisions as linguistics. If one accepts the view that
there are three distinct levels of linguistic analysis:
phonological, lexical and syntactical, then stylistic
analysis will have to distinguish between the same three
levels (1964.: 111).
In this way we have 'stylistics of the sound', 'stylistics of the
word' and 'stylistics of the sentence'. Of these, 'stylistics of
the word'
will explore the expressive resources available in the
vocabulary of a language; it will investigate the stylis¬
tic implications of such phenomena as word-formation,
synonymy, ambiguity, or the contrast between vague and
precise, abstract and concrete, rare and common terms ...
(Ullmann, 1964.: 111).
It will thus be seen that the stylistic study of synonymy is part
of the 'stylistics of the word', with clear connections and over¬
laps with other phenomena that come under this subdivision of
stylistics.
We are now in a position to begin our study proper by first
providing a general rationale and descriptive framework.
11.2. General rationale and descriptive framework
Our starting point is what may be called the 'choice-situation',
which consists in the presence of two or more synonyms. Choice-
situations are context-bound. Thus the synonyms which make up one
choice-situation need not occur together in, or be the only items
which occur in, another choice-situation.
Whenever there is a choice-situation, the question arises as to
whether there is judged to be a material choice between the synonyms,
i.e. whether any one word is judged to be preferable to its one or
more synonyms. Since this is a yes-no question, it obviously has
two possible answers.
The first possible answer is that there is judged to be no
material choice between the synonyms. Such an answer does not mean
that there is no difference between the synonyms: it only means
that what difference there may be is not communicatively relevant.
A difference between synonyms in a choice-situation is communica¬
tively relevant if and only if it gives rise to a material choice
in that choice-situation. Nor does a negative answer mean that any
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difference which is not communicatively relevant in this choice-
situation cannot he communicatively relevant in another choice-
situation. Communicative relevance is a function of the interact-
tion between a particular difference and the context (in the widest
sense) in which the choice-situation in question arises. How and
why this is so will be explained later.
We now come to the second possible answer, where there is a
material choice between the synonyms. Behind every material choice
there must be, by definition, one or more communicatively relevant
differences. In the event of an affirmative answer, there naturally
arises the further question as to the ground(s) on which one word
is judged to be preferable to its one or more synonyms. To provide
the ground(s) is to identify the communicatively relevant difference(s).
Our concern is thus with types (or dimensions) of potentially
communicatively relevant differences between synonyms. A difference
is potentially communicatively relevant if it can be shown to be
communicatively relevant in at least one choice-situation. All the
potentially communicatively relevant differences together make up
the stylistic potential in the domain of synonymy.
A choice-situation may be 'simple' or 'complex'. A simple
choice-situation is one which is made up of two synonyms, while a
complex choice-situation is one which is made up of more than two
synonyms. In fact, strictly speaking, in the case of a complex
choice-situation the two questions we have raised above must be
posed and answered for each simple choice-situation to which the
complex choice-situation is reducible. On the basis of the individ¬
ual answers thus obtained it will then be possible to arrive at a
general picture. In order that the general picture will be mean¬
ingful, consistency of judgement must be insisted upon, whereby,
for example, if A has been judged to be preferable to B by a speaker,
S, and B has been judged to be preferable to C by S or there has
been judged to be no material choice between B and C by S, then A
must be judged to be preferable to G by S. In this way not only
will the most preferable synonym be unequivocally identified, but
there may well also emerge a hierarchy of preferences. Where there
is a material choice, the underlying communicatively relevant dif¬
ferences between the two synonyms will have been identified in a
specific answer to the second question.
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Now that it has been shown how any complex choice-situation can
be handled via its component simple choice-situations, it will be
sufficient, as well as methodologically desirable, to work with
simple choice-situations alone - all the more so since we are con¬
cerned with types of potential difference between synonyms and not
with their actualization in particular choice-situations. This is
the practice that we shall adopt for the most part in what follows.
Roughly speaking, a ground for preferring one synonym to another
belongs to one of two kinds. On the one hand, it may consist in
what may be called a 'lexical property', or 'stylistic value', of
the preferred synonym. On the other hand, a ground may be attribu¬
table to what may be called an 'extraneous factor' - extraneous,
that is, to the preferred synonym in particular and to the choice-
situation as a whole.
The lexical properties of a word (or, for us, a synonym) are
whatever attributes, other than descriptive meaning, may be ascribed
to the word independently of context, though, as we shall see later,
not always independently of explicit comparison with another word.
As such, a lexical property is something potential, and, as far as
synonyms are concerned, it will become actualized or communicatively
relevant only when it helps to differentiate between the two synonyms
in such a way as to give rise to a material choice between them.
By way of exemplification, we may cite the following terms from
Nida (1975: 37), which all denote lexical properties: FORMAL,
TECHNICAL, PEDANTIC, INFORMAL, COLLOQUIAL, INTIMATE, SLANG, VULGAR,
ARCHAIC, OBSOLESCENT and REGIONAL. But of course dictionaries are
the most natural place to look for terms denoting lexical properties .
In CED (p.xiv), for example, can be found the following labels
arranged under three different categories: usage labels - SLANG,
INFORMAL, TABOO, FACETIOUS, IRONIC, EUPHEMISTIC, NOT STANDARD;
connotative labels - DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE; national and regional
labels - AUSTRALIAN, BRITISH, SCOTTISH, etc. Whether precise or
not, all of the above terms clearly denote lexical properties as
we have defined them here. Thus when we say, for example, that a
word is preferable to its synonym in a simple choice-situation
because it is, say, INFORMAL or DEROGATORY or SCOTTISH (whereas its
synonym, by implication, is not), the ground for our preference
consists in a lexical property of the preferred synonym.
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A ground for preferring one synonym to another consists in an
extraneous factor if the preference is not directly, or necessarily,
due to any lexical property of the two synonyms involved. Such will
be the case, for example, when we prefer one synonym to another on
the sole (pragmatic) ground that it is more likely to be known to
our addressee than the other synonym (cf. Traugott & Pratt, 1980:
29-30). This assumed fact in relation to our addressee may, of
course, in turn be attributable in the particular case in question
to one or more lexical properties, but such a link is clearly con¬
tingent rather than necessary. The extraneous factor we have just
seen at work is of a purely pragmatic character. Other extraneous
factors, however, may also be of a stylistic or rhetorical charac¬
ter, as when we prefer one synonym to another on the sole ground
(l) that it satisfies the need of lexical variation (cf. Nash, 1980:
4-8-53), or (2) that it satisfies the need of lexical reiteration
(cf. Nash, 1980: 4-6-8), or (3) that its choice is dictated by a
rhetorical scheme, such as recursion or inversion (cf. Nash, 1980:
82-3). Extraneous factors, as we have just seen, are of diverse
kinds, but they all have in common the fact that they do not consist,
or do not directly consist, in any lexical properties of the syn¬
onyms involved.
The distinction between lexical properties and extraneous fac¬
tors is a useful one. For one thing, though this point does not
bear on our present concerns, the distinction helps to delimit the
range of admissible grounds on which (absolute) synonymy might be
denied. Thus, while it is admissible to deny (absolute) synonymy
by invoking potentially communicatively relevant lexical properties
as differentiating between otherwise synonymous words, it is clearly
inadmissible to deny (absolute) synonymy by invoking purely
extraneous factors. From this point of view, then, lexical prop¬
erties and extraneous factors belong to two sharply distinct
categories and should not, as seems to have been done by Harris
(1973: 13), be treated (whether invoked or dismissed as grounds for
denying synonymy) on a par with each other. For our present pur¬
pose, the usefulness of the distinction lies in separating phenom¬
ena which form part of the lexico-stylistic resources of a language
from matters which, strictly speaking, fall entirely within the
realm of style and rhetoric. Having made this distinction, we shall
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in the remainder of this section concentrate on lexical properties:
not on their actual description, however, but on their general
nature and mode of behaviour.
Lexical properties can be grouped into dimensions according to
the kind of contrasts they represent. Every dimension is made up of
two or more contrasting lexical properties. For example, as we
shall see later, the dimension of 'regional dialect' consists of
REGIONAL and NEUTRAL (i.e. NON-REGIONAL); the dimension of 'tone'
consists of HIGHLY FORMAL, FORMAL, BARELY FORMAL, BARELY INFORMAL,
INFORMAL, and VERY INFORMAL; the dimension of 'politeness' consists
of EUPHEMISTIC and NEUTRAL (i.e. NON-EUPHEMISTIC); and the dimension
of 'attitude' consists of FAVOURABLE, UNFAVOURABLE and NEUTRAL (i.e.
NEITHER-FAVOURABLE-NOR-UNFAVOURABLE). Now every word possesses one,
but only one, lexical property on each dimension. On the dimension
of 'regional dialect', for example, every word must be either
REGIONAL or NEUTRAL, and cannot be both. Similarly, on the dimen¬
sion of 'tone', every word must be HIGHLY FORMAL, FORMAL, BARELY
FORMAL, BARELY INFORMAL, INFORMAL, or VERY INFORMAL, but cannot
have two or more of these lexical properties simultaneously. It
follows that every word has as many lexical properties as there
are dimensions and that all words have the same number of lexical
properties.
The fact that words have a plurality of lexical properties, with
the number being the same, affords a basis for measuring what may
be called the stylistic distance between synonyms (in a choice-
situation). Other things being equal, the fewer the dimensions on
which two synonyms differ, the smaller will be the stylistic dis¬
tance between them. When there is no material choice between two
synonyms, there is, by implication, no dimension on which the two
synonyms differ in a way that is communicatively relevant in the
choice-situation. Conversely, when there is a material choice
between two synonyms, we must infer the existence of at least one
such dimension, assuming that extraneous factors have been ruled
out. The discovery of the one or more such dimensions and of the
relevant properties along that dimension or those dimensions will
then provide the rational ground(s) for our intuitive preference.
I introduced the qualification of 'other things being equal'
because there are two other relevant measures of the stylistic
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distance between synonyms. One is what may be called the salience
of the differentiating lexical properties. Here we may think in
terms of a scale ranging from the most salient lexical properties,
which are always or almost always actualized (e.g. regional dialect
properties), to the least salient lexical properties, which are veiy
seldom actualized and then only in special contexts (e.g. differ¬
ences in phonetic or graphetic qualities). Thus, other things
being equal, the less salient the differentiating lexical prop¬
erties, the smaller the stylistic distance between two synonyms.
The other measure is the distance between two differentiating
lexical properties on a dimension where the dimension in question
consists of more than two lexical properties which are not equi¬
distant from each other. For example, two words will be stylis¬
tically closer on the dimension of 'tone1 if their difference lies
in the contrast of HIGHLY FORMAL/FORMAL than if their difference
lies in the contrast of HIGHLY FORMAL/BARELY FORMAL, and closer
still than if their difference lies in the contrast of HIGHLY
FORMAL/INFORMAL, and so on. Thus, other things being equal, the
stylistic distance between two synonyms may also be said to be
smaller, the closer together their differentiating lexical prop¬
erties lie along the same dimension.
The fact that all synonyms have a plurality of lexical properties
may, furthermore, give rise to conflicting preferences. But if
there is judged to be a material choice between two synonyms one
synonym must eventually be preferred to the other. Such a situ¬
ation occurs whenever of the desired lexical properties in a
choice-situation one or more are found only in one synonym and one
or more are found only in the other synonym. Hence the need for
compromise by opting for the more important lexical property or
properties at the expense of the less important one(s) in the
light of context. There are also situations in which accuracy of
descriptive meaning has to be sacrificed in favour of one or more
strongly desired lexical properties, as has been pointed out by
Baldinger:
It often happens that the speaker, for stylistic reasons,
prefers a conceptually neighbouring word, for example
volume for book (which are not synonymous on the concep¬
tual level, since a book may have several volumes; ...).
In such cases, stylistic selection is thought more import¬
ant than the difference in sememes. Stylistic effect is
preferred to communicative precision (1980: 252-3)•
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Such compromises, whether or not involving the sacrifice of descrip¬
tive accuracy, represent a pervasive feature of the choice of words,
according to Ogden and Richards:
Most writing or speech then which is of the mixed or
rhetorical kind as opposed to the pure, or scientific
or strictly symbolic, use of words, will take its form as
the result of compromise. Only occasionally will a sym-
bolization be available which, without loss of its symbolic
accuracy, is also suitable (to the author's attitude to
his public), appropriate (to his referent), .judicious
(likely to produce the desired effects) and personal (in¬
dicative of the stability or instability of his refer¬
ences). The odds are very strongly against there being
many symbols able to do so much. As a consequence in most
speech some of these functions are sacrificed (1923: 234-).
A dimension of lexical properties may consist either of a series
of discrete 'steps', with each lexical property on it being one
step (e.g. REGIONAL, NON-REGIONAL); or it may consist of a 'cline',
with the lexical properties on it ranged from one end to the other
(e.g. VERY FORMAL, FORMAL, BARELY FORMAL, BARELY INFORMAL, INFORMAL,
VERY INFORMAL). It will perhaps be more accurate to say that any
two lexical properties may be related as steps belonging to a
dimension or they may be related as points on a cline belonging to
a dimension; and that a dimension may display one kind of relation
or the other or both.
In view of these two kinds of relation, a ground for preferring
one synonym to another can be formulated in one or two ways, one
'absolute', the other 'comparative'. On the one hand, one synonym,
A, may be preferred to another, B, because A possesses some lexical
property, X (e.g. REGIONAL or NON-REGIONAL), which B does not.
We may formulate such a ground, when the need arises, as: A is
preferable to B because A is/does/has X (implying that B is not/does
not/has not X). On the other hand, one synonym may be preferred to
another because it possesses a higher degree of what may be regarded
as a common lexical property than the other synonym does, as when
A is VERY FORMAL and B is FORMAL. Here we have a choice of either
using the first formulation or formulating the ground as: A is/
does/has more X than B. There are cases where it may be difficult
to decide which of the two relations is involved. However, where
no such uncertainty exists, it seems to me desirable to maintain
the distinction and to formulate the grounds accordingly, as the
case may be.
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Thus I regard the following grounds, advanced by Collinson
(1939: 61-2), as inappropriately conceived and formulated;
(1) "One term is more 'professional' than another; e.g.
... decease/death; domicile/house";
(2) "One term is more local or dialectal than another,
e.g. Scots flesher/butcher. or to feu/to let";
(3) "One term is more colloquial than another, e.g.
turn down/refuse".
For these grounds are liable to imply, misleadingly, that the sec¬
ond synonym is also (exclusively) PROFESSIONAL, (exclusively)
LOCAL or DIALECTAL, and (exclusively) COLLOQUIAL respectively. It
is possible to think of one sense in which these implications may
be regarded as partially valid, namely, that the second synonym
may occur in contexts which are professional, local or dialectal,
and colloquial respectively, in addition to its ability to occur
in contexts which are not any of these. However, when looked at
from this point of view, the kind of facts in question will be
much better captured by means of the distinction between marked and
unmarked lexical properties.
Lexical properties may be either unmarked or marked. A lexical
property is unmarked if it does not prevent the word to which it
belongs from occurring equally appropriately in all contexts. We
will amend this definition in an important respect later. Unmarked
lexical properties are represented by NEUTRAL (plus a specification
of the relevant dimension where necessary) or NON- followed by the
contrasting marked lexical property or properties. A lexical
property is marked if it restricts the range of situational appli¬
cability of the word to which it belongs. And it is marked to the
extent that it imposes such a restriction. From the above it
follows that unmarkedness is absolute while markedness is relative.
Given the distinction between marked and unmarked lexical prop¬
erties, it is sufficient for the purpose of enumerating the lexical
properties of a word to name only those that are marked.
In discussing varieties of meaning Hofmann distinguishes "struc¬
tural from substructural meaning by whether (or not) a variety of
meaning has a discrete structure & thus belongs to a system of the
type studied in linguistics" (1976: 12). It seems that this dis¬
tinction between the structural and the substructural applies also
to dimensions of lexical properties; some dimensions are structural
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while others are substruetural. In other words, some dimensions
are systems while others are not.
As to the exact nature of systems, Hofmann only mentions the
presence of a discrete structure. For a more specific account we
may turn to Berry (1975: 114--5), who has brought together three
essential properties of (linguistic) systems, namely: (l) "the
terms in a system are mutually exclusive", (2) "a system is finite"
and (3) "the meaning of each term in a system depends on the mean¬
ing of the other terms in the system". These three properties will
serve, in clear cases, to distinguish structural from substructural
dimensions.
In the light of these three criteria of systems, we may cite the
dimension of 'tone' as an example of structural dimensions, and the
dimension of 'reflected meaning' as an example of substructural
dimensions.
As far as structural dimensions axe concerned, we may speak of
'structural stylistics' on an analogy with structural semantics.
The analogy will become clear in the light of the following state¬
ment, by Lyons, of "one of the cardinal principles of 'structuralism'":
Every linguistic item has its 'place' in a system and its
function, or value, derives from the relations which it
contracts with other units in the system (1968: 14-3).
From this principle of structuralism have been derived structuralist
theories of meaning (e.g. Lyons, 1963). On an analogy with struc¬
tural semantics it is possible to develop a structural stylistics
(of words, in our case). In structural semantics 'function' in the
above quotation is to be construed as 'meaning'. In structural
stylistics 'function' is to be construed as 'lexical property' or
'stylistic value'.
Furthermore, just as in structural semantics we can classify
sense-relations into hyponymy, antonymy, complementarity, synonymy
and so on, so in structural stylistics we may classify what may be
called style-relations into various kinds according to the nature
of the relations involved. Hence our dimensions of lexical prop¬
erties, where each dimension may be regarded as a type of style-
relation.
To pursue the analogy further, let us bring in the choice-situ¬
ation, to which we may now give another name. Words which enter
into meaning-relations with one another can be said to make up a
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semantic field. By analogy, we may say that a set of synonyms,
by entering into style-relations with one another, make up what may
be called a stylistic field, which we have so far referred to as a
choice-situation. But here the analogy ends.
We must now attach a more precise meaning to the idea of the
lexical properties on a dimension as terms in a system. A lexical
property of a word is not the function of the style-relations which
that word contracts with its synonyms, if there be such, in a
stylistic field. For all words, regardless of whether they have
synonyms or not, have lexical properties, and have the same number
of such properties. It is therefore wrong to assert, as Hofmann
does, that "the use of 1 instead of another synonymous signe is
what yields the information" (1976: 15), where by 'information' are
meant "register and dialectal meanings" (1976: 14)• Instead, a
lexical property of a word derives (in the case of structural dimen¬
sions) from the type of situation in which the word occurs, that
type of situation in turn deriving its value as a term in a system
(of types of situation) (cf. Halliday, 1974s 33). It should also
be noted that most lexical properties on substructural dimensions
also derive from the contexts in which the words in question occur.
There are of course exceptions, such as the reflected meaning of a
sense and the shape and sound of a lexeme.
Let us pursue the nature of contextually-derived lexical prop¬
erties a little further. Ullmann draws our attention to the source
of such lexical properties when he says that what he calls 'evoca¬
tive ' devices
derive their stylistic effect not from any inherent quality
but from being associated with a particular milieu or
register of style (1964: 111).
Thus we have situations on the one hand and words on the other, and
the latter derive their lexical properties from the former. This
relation is spelt out in a more explicit and systematic way by
Crystal and Davy in outlining the aim of stylistics:
The aim of stulistics is to analyse language habits with the
the main purpose of identifying,from the general mass of
linguistic features common to English as used on every con¬
ceivable occasion, those features which are restricted to
certain kinds of social context; to explain, where possible,
why such features have been used, as opposed to other alter¬
natives; and to classify these features into categories based
upon a view of their function in the social context. By
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'features' here, we mean any bit of speech or writing which
a person can single out from the general flow of language and
discuss - a particular word, part of a word, sequence of
words, or way of uttering a word. A feature, when it is
restricted in its occurrence to a limited number of social
contexts, we shall call a stylistically significant or
stylistically distinctive feature (1969: 10-11; cf. also
Firth, 1935: 28; Traugott & Pratt, 1980: 116).
Once we see lexical properties as deriving from situations, we
must reconcile this view with the fact that words with apparently
incompatible lexical properties (e.g. FORMAL and INFORMAL) can occur
in the same text and situation, and yet be distinguished as having
such lexical properties. Two phenomena are involved here, and the
reconciliation must accordingly be sought in two different ways.
In the first phenomenon, what happens is that two words can have
overlapping or incorporating distribution with regard to situational
restrictions. This phenomenon is represented in a schematic way in
the following diagram from the American College Dictionary:
The three circles X, Y, Z, represent the three sets of
language habits indicated above.
X—formal literary English, the words, the expressions,
and the structures one finds in serious books.
Y—colloquial English, the words, expressions, and the
structures of the informal but polite conversation
of cultivated people.
Z—Illiterate English, the words, the expressions, and
the structures of the language of the uneducated,
b, c, and e represent the overlappings of the three types
of English.
c—that which is common to all three: formal literary
English, colloquial English, and illiterate English,
b—that which Is common to both formal literary
English and colloquial English,
e—that which is common to both colloquial English
and illiterate English,
a, d. and f represent those portions of each type of
English that are peculiar to that particular set of
language habits.
By way of clarifying this diagram, Brooks and Warren have made the
following observations:
Modern slang, for example, falls into segment e - and
possibly d. It would be properly available for col¬
loquial and informal writing. (But segment d and e, of
course, include more than slang: they include colloquial
terms of all kinds that do not occur in formal literary
English.) Segment a includes the terms that occur only in
formal literary English, but the overlap of formal literary
English with colloquial and illiterate English is large -
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so large that most of the words used in writing of the
most formal style are to be found in writings at the other
extreme of style (1970: 411-2).
We need not agree with the diagram or the accompanying observations
by Brooks and Warren as regards detail, but we must agree with them
as regards the general point about the overlapping and incorporating
situational distribution of words. From this general point it is
possible to derive the following observation, which will serve to
reconcile the two apparently contradictory facts in question: two
stylistically different words (including synonyms) derive their
distinct lexical properties from their respective overall range of
situational applicability. It follows that two words will differ in
their lexical properties if they differ in their overall range of
situational applicability. And it also follows that a difference
in the lexical properties of two words is not incompatible with
the presence of an overlap in their overall range of situational
applicability: hence the possibility for two words to occur in the
same text and situation and yet to be distinguished as having dif¬
ferent lexical properties.
By way of introducing the second phenomenon, let us quote Crystal
and Davy, and Halliday and Hasan on the notion of consistency of
style or register:
We make the assumption that the text is homogeneous, and
we therefore expect the stylistic features to show a
consistent function (Crystal & Davy, 1969: 86).
The concept of COHESION can therefore be usefully supple¬
mented by that of REGISTER, since the two together effec¬
tively define a TEXT. A text is a passage of discourse
which is coherent in these two regards: it is coherent
with respect to the context of situation, and therefore
consistent in register; and it is coherent with respect
to itself, and therefore cohesive. Neither of these con¬
ditions is sufficient without the other, nor does the one
by necessity entail the other. Just As one can construct
passages which seem to hang together in the situational-
semantic sense, but fail as texts because they lack
cohesion, so also one can construct passages which are
beautifully cohesive but which fail as texts because they
lack consistency of register - there is no continuity of
meaning in relation to the situation. The hearer, or
reader, reacts to both of these things in his judgement
of texture (Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 23).
Now as far as the first phenomenon is concerned, the consistency
of style of a text is not disturbed by the co-occurrence of words
with overlapping or incorporating stylistic distribution. What
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differentiates the second phenomenon from the first is that here we
find within the same text and situation words which seem to have
(normally) complementary stylistic distribution, so that the con¬
sistency of style of the text is (somewhat) disturbed. The co¬
occurrence of (normally) situationally incompatible words, however,
need not always render a text inappropriate, for, as Nash points out,
In sensitive writing the vocabulary is in a constant play
of tonal adjustments, here lifting into abstraction, there
lowering towards the concrete and particular, now focusing
attention on some learned word, now exploiting the warmth
and intimacy of simple everyday speech (1980: 153)•
Thus, on the one hand, we have seen that Crystal and Davy, and
Halliday and Hasan insist on the consistency of style, while on the
other hand we have seen that Nash observes that consistency of style
need not be strictly observed in the appropriate use of language.
There is, I think, some truth in both positions. In fact, in the
same work from which the earlier quotation is taken Nash strikes
the following balance between the two positions:
Usually there are a few indices in stylistic company, and it
is from the interplay of compatible features that we derive
an impression of tone and a sense of what is tonally correct.
... The tolerances within a single sentence are of course
very strict. They relax a little as a text grows, - necess¬
arily, or it would be very difficult to make a shift of tone
- but the writer still has to be careful about the rate of
tonal change, the gradual discarding of some indices and the
introduction of others (1980: 135-6).
To complement what Nash has to say, let us quote Leech, who strikes
a balance between the two positions from a different angle:
The inhibiting power of conventions of role varies a great
deal. The maximum degree of stringency applies to language
used in religious and legal rites (for example, oath-taking).
Here any divergence from the precribed form of words annuls
the form of social activity concerned. At the other extreme
I would place literature: here (at least in modern times)
virtually all conventions observed are those which the writer
imposes of his own free-will (1966: 72).
The question now is: If words of (normally) complementary stylis¬
tic distribution can occur in the same text without making it
inappropriate, how do we know that these words in fact are of (nor¬
mally) complementary stylistic distribution, and how do we derive
lexical properties from situations?
To provide an answer, we have to invoke the not very precise yet
undoubtedly useful notion of 'usual environment'. As Ullmann puts it:
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Many of our words owe their expressiveness and their emotive
effect to the associations which they call forth. Terms
peculiar to a given milieu or level of style will evoke
their usual environment even when they occur in totally dif¬
ferent contexts. Archaisms, foreign words, technical and
dialect terms, vulgarisms and slang, will transport the
reader into the stylistic climate to which they normally
belong (1962: 133; cf. also Firth, 1935: 28 for the 'prin¬
ciple of relative frequency', which amounts to the same
thing).
In theory, then, we may regard the fact of lexical properties
deriving from situations and the fact of stylistically different (in
the first phenomenon) or incompatible (in the second phenomenon)
words occurring in the same text as having been reconciled. How¬
ever, the very need to introduce the notion of 'usual environment'
ought to serve as a warning against over-confidence in deriving
lexical properties from situations and against the temptation to
treat terms denoting lexical properties as more precise than they
are capable of being. As Crystal and Davy have found:
The main procedural difficulty ... arises from the fact
that linguistic features do not usually correlate in any
neat one-for-one way with the situational variables in an
extra-linguistic context. ... any piece of discourse con¬
tains a large number of features which are difficult to
relate to specific variables in the original extra-linguis¬
tic context, even though they may be felt to have some kind
stylistic value (1969: 62).
This frequent lack of definite correlation, which may be either
inherent or due to difficulty of observation, needs to be constantly
borne in mind. Nevertheless, within these limitations, we must try
to be as precise as we can. In so doing, however, we will find it
necessary and, with due warning, justifiable to adopt an approach
which is somewhat more rigid than is strictly warranted by the
nature of the inquiry.
It will be remembered that an unmarked lexical property is one
which does not prevent the word to which it belongs from occurring
equally appropriately in all situations. We may now introduce the
notion of 'common-core' (or stylistically neutral) words. A word
is common-core if all its lexical properties are unmarked. Given
that a common-core word only has unmarked lexical properties and
that unmarked lexical properties impose no restrictions on the
range of situational applicability of the words to which they belong,
it follows that a common-core word is capable of occurring equally
appropriately in all situations.
- 202 -
Now if we adhere strictly to this consequence, it will in turn
have the strange consequence that a word cannot be common-core if
it is a member of a stylistic field. It will be easy to see how
this further consequence arises if we compare a common-core word, A,
with a word, B, which we would regard as common-core but for its
being a member of a stylistic field. Now, since A has no competing
stylistic synonyms, it will of necessity be equally appropriate in
all situations. The same cannot be said, however, of B, which, let
us say, shares a stylistic field with two synonyms, C and D, of
which the former is FORMAL and the latter INFORMAL. For in such
situations as require FORMAL and INFORMAL, words respectively the
availability of C and D will render B less appropriate than in other
situations; in fact, the availability of 0 and D may even, though this
need not happen, render B inappropriate in the two former types of
situation. To generalize, a word will not be as appropriate - the
limiting case being that it is inappropriate - in a type of situ¬
ation when it has a stylistic synonym whose use is restricted to,
and which is therefore particularly appropriate in, this type of
situation as when it does not have such a stylistic synonym.
Applying what has been said in the last paragraph to lexical
properties, we may say that a lexical property cannot be unmarked
if it belongs to a word which has a stylistic synonym with a
contrasting lexical property on the same dimension. For an otherwise
unmarked lexical property of a word will make the word less appro¬
priate in a 'marked' situation if the word has a synonym with a
marked lexical property deriving from that situation than if the
word has no such synonym.
In the last two paragraphs, then, we have noted two consequences
concerning the nature of common-core words and the nature of
unmarked lexical properties respectively. I have drawn attention
to these consequences for two reasons.
In the first place, I wanted to show the need to amend our
original definition of unmarked lexical properties in the light of
those consequences. Despite the first consequence, the fact
remains that a large number of words with stylistic synonyms approxi¬
mate to the status of common-core words as we have defined them so
far and differ radically from other words. Despite the second con¬
sequence, the fact remains that a large number of lexical properties
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approximate to the status of unmarked lexical properties as we have
defined them so far and differ radically from other lexical prop¬
erties. This being the case, we have either to introduce new
categories for such words and lexical properties or to amend our
original definition of unmarked lexical properties in order to
accommodate them. I think that the second measure will be more
satisfactory, not only because it will be easier to take, but also
because it leaves room for an observation together with which it
can capture the relevant facts more clearly than if the first
measure had been taken. This observation is in fact the second
reason for my drawing attention to the two consequences, and I will
come to it presently. In the meantime, let us amend our original
definition of unmarked lexical properties by omitting 'equally' and
replacing 'all' with 'most', so that it now stands as follows: A
lexical property is unmarked if it does not prevent the word to
which it belongs from occurring appropriately in most situations.
Given this new definition, the two consequences which we noted
earlier cease to apply.
Let us turn to the second reason. We said earlier that a
lexical property (of the kind in question) of a word derives not
from the style-relations which that word enters into with its syn¬
onyms (where they are available) in a stylistic field, but from the
type of situation in which the word occurs. While still holding
this view to be true, I want now to make the equally important
observation - which is made all the more necessary by our amended
definition of unmarked lexical properties - that the exact relation
between a lexical property of a word and the type of situation in
which the word occurs may be affected by whether the word is a
member of a stylistic field. Thus, an unmarked lexical property of
a word will, strictly speaking, make the word somewhat less appro¬
priate in a certain type of situation if the word has a synonym
with a marked lexical property deriving from that situation than if
the word has no such synonym. However, only in this limited sense
is it correct to say that a lexical property of a word also derives
(partially) from the style-relations which the word contracts with
its synonym(s). Otherwise the presence of one or more synonyms
alongside a word can only serve to underline. rather than define,
one or more lexical properties of the word, which have already
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derived from the occurrence of the word in situations.
We have already identified three levels of lexical unit on which
synonymy may be located, i.e. lexeme, sense and occurrence. Just as
synonymy may hold on any of these three levels, so lexical properties
too may attach to lexemes, senses, or occurrences. It is thus
important, in assigning lexical properties, to identify the right
level of lexical unit to which they belong. In this we may be
guided by the same principles as apply to the making of synonymy
statements, i.e. the principle of descriptive adequacy and the prin¬
ciple of descriptive economy (cf. A.5).
Lexical properties as such are potential: they may or may not be
actualized in a given choice-situation. The likelihood of a lexi¬
cal property being actualized is a function of what we have called
the salience of the lexical property and the context in which the
word with that property is being used.
As far as the role of context is concerned, most of the relevant
factors boil down to the degree of care and attention which a person
brings to his use of language in a particular context as a result,
or partly as a result, of that context. In this regard, literature
stands out as the most clear-cut example. It has been said, rightly
or wrongly, that "there are no synonyms in literature because the
set of conventions by which we designate and interpret literary-
works does not permit them" (Bogel, 1978: 135). Since there are
undoubtedly words with exactly the same descriptive meaning, this
statement, if true, must be taken to mean that any two otherwise
synonymous words are necessarily differentiated by at least one
actually communicatively relevant lexical property. This may be
too sweeping a statement, but it would certainly be true to say, as
a rough generalization, that lexical properties are more likely to
be actualized in literature than in non-literature.
As far as the salience of lexical properties is concerned, we
may, as we said earlier, think in terms of a scale ranging from the
most salient lexical properties, which are always or almost always
actualized (e.g. regional dialectal properties), to the least
salient lexical properties, which are very seldom actualized and
then only in special contexts (e.g. phonetic and graphetic prop¬
erties ).
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11.3. Categories of dimensions
The dimensions of difference between synonyms may be seen as
falling into several broad categories. These are
(I) Dialectal varieties
(II) Diatypic varieties
(III) Emotive (or attitudinal) meaning
(IV) Associations
(V) Shape and sound
(VI) Principles of style and rhetoric
(VII) Pragmatic factors
(VIII) Prescriptive judgements of correctness or appropriateness.
The nature and scope of the first two categories require little
explanation. Both dialectal and diatypic varieties have been the
subject of extensive stylistic investigation in recent years, and
as to their nature and scope there is considerable agreement, as is
witnessed in such treatments as Halliday et al (1964-), Spencer and
Gregory (1964), and Crystal and Davy (1969). It suffices at this
point to say that we shall operate within the broad framework to be
found in such treatments.
By (III) 'emotive meaning' we mean that aspect of words which
is designated by such terms as 'favourable', 'unfavourable' or 'neu¬
tral' (cf. Lyons, 1981: 5Ai Palmer, 1976: 6l). Here again, since
our usage is in line with general practice, no more needs to be
said at this stage.
What is meant by (IV) 'associations' is intuitively clear, yet
in discussions of semantics and stylistics this has often become a
vague and all-embracing term. Thus, all the three categories we
have just considered have been casually referred to as 'associ¬
ations '. In the present treatment I will give the term a much
narrower interpretation, such that the (IV) category, 'associations',
will be independent of and distinct from all the other categories
in our classification. To narrow down the coverage of this cat¬
egory with regard to the first three categories, it is sufficient
to obssrve that two synonyms may differ in the assiciations they
evoke despite being of the same dialectal variety, and/or despite
being of the same diatypic variety, and/or despite sharing the same
emotive meaning. That the (IV) category is independent of and
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distinct from the remaining categories will be too obvious to need
demons tration.
By the next category, (V) 'shape and sound', I mean cases where
A is judged to be preferable to B because of its phonetic or
graphetic properties (e.g. phonaesthetic choices and eye-rhyme).
We come now to the (VI) category, 'principles of style and
rhetoric'. Under this category come such devices as reiteration,
variation, recursion and inversion. These we have already briefly
considered earlier, though in a different connection.
In that same connection we also touched upon pragmatic factors
that can give rise to a material choice between two synonyms, which
now make up our (VII) category. It will be remembered that we cited
as an example the situation in which we prefer one synonym to
another on the sole ground that it is more likely to be known to
our addressee(s) than the other 3ynonym. Similarly, a purely prag¬
matic factor is at work when we 'prefer' one synonym to another for
no other reason than that we are not sure of the pronunciation or
spelling or grammatical properties (e.g. irregular verbs and nouns)
of the latter synonym. Prom these examples it will be clear that
pragmatic factors form a rather trivial category: we have drawn
attention to them partly to clarify the whole picture and partly
to exclude them from further consideration.
At this point it is helpful to remind ourselves of the distinc¬
tion we drew earlier between lexical properties and extraneous
factors as grounds for preferring one synonym to another. Of the
categories in our classification the first five are to do with
lexical properties, while the sixth and seventh are to do with
extraneous factors.
In this respect the last category, (VIII), may be seen as belonging
together with the first five. However, this category stands apart
from all the other seven categories, in that it primarily involves
somewhat prescriptive judgements. Prescriptive judgements of
correctness or appropriateness are at work when we prefer one syn¬
onym to another on the sole ground that the latter synonym is
incorrect or inappropriate either in our own judgement or, more
probably, according to some higher 'authority' (e.g. Fowler (A Dic¬
tionary of Modern English Usage); Gowers, 1977). It is important
to emphasize the word 'sole', for there are many cases where judge-
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ments of correctness or appropriateness are based on inter-subjec¬
tively perceived lexical properties. In such cases whether or not
a synonym is correct or appropriate is not a matter of prescriptive
judgement but is a function of the relationship between the lexical
properties of a synonym and the context in which it is being used.
In the making of prescriptive judgements of correctness or appro¬
priateness, on the other hand, no account is taken of the context
other than as a means of helping to identify the meaning involved.
It is for this reason that prescriptive judgements of correctness or
appropriateness have been isolated as an independent and distinct
category.
11.4. Enumeration, exemplification, and brief explanation of
dimensions
There have been a number of classifications of the differences
between synonyms (e.g. Baldinger, 1980: 241-53; Collinson, 1939:
61-2; Palmer, 1976: 60-3; Nash, 1980: 153). Of these the best-
known is perhaps the one by Collinson while the most comprehensive
is the one by Baldinger.
The enumeration that I will give in what follows is in large
measure a bringing together and re-organizing of the dimensions
already identified in the work alluded to, with a few additions
that I have drawn from work not directly concerned with synonymy.
The aim is to achieve at once a greater comprehensiveness (but
something well short of exhaustiveness) of coverage and, through
the classification of dimensions, what I hope will be greater
clarity as regards the systematic relations between the dimensions.
In keeping with our general rationale and descriptive framework
presented in 11.2, I will formulate each dimension in terms of a
simple choice-situation between the two synonyms. Once formulated
in this way, most of the dimensions are self-explanatory. Where
this is not entirely the case, some explanation will be given, in
most cases somewhat sparingly. Examples will be provided where
this is considered essential and/or convenient.
(I) Dialectal varieties
(1) A is preferable to B because A is geographically unmarked or
marked and, if markedness is desirable, because A belongs to a
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particular local or national dialect. Examples:
small/wee (Scottish dialect); autumn (unmarked in English-
speaking countries other than North America)/fall (North
American).
(2) A is preferable to B because A is socially unmarked or marked
and, if markedness is desirable, because A belongs to a particular
social dialect.
A controversial distinction has been drawn between upper-class
usage and that of the rest of society, which are designated as 'U'
and 'non-U' respectively (cf. Ross, 1959). Here are some pairs of
synonyms which, according to Ross (1959: 24-8), exemplify this
bipartite distinction, the first word in each pair being the U word:
counterpane/coverlet; vegetables/greens; looking-glass/
mirror; writing-paper/note-paper; wireless/radio; (table-)
napkin/serviette; rich/wealthy; false teeth/dentures;
spectacles/glasses; sick/ill (in the sense of "feeling
nausea"); lunch/dinner; dinner/evening-raeal; jam/preserve;
pudding/sweet.
(3) A is preferable to B because A is typically used by people of a
certain age group (e.g. young children, elderly people). A may also
be preferred by an 'outsider', for reasons of 'empathy', in speaking
to people in one of these age groups, as when a mother says to a
child 'Where's your gee-gee (see below)?', or when a young person
says to his grandmother 'Would you like me to fetch your wireless
(see below), Granny?'. Examples:
gee-gee (baby language)/horse; wireless (chiefly used by
elderly people)/radio.
fll) Diatypic varieties
(4) A is preferable to B because A is of a certain degree of
formality of 'tone': VERY FORMAL, FORMAL, BARELY FORMAL, BARELY
INFORMAL, INFORMAL, or VERY INFORMAL.
It is first of all necessary to clarify this notion of 'tone'.
Our use of this notion is akin to the notion of 'tenor of discourse'
or 'status' as it is sometimes conceived; not, however, as it is
conceived by Crystal and Davy:
In this dimension we describe the systematic linguistic
variations which correspond with variations in the relative
social standing of the participants in any act of communi¬
cation (1969t 73-4)•
It is important to note that 'the relative social standing of the
participants in any act of communication' is something permanent
and does not change with the circumstances of communication. Thus
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two participants will be friends whether they are communicating by
speaking or by writing. Similarly, two participants will be boss
and subordinate whether they are speaking to each other in their
professional capacity or conversing in the relaxed atmosphere of a
social occasion.
Such changes in the circumstances of communication, however,
have a powerful effect on what I have referred to as the tone of
our use of language. As a simple illustration, two friends will
tend to be less formal in their use of language when they communi¬
cate orally than when they communicate in writing. By the same
token, boss and subordinate will tend to be more formal in their use
of language when they speak to each other in their professional
capacity than when they converse in the relaxed atmosphere of a
social occasion. Formality and informality are two of the shades
of what I mean by 'tone'. Needless to say, "the relative social
standing of the participants' also plays an important part in
determining the tone of their use of language.
Tone, then, is the product of both the 'relative social standing
of the participants' and the actual circumstances of communication.
The exact nature of these circumstances will be made clear later.
In the meantime we may observe that our conception of tone is close
to Catford's conception of 'style' (i.e. 'tenor of discourse') when
he says:
By style we mean a variety which correlates with the
number and nature of the addressees and the performer's
relationship to them (1965s 90; cf. also Spencer & Gregory,
1964.: 88-9).
Havingclarified the notion of tone, we must next address our¬
selves to the question: How many degrees of formality of tone are
there? To be more precise, how many degrees of situational formality
is the vocabulary of English capable of manifesting?
It should be emphasized that our concern is not with degrees of
situational formality as they are reflected in linguistic features as
a whole, but only with degrees of situational formality as they are
reflected in the vocabulary. With regard to the former, it may
well be true that "the stylistic range of English is wide and
ultimately the gradations are infinite" (Quirk, 1968: 246) or that
"this dimension is unlikely ever to yield clearly defined, discrete
registers" (Halliday et_al, 1964: 92-3). Neither of these observa¬
tions, however, need be true with regard to the vocabulary. Whether
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(and to what extent) these observations are in fact true we will
see in the course of the discussion to follow.
As the basis of my inquiry, I will make what I consider to be a
reasonable assumption, namely, that when confronted with two English
words (lexemes, senses, or occurrences), native speakers will be
able to decide, with a large measure of agreement, whether one word
is more formal than the other or whether both words are of (roughly)
the same degree of formality. It would be easy to put this assump¬
tion to the test, and it would be worth doing so in a study more
firmly based on experimentation than the present one. In the
present study, however, I shall simply accept this assumption.
Once we accept this assumption, we will automatically have at
our disposal a means of determining how many degrees of formality
there are for the vocabulary of English. For a scale of formality
can be easily produced by having a cross-section of native speakers
make 'same in formality' and 'different in formality' judgements on
a representative range of data. This, again, is a procedure which
would be worth putting into practice in an experimental study. Not
having been able to carry out such a study, I must stress the
hypothetical nature of what I have to say on this matter.
On the basis of some informal experimentation on the lines sug¬
gested above, I will put forward the hyppthesis that there are
(roughly) six degrees of formality for the vocabulary of English.
These are exemplified by sets of synonyms on the next page.
It will be noticed that, in addition to being of a high or fairly
high degree of formality, some of the items in the table also
possess other lexical properties. According to Leech (1974.: 17),
for example, 'domicile' is also OFFICIAL, 'abode' and 'steed' are
also POETIC, and 'cast' is also LITERARY and BIBLICAL. This sug¬
gests some measure of dependence or interdependence in the relation
between the dimension of 'tone' and other dimensions of diatypic
variation. We will come back to this question later. In the mean¬
time it suffices to point out that items with such lexical prop¬
erties as imply a certain degree of formality should not, strictly
speaking, be placed on the scale of formality.
It would be fairly simple and straightforward to test the validity
of a 'formality table' such as this one. First, we check horizan-























pass away die pop off
decline refuse turn down
fatigued exhausted tired out
worn out tuckered out beat
pooped


















fabricate invent make up
malefactor criminal crook
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item to its right. Next, we check vertically to see whether all the
items within a column are indeed of the same degree of formality. I
am far from claiming that all the examples in the above table will
stand up to such a test, not least because the items are not con-
textualized, and consequently it is impossible to make the important
distinction between lexemes, senses and occurrences. Nor do I claim
that each of the six degrees of formality is internally homogeneous
in the sense that no further degrees can be identified within it
by means of more delicate 'different in formality' judgements. All
I claim, as a hypothesis, is that six degrees of formality can be
distinguished such that all the items coming under one degree are
closer to each other in formality than they are to items coming
under another degree of formality. I shall now proceed on the basis
of this hypothesis, taking some comfort in the belief that the
essence of what I have to say will not be seriously affected if the
hypothesis proves false.
Having distinguished six degrees of formality, we have yet to
provide a characterization for each by specifying its situational
correlate. This is because the setting up of a scale of formality
can proceed independently of any characterization of the degrees on
it and does not even imply the possibility of carrying out such a
characterization. As we have seen, it is possible to establish a
scale of formality by relying on 'same in formality' and 'different
in formality' judgements alone. Such judgements by native speakers,
insofar as they are valid, derive, of course, from their experience
of the use of words in situations. In fact, this is the only
reason why we attach any value to such judgements. Two factors,
however, combine to make it extremely difficult to move in the
opposite direction, from 'same in formality' and 'different in
formality' judgements to the exact circumstances of communication
that have given rise to these judgements in the first place; and
it is on the possibility of making just this move that the charac¬
terization of each degree of formality depends.
The first factor is simple, namely, that language activity is
creative, both in an artistic and in a mundane sense, and is not
invariably subject to hard and fast rules. This is perhaps particu¬
larly true as regards the correlation between linguistic features
and situations. As a result, we can only speack in terms of
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likelihood when matching degrees of formality with their situational
correlates.
The second factor is more important and concerns the very nature
of our undertaking. To put it simply, situational categories are
not given to us, but are abstracted from infinite contexts by means
of classification. If so, then something of the same uncertainty
and lack of total precision must of necessity attach to situational
categories as is acknowledged to be the case with the sense-meaning
in dictionaries, which are obtained through essentially the same
process (cf. Firth, 1935: 28; Evkvist, 1964: 56).
There is yet a third factor, which makes the characterization of
degrees of formality more complex by militating against uniform
characterizations. We have assumed that, when given any two English
words, native speakers will generally agree whether one word is
more formal than the other or whether the two words share (roughly)
the same degree of formality. It must now be stressed that to make
this assumption is very different from assuming that (even educated)
native speakers will find themselves in agreement (in terms of
judgements or actual performance) as to the situations in which
these words occur or should occur. As Mackin and Cowie have reminded
us in the Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English (p.lix),
"the conventions observed by individual speakers and writers differ
very considerably". To take full account of such differences would
be very difficult and would add enormously to the complexity of the
resulting characterizations. To idealize them away, on the other
hand, could lead to one-sidedness and even distortion. In what
follows, I choose to run the second risk more than the first, in the
hope that the results will serve as the basis for further inquiry.
Within, and mindful of, the limitations imposed by the three
factors just mentioned, let us now see how far we can go in supply¬
ing clear and valid characterizations for the six degrees of formal¬
ity. For this purpose I will proceed in two stages.
The first stage is designed to specify the permissible range of
use for words with different degrees of formality. To do this, I
will invoke, within 'modes of discourse', the crude distinction
between speaking and writing. In terms of this distinction, the
six degrees of formality may be roughly characterized as follows:
(a) VERY FORMAL words are ones which native speakers almost
never use in speaking and normally hesitate to use even
in writing.
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(b) FORMAL words are ones which native speakers normally
hesitate to use in speaking.
(c) BARELY FORMAL words are ones which native speakers normally
do not hesitate to use either in speaking or in writing.
(d) BARELY INFORMAL words are ones which native speakers nor¬
mally do not hesitate to use either in speaking or in
writing (note that this is exactly the same as (c)).
(e) INFORMAL words are ones which native speakers normally
hesitate to use in writing.
(f) VERY INFORMAL words are ones which native speakers almost
never use in writing and normally hesitate to use even in
speaking.
There are three points to be made about the characterizations
just given. First, it will have been seen that BARELY FORMAL and
BARELY INFORMAL words are the only ones that normally occur in both
speaking and writing. These are thus the unmarked lexical properties
on this dimension.
The second point concerns VERY FORMAL and VERY INFORMAL words,
which we find situated at the two poles of the scale. We have
already remarked in their respective characterizations that such
words are not normally employed either in speaking or in writing.
To say this is, of course, to say that they are not normally used at
all. To quote Gregory and Carroll:
Most of us could not even attempt to use with flair the
most informal of the points on the personal-tenor cline.
On the other hand most of us could not master formal
degrees either as exemplified by the fine points of an
old-style grammarian or diction specialist. We tend
generally to operate in the middle ranges (1978: 55)*
The middle ranges, according to our scale, are made up of four
degrees of formality, with BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL words
as the ones with which native speakers are most at home.
We come now to the third and final point, which is also to do
with VERY FORMAL and VERY INFORMAL words. As the examples in our
table suggest, words with the lexical property VERY FORMAL tend to
possess another lexical property, such as OFFICIAL or POETIC, which
implies VERY FORMAL. Similarly, as the examples in the extreme
right column of the table suggest, words with the lexical property
VERY INFORMAL tend also to possess the lexical property SLANG,
which seems to imply the former. Now we may distinguish three
points of view from which slang may be considered, namely, range of
intelligibility, provenance, and degree of formality. The first
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point of view does not concern us, except that we are interested
only in those slang words and expressions which have come into
common use and which should perhaps therefore be regarded as part
of standard English. In fact, such words and expressions are,
strictly speaking, no longer slang other than in terms of provenance
(which ought not be a defining feature). As far as we are concerned,
the provenance of such words and expressions is relevant only as an
explanation of their informality. It is thus only from the third
point of view that slang properly enters into our consideration.
However, when regarded from this point of view alone, the term
'slang' denotes nothing more than the lexical property VERY INFORMAL. In
the light of these observations, it is perhaps not surprising that
VERY FORMAL and VERY INFORMAL words are not normally used at all.
A more interesting point, however, is that, if the first observa¬
tion is true (i.e. that VERY FORMAL always implies one of a number
of other lexical properties more specific than itself), then we
should perhaps, strictly speaking, do away with VERY FORMAL, with
the result that there will be five degrees of formality rather
than six. Until this observation can be firmly established, how¬
ever, it will be advisable to retain VERY FORMAL on our scale.
Although the distinction between speaking and writing is crude
and needs elaborating (at the second stage), I believe it is a
useful for our purpose, at least a3 a starting-point. It is clearly
not enough, however, to invoke this distinction alone. To appreci¬
ate this, it will be helpful to keep speaking and writing clearly
apart. Where there are stylistic synonyms within the first-level
area of speaking or writing, we have yet to characterize the two
or three degrees of formality permissible in each by specifying
their more exact situational correlates. It is for this purpose
that the second stage is designed. At this second stage VERY FORMAL
and VERY INFORMAL will be left out of account, since they have
already been completely covered by the first stage.
I will consider writing first. Within this first-level area I
will now draw a second-level distinction between what may be called
'impersonal writing' and 'personal writing'. By impersonal writing
is roughly meant writing in which the addresser takes or displays
no personal interest in his addressee(s). Examples of such writing
are essays, official correspondence, and leading articles in
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newspapers. In straightforward contrast with impersonal writing is
personal writing, in which the addresser does take or display some
personal interest in his addressee(s). Examples of this latter
kind of writing are personal correspondence (perhaps the best
example) and children's stories.
In the light of this second-level distinction, FORMAL words may
be distinguished from BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL words as
follows:
(g) FORMAL words are ones which native speakers normally
hesitate to use in personal writing.
(h) BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL words are ones which
native speakers normally do not hesitate to use either
in personal or in impersonal writing.
Turning now to speaking, we may draw, within this other first-
level area, a similar second-level distinction between what may be
called 'serious speaking' and 'casual speaking'. To characterize
these two types of speaking, it is helpful to invoke Halliday's
(1970: 14.1-4.) typology of the functions of language. Thus serious
speaking is speaking where the ideational function is dominant,
while casual speaking is speaking where the interpersonal function
is dominant. We may also remark that the ideational/interpersonal
distinction is also relevant to the characterization of the two
types of writing: the interpersonal function plays a larger part
in personal writing than in impersonal writing, where its role is
minimal. To come back to speaking, we are now in a position to
distinguish INFORMAL words from BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL
words. Thus:
(i) INFORMAL words are ones which native speakers normally
hesitate to use in serious speaking.
(j) BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL words are ones which
native speakers normally do not hesitate to use either
in serious speaking or in casual speaking.
In connection with the four new characterizations, three points
need to be made.
First, from (g) and (h) it can be inferred that within imper¬
sonal writing there may again be a stylistic choice between FORMAL
and BARELY FORMAL/BARELY INFORMAL words. Similarly, it can be
inferred from (i) and (j) that within casual speaking there may be
a stylistic choice between INFORMAL words and BARELY FORMAL/BARELY
INFORMAL words. I have not been able to discover any clear and
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general constraints operating on such choice in either case. In
the case of impersonal writing, I must be content instead with the
comparative statement that, for the same addresser, the more imper¬
sonal the addresser/addressee relationship, the more likely the
addresser is to use FORMAL words, and vice versa. In the case of
casual speaking, I must be content with a similar comparative state¬
ment, that, for the same addresser, the more casual the occasion the
more likely the addresser is to use INFORMAL words, and vice versa.
Second, as regards (h) and (j), it must be mentioned that to
say that the stylistic range BARELY FORMAL/BARELY INFORMAL words
incorporates that of FORMAL words on the one hand and that of
INFORMAL words on the other is not to say that the former are
invariably equally felicitous as their FORMAL or INFORMAL synonyms
from the point of view of 'tone1. At work here are the general
observations which we made in 11.2 about the relationship between
unmarked lexical properties and the presence of stylistic synonyms.
Thirdly, as is clear from (c), (d), (h) and (j), the two central
degrees of formality, i.e. BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL, have
received exactly the same characterization. To prove that these
indeed represent two different degrees of formality, we must show
that they have different situational correlates. This is not easy
to do, for BARELY FORMAL and BARELY INFORMAL are closer to each
other than the former is to its neighbouring degree FORMAL or the
latter is to its neighbouring degree INFORMAL. Here again we may
consider writing and speaking separately. With regard to writing,
it seems that where there is a choice between a BARELY FORMAL word
and a BARELY INFORMAL word the former is more likely to be favoured
in impersonal writing. It is doubtful that BARELY INFORMAL words
are more likely to be favoured than BARELY FORMAL words in personal
writing. We may nevertheless say with some confidence that they
are more likely to be chosen in personal writing than they them¬
selves are in impersonal writing. Something of the converse
applies to speaking. Here it seems that where there is a choice
between a BARELY INFORMAL and a BARELY FORMAL word the former is
more likely to be favoured in casual speaking. As to serious
speaking, regardless of their chances of being chosen as against
each other, it is fairly certain that the (absolute) chances of
BARELY FORMAL words occurring increase as we move from casual
speaking to serious speaking.
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(5) A is preferable to B because A is LEARNED or POPULAR.
Closely related to yet distinct from the dimension of 'tone' is
what might be called the dimension of 'learning1.
Formality of tone, as we have seen, is a gradable notion, capable
of no less than six degrees according to our hypothesis. Unlike
the dimension of 'tone', the dimension of 'learning' as we conceive
it allows for no degrees, but consists of a simple polar opposition:
LEARNED versus POPULAR.
LEARNED may be characterized as a lexical property belonging to
those words that are normally used only by people who are supposed
to be learned or well-read. There is the implication that most
native speakers either do not have words with this lexical property
in their (active) vocabulary or will hesitate to use them even in
writing (for fear of appearing pretentious or pedantic).
Words with the lexical property POPULAR make up the complementary
set. However, subject to the same qualifications as apply to the
dimension of 'tone', POPULAR words are unmarked, in the sense that
they are normally used by all speakers regardless of whether they
are supposed to be learned.
The connection of this dimension with the dimension of 'tone' is
obvious. Short of perceiving mutual entailment, we may see the
connection as follows:
VERY FORMAL FORMAL BARELY FORMAL BARELY INFORMAL INFORMAL VERY INFORMAL
LEARNED POPULAR
It is not easy to exemplify the lexical property LEARNED. While
intersubjectively valid to a certain degree, this is not a very
definite lexical property. Nor is it an important one, and part of
my purpose of identifying it is so that other lexical properties
will not be confused with it. As for exemplification, I will
content myself with citing two examples from Nash and Baldinger
(though not from English) respectively:
The writer may opt for a word of learned status, e.g.:
malefactor (directly modelled from Latin), or he may look
for a more familiar equivalent, e.g.: criminal (Latin
mediated through French) (Nash, 1980: 152).
Ger. Telephon (foreign + pop)/Fernsprecher (learned + native)
"telephone" (Baldinger, 1980: 235).
(6) A is preferable to B because A is FAMILIAR or UNUSUAL.
To be distinguished from both of the above dimensions is the
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dimension of 'currency' or 'familiarity'. This dimension is very
simple and concerns only the frequency with which a word occurs.
'Currency' is clearly a gradable notion. It is neither feasible
nor useful, however, to distinguish a finite number of degrees.
Instead, we may for practical purposes treat this dimension as if it
consisted of a polar opposition: FAMILIAR versus UNUSUAL.
Though distinct, this dimension bears a close relation to the
two earlier dimensions, particularly the dimension of 'tone'. This
relation may be roughly represented as follows:
VERY FORMAL FORMAL BARELY FORMAL BARELY INFORMAL INFORMAL VERY INFORMAL
LEARNED POPULAR
UNUSUAL FAMILIAR UNUSUAL
The polar distinction of FAMILIAR and UNUSUAL is useful as far as
it goes. It is often necessary, however, particularly within the
range of broadly FAMILIAR words, to made use of comparative state¬
ments, i.e. to say that one word is more FAMILIAR or UNUSUAL than
a stylistic synonym (cf. Brewer, 1975s 4-60 for 'naturalness').
So far we have talked about the relative frequency of words as
such, without qualifications. To make the notion of currency more
useful for stylistic purposes, three qualifications must be intro¬
duced. First, frequency of use is context-bound: what is FAMILIAR
is one type of context may be UNUSUAL in another. Secondly,
frequency of use is bound to lexical units: a FAMILIAR lexeme may
have an UNUSUAL sense, and a FAMILIAR sense may have an UNUSUAL
occurrence, and vice versa. Thirdly, frequency of use is bound to
individual speakers: what is FAMILIAR for one speaker or group of
speakers may be UNUSUAL for another speaker or group of speakers.
Let us now consider together three further dimensions.
(7) A is preferable to B because A is POETIC (or NEUTRAL).
(8) A is preferable to B because A is LITERARY (or NEUTRAL).
(9) A is preferable to B because A is ARCHAIC/POETIC (or NEUTRAL).
LITERARY, POETIC and ARCHAIC are commonly employed for labelling
words, and yet they seem to defy precise characterization. In fact,
their meanings are more often taken for granted than spelt out. In
what follows I can do no more than offer some clarification.
The need for clarification arises largely as a result of three
inconsistencies in the way these terms are employed. To begin with,
the three terms are sometimes regarded as on a par with each other,
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as in OALDCE. In contrast, they have also been conceived in such
a way that LITERARY subsumes POETIC and ARCHAIC, as when Ullmann
says that "literary terms may be divided into poetic, archaic, and
others" (1962: 143; cf. also Collinson, 1939: 61). If we fellow the
first practice, all three terms play indispensable roles. If we
follow the second practice instead, however, LITERARY serves only
as a cover-term and, as such, is not essential.
The second inconsistency lies in the way the three terms are
applied to actual words. To take only POETIC, the second items in
each of the following pairs, for example, have been treated by
Traugott and Pratt as POETIC:
We can find pairs of synonyms illustrating the contrast
between neutral and poetic forms, such as incessant/
unceasing, branch/bough, girl/maiden, sleep/slumber.
room/chamber, problems/woes or cares, and a great many
others (1980: 117)•
Of these, 'unceasing', 'bough', 'chamber' and 'cares' are not
labelled in OALDCE; 'maiden' and 'slumber' are labelled as LITERARY;
and only 'woes' is labelled POETIC.
There is yet another inconsistency, to do with the way in which
the term LITERARY is employed. A clear example is provided by
Chafe. Commenting on the difference between "a. The road widened",
"b. The road became wider" and "c. The road got wider", Chafe says:
It seems to me that in normal, uninhibited, colloquial
conversation I would hardly ever use either (31a) or (31b),
but only (31c). Conversely, in writing, unless I were
quoting a colloquial conversation, I would not normally
use (31c). That is, the difference between (31a,b) on
the one hand and (31c) on the other is simply the dif¬
ference between what might be called literary and non-
literary style (1971: 137).
It is clear that Chafe is using LITERARY to mean something like
FORMAL, which is not the sense in which the term has been used
either in OALDCE or by Ullmann.
Having drawn attention to the pitfalls, we must now begin the
job of clarification.
To begin with, there is a useful distinction to be drawn between
POETIC and LITERARY. It will be recalled that 'woes' and 'unceas¬
ing' are both given by Traugott and Pratt as examples of POETIC
words. Mow between these two words can be seen a fairly clear
stylistic difference. In the first place, 'woes' has a strong
'poetic flavour' while 'unceasing' is somewhat detached from poetic
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contexts. In the second place, though neither word is wholly
exclusive to poetry, 'woes' is more restricted than 'unceasing' in
its stylistic range outside poetry.
It will not do, however, simply to banish words like 'unceasing'
from the range of POETIC words if there is no other term to accom¬
modate them. For, though less POETIC than 'woes', 'unceasing' is
definitely more than just FORMAL: it is associated with 'elegant'
literary composition in general. To capture such difference as is
exemplified by these two words, there is a lot to be said for
retaining LITERARY (for words like 'unceasing') alongside POETIC.
In the final analysis, however, there is 110 hard and fast line
between POETIC and LITERARY. These two lexical properties belong
to a dimension which is a continuum rather than a series of dis¬
crete steps and on which any cut-off point must therefore be
somewhat arbitrary. Despite a measure of arbitrariness, the dis¬
tinction between POETIC and LITERARY nevertheless plays a useful
role in indicating the different stylistic ranges of two closely
related sets of words, particularly where the distinction is
relatively clear, as in the case of 'woes' and 'unceasing'.
Closely related yet to be distinguished from POETIC (as con¬
ceived here) is the lexical property ARCHAIC. To adopt the
definition in SOED, archaic words are those which "belong to an
earlier period, though still retained by individuals, or for
special purposes, poetical, liturgical, etc" (p.99). From this
definition it can be inferred that the relation between POETIC
words and ARCHAIC words is one of overlap: only some POETIC words
are also ARCHAIC, and only some ARCHAIC words are also POETIC. If
so, the juxtaposition of POETIC and ARCHAIC is not vacuous. POETIC
words as such, we have seen, are not exclusive to poetry. In
contrast, from a purely synchronic point of view, POETIC words
which are also ARCHAIC (hence ARCHAIC/POETIC) are more likely to
be exclusive to poetry.
(10) A is preferable to B because of its etymology.
It is a well-known fact that synonyms often differ in their
etymological origin. In this respect, two 'scales' have been
identified by Ullmann as follows:
The double scale - 'Saxon' versus 'Latin', as it is
usually called. ... There are in English countless pairs
of synonyms where a native term is opposed to one borrowed
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from French, Latin or Greek. In most cases the native
word is more spontaneous, more informal and unpretentious,
whereas the foreign one often has a learned, abstract or
even an abstruse air. There may also be emotive differ¬
ences: the 'Saxon' term is apt to be warmer and homelier
than its foreign counterpart. ... There are many excep¬
tions to this pattern; yet it recurs so persistently that
it is obviously fundamental to the structure of the lan¬
guage. ...
It will be sufficient to quote a few examples of this
synonymic pattern. All major parts of speech are involved













































The ease with which examples can be multiplied shows how
all-pervasive this pattern is in English (1962: 145-6).
Side by side with this main pattern there exists in English
a subsidiary one based on a triple scale of synonyms: native,
French, and Latin or Greek:






In most of these combinations, the native synonym is the
simplest and most ordinary of the three terms, the Latin
or Greek one is learned, abstract, with an air of cold
and impersonal precision, whereas the French one stands
between the two extremes (1962: 147-8).
Conspicuous in Ullmann's account is the regular correspondence
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between etymological origins and lexical properties. Such a corre¬
spondence is not doubt useful, for those who are versed in etymol¬
ogy, in providing clues to and explanations for lexical properties.
But in the final analysis, particularly in view of the exceptions
to the two scales, it is the lexical properties rather than the
etymological origins that are generally synchronically relevant.
For our purpose, historical provenance is an independent dimen¬
sion only to the extent that it might be synchronically relevant.
It will be synchronically relevant only to the extent that it
affects native speakers' choice of words in its own right - that is,
over and above its role in providing clues or explanations concern¬
ing other lexical properties. The extent in question must be very
small indeed.
(11) A is preferable to B because A is semantically opaque (i.e.
difficult to gra3p?) or transparent (i.e. easy to grasp?).
This is a real yet somewhat elusive dimension, of which Nash
has given the following account:
Though most classical words should nowadays be no more
'difficult' than words of Anglo-Saxon origin, they tend
to keep a certain mystery, for all but the accomplished
classicist. Thus a word like ingenuous lias an opacity
which is in itself a tonal value, as compared with the
transparent simplicity of words like forthright, or
frank. The density of the classical word can be a
barrier, sometimes deliberately raised, between writer
and reader; or possibly a form of stylistic test (1980: 153).
(12) A is preferable to B because it is motivated or not motivated
and, if motivated, is so in a particular way.
Here is a brief account by Baldinger:
The motivation of compound or derived words. For example,
two German words for "pavement", Trottoir and Gehweg. are
synonymous (absolute synonyms on the level of the sub¬
stance of content). But they are not synonymous as far as
their motivation is concerned. For any German speaker,
Gehweg is easy to analyze (gehen "go", and Weg "way");
Trottoir. on the other hand, is not (being a French loan-
word). The speaker may prefer a motivated compound or
derivative over its non-motivated synonym (whether this is
a simple word or a compound or derived word from a dia-
chronic viewpoint), which has lost its motivation because
of phonetic evolution or other diachronic factors (such
as loan-words, for example). The scientific analysis of
these compounds is performed (1) in the level of the form
of expression and (2) on the level of the form of content
(1980: 223-4).
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Examples may also be supplied from English, such as
unilateral/one-sided (disarmament); transparent/see-through
(blouse); collapsible/knock-down (furniture); arduous/
uphill (struggle).
As these examples show, this dimension has obvious connections with
certain others dealt with above.
(13) A is preferable to B because A is TECHNICAL (or NEUTRAL).
By TECHNICAL words I mean all those that are restricted to a
greater or lesser degree to use by people belonging to a special¬
ized profession or occupation. Examples:
death/decease; house/domicile; bruise/contusion; opening/
aperture; dry/desiccate; false teeth/artificial dentures;
milk teeth/deciduous dentition.
(14.) A is preferable to B because A is or is not EUPHEMISTIC.
Examples:
toilet/bathroom; homosexual/gay; die/pass away; drunk/
stoned; insanity/mental disorder; rat-catcher/rodent
officer; slaughterhouse/abattoir; strike/industrial action.
(15) A is preferable to B because A is or is not FIGURATIVE.
Figurativeness is obviously a matter of degree. By FIGURATIVE
senses here are meant all 'extended' senses such that the senses
from which they were derived are still part of the synchronic system
of English and that the link between the more basic sense and the
extended sense is still obvious. There is an obvious connection
between this dimension and the dimension of 'reflected meaning',
which we will come to presently. Examples, where the second item
in each pair is FIGURATIVE:
dishonest/crooked; reckless/blind; beginning/dawn, thresh¬
old; stupid/dense, thick; result/fruit; depend/hinge;
invent/coin (a word); reflect/mirror; excel/shine; desire/
thirst (for knowledge); uncontrolled/unbridled; difficult/
uphill; means/vehicle, conceal/veil; inexperienced/green;
addicted/hooked; imitate/ape; search/comb.
(16) A is preferable to B because A is or is not HUMOROUS (or
FACETIOUS).
Examples, where the second item is HUMOROUS:
head/pear; die/kick the bucket.
((Ill) Emotive (or attitudinal) meaning
(17) A is preferable to B because A is FAVOURABLE, UNFAVOURABLE, or
NEUTRAL.
(a) Examples where descriptive meaning remains the same (?):
policeman (NEUTRAL)/fuzz (UNFAVOURABLE); cherub (FAVOURABLE)/
child (NEUTRAL)/brat (UNFAVOURABLE).
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(b) Examples where descriptive meaning undergoes some change:
prudent (FAVOURABLE)/cowardly (UNFAVOURABLE); brave (FA¬
VOURABLE )/foolhardy (UNFAVOURABLE); statesman (FAVOURABLE)/
politician (NEUTRAL or UNFAVOURABLE); thrifty (FAVOURABLE)/
economical (NEUTRAL)/stingy (UNFAVOURABLE); liberty (FA¬
VOURABLE or NEUTRAL)/license (UNFAVOURABLE).
(IV) Associations
(18) A is preferable to B because A has or does not have certain
associations owing to its reflected meaning.
In Leech's words:
Reflected meaning is the meaning which arises in cases of
multiple conceptual meaning, when one sense of a word forms
part of our response to another sense (1974.: 19).
There is a difference of view as regards the extent to which one
sense of a lexeme can be 'reflected' onto another sense. Thus, in
Bennett's view, "it seems likely ... that reflected meaning is only
carried over from a more concrete sense to a less concrete sense"
(1968: 167). It 3eems to be suggested by Baldinger, however, that
any sense of a lexeme can be reflected onto any other sense of the
same lexeme, when he says:
Two monemes (lexemes or morphemes) which have two or more
meanings are never absolutely synonymous, although one may
use them with the same meaning (or one of the meanings)
that they have in common, because the other meanings are
still potentially present (1980: 220).
Both views, I think, are partly true. This will become clear as
soon as we make the following distinction. On the one hand, there
is the reflection of one sense upon another as a subconscious
motivation on the part of the addresser or a subconscious response
on the part of the addressee. On the other hand, there is the
conscious manipulation of what Baldinger calls the 'samasiological
field' of a word or the conscious response to such manipulation.
V/hen reflected meaning is conceived in the first way, Bennett
is likely to be correct, though I think that the salience of a sense
is more relevant than its concreteness and that the reflected sense
need not be more salient (or concrete) than the reflecting sense as
long as the former is salient (or concrete) to the necessary extent
(cf. Leech, 1974: 19).
When reflected meaning is conceived in the second way, Baldinger
is undoubtedly right. However, the conscious manipulation of and
response to potential reflected meaning is a rare phenomenon. As
Leech says:
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Only in poetry, which invites a heightened sensitivity to
language in all respects, do we find reflected meaning
operating in less obviously favourable circumstances (1974.: 19)»
Reflected meaning may be desirable and actively sought, or it
may be undesirable and consciously avoided. Here is an example of
the former situation from Leech:
Are limbs, so dear-achieved, are sides
Full-nerved - still warm - too hard to stir?
In these lines from Futility, a poem on a dead soldier,
Wilfred Owen overtly uses the word dear in the sense of
'expensive(ly)', but also alludes, one feels in the
context of the poem, to the sense 'beloved' (1974: 19).
The following examples of the latter situation also come from Leech:
The case where reflected meaning intrudes through sheer
strength of emotive suggestion is most strikingly illus¬
trated by words which have a taboo meaning. Since their
popularization in senses connected with the physiology of
sex, it has become increasingly difficult to use terms
like intercourse. ejaculation, and erection in 'innocent'
senses without conjuring up their sexual associations
(1974: 19).
(19) A is preferable to B because A has or does not have certain
associations owing to it formal identity (homonym) with or similar¬
ity to another lexeme, whose meaning, and perhaps even associations,
will thus be evoked.
If we stretch the definition of reflected meaning a little, we
are in a way still dealing with reflected meaning, though here we
move beyond the boundaries of individual lexemes or semasiological
fields. In the present case, associations are still the result of
meaning 'reflected' from an identifiable source. The difference
is that the source is not another sense of the same lexeme, but a
lexeme identical or similar in form or sound regardless of its
word-class, i.e. a (near) homonym or homophone. Arising from this
difference is the probable further difference that the associations
caused in these ways tend to be weaker than reflected meaning
proper, particularly under the first conception.
To illustrate associations as a result of formal identity with
a hypothetical example, it is possible to conceive a context in
which 'sound' is preferred to 'good' in 'give somebody a
beating' because of its formal identity with 'sound' meaning "that
which is or can be heard".
In fact, punning depends on such associations. Thus, a plausible
contextualization of the above example would be: 'I know John's
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father gave him a sound beating, because I could hear it from the
next room'•
(20) A is preferable to B because A has or does not have certain
associations owing to contexts in which it has occurred.
Associations of this type come largely under what Hofmann refers
to as 'experiential meaning':
The experiential meaning of a word is the experiences that
a person has had in which the word has occurred. Depending
on one's beliefs about neurology, it may be defined as all
of the experiences that the individual has had or just the
ones that he can recall that he has had (1976: 7; cf. also
Winter, 1969: 4-81-2).
Thus a person may prefer one synonym to another because it has been
used on one or more occasions of special significance for him.
However, this is a marginal dimension, since experiential meaning
is not intersubjective and is not accessible to the addressee. To
the extent that experiential meaning is intersubjective, it becomes
subsumed under other categories, such as diatypic varieties or
emotive meaning.
(V) Shape and sound
(21) A is preferable to B because it has certain aesthetic effects
owing to its phonetic or graphetic features, or because it fits a
particular phonetic or graphetic pattern, e.g. rhyme, alliteration,
eye-rhyme (cf. Baldinger, 1980: 224.; Nash, 1980: 87-8; Ullmann, 1962:
129-30; 196A: 111).
(22) A is preferable to B because it fits a particular pattern of
intonation or rhythm, e.g. metre (cf. Baldinger, 1980: 226; Nash,
1980: 81 & 88; Ullmann, 1964: 103).
(23) A is preferable to B because of its length.
For example,
This sort of language is no doubt pardonable in headlines
where as many stimulating words as possible must be crowded
into spaces so small that treaties have had to become pacts:
ambassadors, envoys: investigations. probes; and all forms
of human enterprise, bids (Gowers, 1977: 138).
(VI) Principles of style and rhetoric
(24) A is preferable to A because it fits a pattern of lexical
reiteration (cf. Nash, 1980: 46-8).
(25) A is preferable to B because it fits a pattern of lexical
variation (cf, Nash, 1980: 48-53; Ullmann, 1962: 152).
(26) A is preferable to B because it fits a rhetorical scheme, i.e.
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recursion, inversion (cf. Nash, 1980: 82-3).
(VII) Pragmatic factors, e.g.
(27) A is preferable to B because it is or is not believed to be
known to the addressee(s).
(VIII) Prescriptive .judgements of correctness or appropriateness
(28) A is preferable to B because it is judged by the speaker him¬
self, or is known by the speaker to be judged by some higher 'auth¬
ority' , to be the correct or appropriate word to use.
Here are two examples from Gowers:
The use of alternative for such words as other, new.
revised or fresh is rife. Perhaps this is due to infection
spread by the cliche alternative accommodation.
The Minister regrets that he will not be able to hold
the Conference arranged for the 15th March. Members will
be informed as soon as alternative arrangements have been
made.
Alternative must imply a choice between two or more
things. Other is the right word here (1977: 145).
The proper meaning of to claim is to demand recognition
of a right. But the fight to prevent it from usurping the
place of assert has been lost in America and seems likely
to be lost here also, especially as the BBC have surrendered
without a struggle. Here are some recent examples from this
country:
The police took statements from about forty people who
claimed that they had seen the gunmen in different parts of
the city.
The Statement Department claims that discrimination is
being shown against the American film industry.
• • •
The enlargement of claim ought to be deplored by all
those who like to treat words as tools of precision, and to
keep their edges sharp. Why should claim, which has its own
useful job to do, claim a job that is already being effi¬
ciently done by others? Perhaps the idea underlying this
usage is that the writer claims credence for an improbable
or unverified assertion (1977: 147).
Our concern in this chapter has been with differences between
synonyms. If we now attach equal weight, as we did earlier, to
the fact that words can function synonymously despite their dif¬
ferences, there emerge two complementary functions which synonyms
can serve in everyday communication. They add flexibility to the
language by enabling its users to express the same meaning by different
means. At the same time, they add variety and expressiveness to
the language by enabling its users to exercise stylistic choices
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in conveying the same meaning,
functions that make synonymy an
enon in everyday communication,
importance of synonymy that has
It is these two complementary
interesting and important phenom-
and it is an awareness of the




To bring this study to a close, here is a chapter-by-chapter
summary of what I have done.
Chapter 1
It has long been a matter of controversy whether synonymy exists
in natural language. To clarify the issues involved I have drawn
an explicit distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori
approach to synonymy. This distinction, I believe, throws new
light on the controversy and points the way, if not to a resolution
of the controversy, at least to a basis on which scholars may agree
to differ where there is a conflict of purpose. For my part I have
argued, as far as linguistic semantics is concerned, in favour of
the a posteriori approach, whereby synonymy is treated as an
empirical phenomenon which it is the task of linguistic semantics
to explicate.
Chapter 2
I have, for the purpose of explicating synonymy in the remaining
chapters of Part One, divided the question of what synonymy is into
JZ;
a number of component questions with the aid of^simple formula.
These questions are of no novelty, but I have recast them and brought
them together in what I hope is a more explicit and more systematic
way. This conscious 'divide and rule' procedure has the double
advantage of focusing our attention more closely on questions
which may otherwise be neglected and of enabling us to identify the
locus of controversies more precisely.
Chapter 3
This chapter is concerned with the question: On what level(s)
of lexical unit is synonymy a meaning-relation? I have (1) ident¬
ified three levels of lexical unit, (2) uncovered a number of
difficulties and unjustifiable assumptions which apply to existing
conceptions of sense-synonymy, (3) argued against treating lexeme-
synonymy or sense-synonymy as the sole legitimate levels of syn¬




This chapter, complementary to the last one, is concerned with
the question of what is the best way of stating instances of syn¬
onymy. I have tried, in particular, to find a way of making
sense-synonymy statements which avoid those difficulties which, as
we have found in Chapter 3, vitiate existing conceptions of sense-
synonymy. The proposed solution consists in (a) conceiving sense-
synonymy statements as the merging of occurrence-synonymy statements,
(b) treating sense-synonymy statements as a 'tool' for achieving
descriptive economy, to be used where applicable, and (c) placing
constraints on sense-synonymy statements to ensure their adequacy.
Chapter 5
I have (l) concluded from the previous chapters that what
remains to be done (except one thing) as regards the explication of
synonymy is to establish criteria of occurrence-synonymy, (2) laid
down certain preconditions which such criteria have to satisfy to
count as adequate, and (3) sharply distinguished interchangeability
and sameness of meaning as two separate criteria of synonymy and
given to each what I see as its due weight.
Chapter 6
This chapter is concerned with establishing the synonymy
criterion of interchangeability. I have (1) drawn attention to the
dependence of interchangeability on acceptability, (2) distinguished
various types of acceptability, (3) established a criterion of
interchangeability in terms of the types of acceptability it entails,
and (4.) acknowledged the difficulty of applying this criterion in
practice by drawing attention to and analysing the indeterminacy of
acceptability judgements.
Chapter 7
This chapter is concerned with establishing the synonymy cri¬
terion of sameness of meaning. I have (l) examined two accounts
of bilateral implication, (2) identified two fundamental respects
in which they differ both in conception and as regards their con¬
sequences, (3) established a criterion of sameness of meaning by
choosing between the two sets of alternatives, (4) discussed, by
way of defending the alternatives thus chosen, (a) the question of
meaning versus reference and (b) degrees of sameness of meaning,
and (5) completed the mechanism for deriving sense-synonymy and
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lexeme-synonymy criteria from occurrence-synonymy criteria by
eliminating 'recalcitrant' sentences.
Chapter 8
This chapter forms a transition from the explication of synonymy
to its description. I. have (1), by bringing together the conse¬
quences of certain conclusions reached in previous chapters, dis¬
tinguished three types of synonyms and (2), in the light of this
classification, identified three tasks in the description of synonymy.
Chapter 9
This chapter is concerned with accounting for the propria between
otherwise synonymous senses. I have distinguished three types of
propria, due respectively to grammatical, semantic and purely collo¬
cational unacceptability.
Chapter 10
This chapter complements the preceding one by seeking to account
for the communis between otherwise non-synonymous senses. I have
(l) supplied an explanation of such communis be distinguishing
between potential and actual meaning and by subsequently treating
actual meaning as a function of potential meaning interacting with
sentence/context, and (2) defended potential and actual meaning
against the contextualist and autonomist views of meaning respect¬
ively.
Chapter 11
This chapter is concerned with classifying and describing
dimensions of communicatively relevant difference between synonyms.
I have (1) provided a general rationale and descriptive framework
for this purpose, (2) grouped the various dimensions into a number
of categories, and (3) offered an inventory of the dimensions.
It only remains for me to express the hope that the sum total of
these chapters, despite their tentativeness and many shortcomings,
is a useful synthesis which, on the one hand, has clarified or
shed fresh light on old questions and which, on the other hand,
has raised and suggested answers to new ones.
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